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Funding Public Participation In Agency
Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission
Experience
BARRY B. BOYER*
Reflecting the recent political and economic climate, both Congress and
the business community increasingly have scrutinized and criticized
agency funding of public participation in administrative proceedings.
They have charged that these funding programs represent expensive,
one-sided subsidies for proponents of additional regulation. To deter-
mine the validiy of this and other criticisms, Professor Boyer examines
the Federal Trade Commission's compensation provision, its implemen-
tation over a four-year period, and its effects on rulemaking proceed-
ings. Professor Boyer concludes that much of the criticism directed at
the Commission was a result of the agency's limited resources, and the
fundamental tension between the compensation statute's "technocratic"
and 'democratic" objectives. Professor Boyer notes that without
clearer legislative direction as to the balance. desired between these com-
peting values, the ultimate success of the Federal Trade Commission's
funding program is indeterminable.
* Professor and Associate Dean, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at
Buffalo. A.B. 1966, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
This study was funded by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The Confer-
ence's support made possible not only the collection of detailed data, but also the assistance of many
people in analysis and interpretation. Deserving special mention for their many contributions are James
V. DeLong and David B.H. Martin, Research Directors of the Conference during the period covered by
this study; Professor Bliss Cartwright, who had primary responsibility for design of the witness ques-
tionnaire and analysis of the responses; Sarah Flanagan and Michael Bowers of the Conference staflr
and Jamie M. Bennett, Research Manager for the ACUS study of Trade Regulation Rulemaking dur-
ing the early phases of the project. The staff of the Federal Trade Commission, particularly Bonnie
Naradzay, Special Assistant for Public Participation, and Barry Rubin, Assistant General Counsel,
were extremely helpful and candid in providing information about the functioning of the compensation
program. As is customary, neither the Administrative Conference nor any of these individuals is re-
sponsible for errors and omissions in the article.
To preserve the confidentiality of the FTC, its members, and the applicants for compensation, some
documentary sources are identified only by the title of Confidential Document or Staff Evaluation, and
by catalogue numbers designated by the author. The editors of the Georgetown Law Journal have relied
upon the author to verify the accuracy of statements in these documents. Any inquiries regarding these
documents should be directed to the author, who must consult the FTC as to the disclosure of any
confidential agency information.
Photocopies of all letters, applications for compensation, and interview memoranda cited in the arti-
cle are on file at the Georgetown Law Journal.
Unless otherwise indicated, all tables, charts, and appendices have been derived by the author from
information obtained through the witness survey.
The following acronyms used throughout the article are assigned the meanings below:
ACUS-Administrative Conference of the United States
BCP-Bureau of Consumer Protection
FTC-Federal Trade Commission
TRR-Trade Regulation Rule
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PART ONE: IMPLEMENTATION
I. INTRODUCTION: THE UNEXPECTED PROGRAM
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) became the first major fed-
eral regulatory agency' possessing explicit statutory authority to fund public
participation in agency proceedings. The Magnuson-Moss Act,2 which con-
firmed and expanded the agency's power to issue trade regulation rules
(TRR's) supported by strong legal sanctions,3 also empowered the FTC to
"provide compensation for reasonable attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and
other costs of participating" in rulemaking proceedings.4 The FTC had
neither sought nor anticipated this grant of authority, and in many respects
lacked both the organizational structure and experience to utilize it effectively.
The direct funding program initially made few demands on agency resources,
and operated in relative obscurity. By 1979, however, the political climate had
changed dramatically. The Magnuson-Moss compensation plan became a ma-
jor issue in the bitter controversy over the future role of the FTC and the
direction of regulatory reform.
5
Prior to passage of the Magnuson-Moss compensation authority, numerous
legal and administrative victories had established broad rights of public partic-
ipation in agency proceedings. 6 By the mid-1970's, however, pnvate funding
of such participation was declining. Private foundations that had provided
"seed money" to establish advocacy groups began to limit their grants to par-
ticular program areas.7 In 1975, the Supreme Court held that "fee-shifting"
arrangements that imposed the costs of public interest participation on the reg-
ulated industry required specific legislative approval." In addition, legislative
1. See generally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION,
VOL III: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. Doc. No. 71, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 91-97 (1977).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(h)(1), 88 Stat. 2183-2203 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)
(1976)). The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 amended the FTC's compensation
authority and the rulemaking provisions to which it relates. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
3. Until the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FTC's
authority to issue substantive consumer protection rules in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the agency's power to issue trade regulation rules (TRR's) with the
force and effect of law had been in doubt. See generally A.L. FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS (2d
ed. paper 1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(l) (1976).
5. See notes 21, 71 & 154 infra (reporting comments by members of Congress and congressional
response thereto).
6. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (responsible representatives of listening public have standing as parties in interest to intervene
and to contest renewal of broadcast license before FCC). The ACUS generally supported the liberali-
zation of the public's right to participate in administrative proceedings, subject to adequate controls
against tactics of delay or obstruction. 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1981) (Public Participation inAdministrative
Hearings, Recommendation 71-6). See also Cramton, The h y, Where and How of Broadened Public
Particpation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Partiipatlon in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
7. See generally COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FI-
NANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 234-37 (1976) [hereinafter FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW]; Foster, Playing It Safe on $11 Million,4 Year, JURIS DOCTOR, June-July 1973, at 9-12, 15; Jaffe,
Public Interest Law_-Five Years Later, 62 A.B.A.J. 982 (1976); Terris, Hard Times Ahead For Public
Interest Law, JuRIs DOCTOR, July-August 1974, at 22.
8. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Socy, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which had been reversed by the Supreme Court in the
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proposals to create a federal Consumer Advocacy Agency were defeated de-
spite vigorous lobbying efforts by their proponents and strong support from the
Carter Administration.9 Thus, compensation programs like that of the
Magnuson-Moss Act became increasingly important'0 to the continued effec-
tiveness of the public interest movement."
Many agencies were uncertain whether the authority to establish compensa-
tion programs was implied under existing authorization and appropriations
statutes,' 2 and they responded in markedly different ways to public partici-
Alyeska decision, later concluded that the,4eska rationale governed questions of the agencies' power
to order fee-shifting; thus, neither a court nor an agency could require payment of an adverse party's
attorneys' fees without explicit congressional authorization. Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (Supp. III 1979), is a
statute authorizing such fee-shifting.
9. See generally N.Y. Times, April 7, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 2; id, June 30, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 3; id,
Nov, 2, 1977, § A, at 19, col. 6.
10. Another funding approach which gained at least limited acceptance is the "check-off" system, in
which customers of regulated utilities authorize automatic additions to their bills to support public
interest advocacy. See generally Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movemen/s,
in THE ROLE OF RESEARCH IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 97, 101-02 (L. Brickman & R.
Lempert eds., paper ed. 1976). Many of the Nader-inspired public interest research groups (PIRG's)
are supported by similar check-off systems attached to student tuition and fees at colleges and universi-
ties.
In addition, there was a limited revival of interest in the establishment of separate consumer advo-
cacy offices within the agencies-an idea that traces back at least to the New Deal. See general y Nel-
son, Representation ofthe Consumer Interest in the Federal Government, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 151
(1939). For discussions of more contemporary versions of this approach, see also REPORT BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION FOR GREATER MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS 23-24 (1979) (CED-79-
107); Bloch & Stein, The Public Counsel Concept in Practice: The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 218-21 (1975); Murphy & Hoffman, Current Modelsfor Improving
Public Representation in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 391, 402-07 (1976); Note, Federal
,4gency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1819-22 (1975).
11. The term "public interest movement" refers to the loose coalition of consumer, environmental,
and similar constituency groups that arose in the 1960's. Use of the term is not intended to express an
opinion on the much-debated question whether these advocacy groups actually do serve "the public
interest." The term is used here as a shorthand reference to constituency or membership organizations
whose supporters typically do not have a sufficiently large and individualized economic stake in the
outcome of an administrative or judicial proceeding to make individual participation economically
attractive. "Collective goods organizations" might be a more accurate description of such groups, but
the term has not entered the general usage. See notes 191-92 infra and accompanying text (discussing
consumer protection as "collective good"). For historical discussions of the emergence of these advo-
cacy groups, see FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 7, at 19-70; F. MARKS, K. LESWING &
B. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-45 (1972); Rabin,
Lawyers in Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209-27 (1976).
The non-legal aspects of the public interest movement are described in J. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE
PEOPLE (paper ed. 1977).
12. Whether agencies had such implied authority proved a surprisingly difficult question to answer.
At the instigation of the FTC, the Comptroller General had issued a series of rulings concluding that
many of the major regulatory agencies did have implied power at least in some circumstances. See
Note, Funding Public Particioation in Agency Proceedings, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 981, 984-88 (1978) (dis-
cussing Comptroller's criteria for determining when compensation appropriate).
In 1969, the FTC ruled that it would not prosecute cease-and-desist cases against indigent respon-
dents because an unrepresented litigant might be denied due process of law. In re American Chinchilla
Corp., 76 F.T.C. 1016, 1034-39 (1969). The Commission avoided the issue of its authority to provide
compensation in American Chinchilla by dismissing the complaint against the respondent. Id at 1039.
A subsequent case involving an indigency claim, however, forced the agency to consider the question.
See In re Universe Chemicals, Inc., 77 F.T.C. 598, 635-36 (1970). The agency responded by developing
more detailed procedures for passing upon indigency claims, id at 165 1-54 (interlocutory order requir-
ing affidavit of financial status), by arranging for volunteer counsel through the American Bar Associa-
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pants' funding requests.' 3 Bills designed to end this confusion by extending
direct funding authority across a broad spectrum of regulatory agencies and
tion's Section on Antitrust Law, id at 1673-74 (interlocutory order), and by issuing a policy statement
that institutionalized these approaches. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,998 (1970).
At about the same time, Students Opposing Unfair Practices (SOUP), a public interest group that
had intervened in an FTC deceptive practices case to argue for a stronger remedy, petitioned the Com-
mission to reimburse the group for some of its expenses. In re Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 77
F.T.C. 1666, 1667-70 (1970) (opinion and order granting limited intervention). See also In re Campbel
Coup [sic] Co., 77 F.T.C. 664, 671 (1970) (denial of SOUP's request for further intervention; grant of
free transcript instead). SOUP requested that they be granted leave to proceed infarmapauper/s and
that the Commission provide them with three kinds of financial assistance: exemption from the rules
that multiple copies of documents be filed, reimbursement of discovery expenses, and payment of wit-
ness fees by the FTC. Inre Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 78 F.T.C. 1572 (1971) (interlocutory order).
The Commission divided sharply on whether it would be legal to use agency funds for such purposes.
Therefore, the agency requested a formal ruling from the Comptroller General defining the scope of its
authority to compensate participants. Id at 1573. The Comptroller responded that the FTC could use
its appropriations to underwrite the travel and subsistence expenses, transcript costs, attorneys' ex-
penses, and witness fees of impecunious respondents and intervenors, if the agency found that the
expenditures were necessary to ensure full and fair consideration of a pending matter. In other words,
the Commission had "reasonable discretion" to determine what constituted "necessary expenses"
within the meaning of the appropriations statutes. Public Participation in FederalAgency Proceedings:
Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Conn.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1976) '(opinion of the Comptroller General) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 2715].
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, disagreed with the Comptroller
General. In the prolonged Greene County litigation, the court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (formerly known as the Federal Power Commission) could not reimburse intervenors in a
licensing hearing without specific congressional approval. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 559 F.2d 1237, 1239 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The
court stated: "The authority of a Commission to disburse funds must come from Congress... and it is
for Congress, not the Comptroller General, to set the conditions under which payments, if any, should
be made." Id at 1239.
Agency uncertainty regarding the scope of existing funding authority was aggravated by two addi-
tional factors. First, the Greene County controversy had been pending before the FPC and the courts
for approximately a decade before certiorari finally was denied. Brief for the Federal Power Commis-
sion on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-8, Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Second, the Department of Justice refused to follow the Second Circuit's hold-
ing, stating that Greene County should be limited to its facts. See Legal Times of Washington, June 26,
1978, at 4, col. 3 (Attorney General Bell reaffirms commitment to allow agencies broad discretion to
award attorneys' fees to participants in proceedings). An official at the Justice Department stated that:
Because the holding of the Second Circuit in Greene County involved only a construction
given to the Federal Power Act ... we think it clear that no department or agency. . . other
than possibly FERC is bound by that holding. Nor do we think that the Second Circuit...
announced a principle of law broad enough to cover other departments and agencies.
Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States
Dep't of Justice to Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, United States Dep't of Transportation 2
(March 1, 1978).
13. Some agencies launched experimental "implied authority" funding programs. See, e.g., 43 Fed.
Reg. 23,560 (1978) (Consumer Product Safety Commission, Interim Policies and Procedures for Tem-
porary Program); 43 Fed. Reg. 17,806 (1978) (Final Rule, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, United States Dep't of Commerce); 42 Fed. Reg. 2,864 (1977) (United States Dep't of
Transportation, National Highwa Traffic Safety Administration, Final Rule and Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 23,044 (1979) (Food and Drug Administration, Proposed
Rule); 44 Fed. Reg. 17,507 (1979) (United States Dep't of Agriculture, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing); 43 Fed. Reg. 30,834 (1978) (Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Inquiry). In a court
challenge decided after the Greene County case, the Department of Agriculture successfully defended
its power to support public participation. Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
459 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.D.C. 1978) (even in absence of explicit statutory authority, federal agency can
fund study by consumer group concerning probable impact of proposed rules on consumers),
Other agencies refused to act without a clearer expression of congressional support. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's statement accompanying its decision not to establish a direct funding pro-
gram expressed this view in part:
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proceedings reached the committee hearing stage in the Ninety-Fourth and
Ninety-Fifth Congresses. 14 These direct funding proposals gained some influ-
ential supporters. Prestigious professional groups endorsed the concept of sup-
port for public participation.15 The Carter Administration's regulatory reform
program' 6 incorporated direct funding authority as a major feature, as did sev-
eral related proposals in the Ninety-Sixth Congress.' 7 Despite these efforts,
however, by the late 1970's a strong backlash had developed against direct
funding in general and the FTC's program in particular.
To the regulatory targets-the firms, trade associations, and individuals sub-
Funding involves the direct transfer of public money to support a private viewpoint; a view-
point which is not subject to control or oversight by the public's elected representatives and
which may or may not reflect the views of many members of the public.. .. From our
perspective, we lack not only the statutory authority to provide funding, but we also find, as a
policy matter, that a non-elected regulatory commission is not the proper institution to expend
public funds in this fashion absent express Congressional authorization.
41 Fed. Reg. 50,831 (1976).
14. See, e.g., S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to amend Administrative Procedure Act to permit
awards of reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses for public participation in federal agency pro-
ceedings); S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (same); H.R. 8798, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (same);
H.R. 3361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (same); H.R. 13,901, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (same). See
generally Hearings on S. 2715, supra note 12.
15. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FED-
ERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 124-26 (Exposure Draft 1978); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUB-
LIC INTEREST PRACTICE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPLEMENTING THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC
INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION (1977); Public Interest Law: Down But Not Out, 63 A.B.A.J. 161
(1977); Statement of Sara-Ann Determan, Member, Special Committee on Public Interest Practice,
American Bar Association, before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Agency Proceedings (July 20, 1979). See also Committee on Federal Legislation, Attor-
neys Feesfor Public Interest Participation in FederalAgency Proceedings, 31 RECORD OF THE ASs'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N. Y. 675 (1976). This Committee concluded that the desirability of funding
such participation was no longer open to dispute:
In the last decade Congress has held over 25 hearings dealing with the need for greater
public participation in the administrative process. The record compiled establishes that
greater public participation in agency proceedings will be of great value to a fair determina-
tion of the overall public interest ....
... A consensus appears to have been reached that the agencies will perform more expertly
in the public interest if they receive input from independent sources who have no significant
economic stake in the outcome of the proceedings.
Balance among the viewpoints expressed before federal agencies is essential.
Id at 679-80.
16. See S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 302 (1979) (each agency to administer own funding program
with ACUS reporting to President on agencies that fail to make effective use of compensation author-
ity). Upon defeat of the consumer advocacy agency bill, the Carter Administration made several efforts
to increase consumer advocacy. One step was to increase the policy-making power of in-house con-
sumer advocate, Esther Peterson. Wash. Post, May 1, 1978, § D, at 9, col. 1. According to newspaper
accounts, this approach was functionally similar in some ways to the proposed consumer advocacy
agency: "Peterson will now be able to express her opinion on any issue that would affect consumers
before the President's decision memorandum on that issue is prepared. . .She will report on the effect
any administrative action would have on consumers ...." Id
In addition, the Administration's 1978 Executive Order on Improving Government Regulations di-
rected the agencies to "give the public an early and meaningful opportunity to participate in the devel-
opment of agency regulations." Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661-62 (1978). Subsequently,
the President issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies urging them to
examine the scope of their existing power to compensate public participants, and to consult with the
White House staff concerning the existence and use of this authority. Memorandum from the President
on Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 867 (1979).
17. E. g, S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 403 (1979) (ACUS provides financial assistance); S. 1291,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1979) (ACUS provides financial assistance after consultation with agency);
H.R. 254, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 201 (1979) (each agency to administer own funding program).
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ject to rules written by the FTC and other agencies-the costs of regulation
became an issue of great practical and symbolic importance. Aroused by the
wave of safety, environmental, and consumer protection rules issued during
the 1970's, and supported by a growing body of scholarship that questioned the
basic purposes and effects of regulation,' 8 the business community resisted
with increasing vigor and success what it considered to be excessive or mis-
guided regulation. This resistance was most apparent in demands for a regula-
tory analysis requirement that would force agencies to make detailed,
systematic cost-benefit assessments of proposed regulations,' 9 but the business
community also resented the direct costs of participating in the administrative
process. As regulators attempted to control more aspects of business behavior,
the expense of complying with subpoenas, of submitting required reports, and
of hiring lawyers and experts to defend against particular agency proposals
mounted steadily. In this setting, the Magnuson-Moss compensation program
easily was viewed by the regulated as a one-sided support system for oppo-
nents invariably seeking more onerous regulation.
20
This theme was played repeatedly in legislative debates.2 ' The compensa-
tion program was publicly denounced as a "slush fund"22 that the FTC used to
18. See generally G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (paper ed.
1975); Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure. Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reorm, 92
HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979).
19. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (requiring agencies to pre-
pare preliminary and final regulatory flexibility analyses for purpose of minimizing economic impact of
rules on small businesses); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1978) (directing executive depart-
ments to prepare regulatory analysis of major rules).
20. For example, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States denounced the program in the
following terms:
Evidence had begun to surface that the agency was using the taxpayers' money to "stack the
record" in rulemaking proceedings by donating hundreds of thousands of dollars to biased
"public interest" groups. These groups in turn merely parroted the FTC staff opinions in
support of a proposed rule at public hearings.
REGULATORY ACTION NETWORK WASHINGTON WATCH 5 (No. 3 March, 1980).
21. See [1979] 907 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 5, § A. Senator Dale Bumpers, Demo-
crat from Arkansas asked: "Aren't all those groups [that were funded in the Children's Advertising
rulemaking] in favor of the FTC rule proposal?" Id FTC officials admitted that the seven funded
groups did favor some action, but noted that they had disagreed about the specific remedy. Id
[Senator] Danforth blasted the FTC for funding groups friendly to agency positions, and he
questioned selection procedures. "How much of your money goes to people who tell the
Commission you're all wet? he demanded of the four commissioners and the dozen FTC staff
members seated before him. His line of questioning was joined in by Subcommittee Chair-
man Wendell Ford (D-Ky), who has authorized his staff to undertake a very close look at the
program .... Commerce Committee Chairman Howard Cannon (D-Nev) also has raised
questions about the program in a recent letter to the FTC.
[1979] 912 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 13, § A.
22. James J. Kilpatrick coined the phrase in a syndicated column that said in part:
Ninety percent of the [FTC compensation] money has gone to "public interest" groups whose
whole reason for being is to encourage more federal rules and regulations.
The FTC has no more business paying tax funds to witnesses than a committee of Congress
would have in paying Ralph Nader to testify on a consumer protection bill. The rule ought to
be that all witnesses stand equally at the bar, but with the FTC's slush fund, some are more
equal than others.
Buffalo Evening News, June 1, 1979, at 20, cols. 6-7.
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maintain a stable of "kept critics."' 23 Corrective legislation was thought neces-
sary to achieve the original goal of providing public participation funding for
"the needy, not the greedy." 24 The FTC and its dwindling circle of supporters
defended the compensation program with equal vigor, albeit with less colorful
rhetoric.25 In the end, the direct funding authority survived the numerous
1980 amendments to the FTC Act with only a few additional limits on the
agency's discretion.26 These limitations were not the worst political setback
the FTC suffered during this period,27 but they reflected the shadow of suspi-
cion the legislative oversight process had cast not only on the FTC's adminis-
tration of the program, but also on the concept of compensating public
participants in administrative proceedings.
This article evaluates the extent to which this criticism of the FTC and its
direct funding program was justified. It examines the FTC's implementation
of the compensation program and the program's effects, from its enactment in
1975 through January, 1979.28 First, the article discusses the FTC's adminis-
23. [1980] 951 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 8-9, § A (quote attributed to Sen. Alan K.
Simpson).
24. Id
25. See [1979] 931 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 26, § A (strong public presence necessary
in regulatory proceedings that often proceed with only perfunctory public presence); [1979] 912 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 12-13, § A (Commissioner Pertschuk defending public participation
funding as "the single most important action we have taken to improve the regulatory process"); [1979]
907 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 5, § A (funding program necessary to balance advocacy
before Commission).
The FTC's general approach in defending the program is reflected in the following excerpt from a
guest opinion column written by Chairman Michael Pertschuk in The Washington Post:
[The] Chamber of Commerce, the toy manufacturers and some congressmen have generously
offered to relieve us of the necessity of having to listen to consumers and small business advo-
cates by urging termination of the public participation program ....
This would leave the opportunity of criticizing our staffs proposals to those business inter-
ests that can afford to do so (helped, of course, by their right to deduct the cost of whatever
they spend from their taxable income) ....
As an individual commissioner, I know that I have benefited enormously from this clash of
advocacy [that the program makes possible].
Wash. Post, June 26, 1979, § A, at 19, col. 6.
26. The amendments stipulate that no person can receive more than $75,000 for participation in any
single rulemaking proceeding, and no more than $50,000 in any fiscal year. They ago require that 25%
of the appropriated compensation fund be set aside for small business, and they direct the Commission
to create a special small business outreach program. The FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, § 10, 94 Stat. 374.
27. At one point the FTC's appropriation lapsed, and the agency was forced to shut down. See
Brown, FTC Temporarily Closedin Budget Dispute, Wash. Post, May 1, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 1. The FTC
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374, imposes various new substantive and
procedural checks on the agency's power to issue trade regulation rules. Among other restrictions, the
Improvements Act limits the FTC's ability to use unfairness theories in rulemaking, id § 1 l(b), places
special restrictions or bans on several pending proceedings, id §§ 7, 11, 19, requires the agency to
prepare a preliminary and final regulatory analysis of rules, id § 15, directs the agency to publish and
transmit to Congress an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, id § 8, and subjects final rules to a
legislative veto. Id § 21.
28. This article relied on several data sources to reach its conclusions: agency records and documents
relating to the compensation program, observations of meetings and rulemaking hearings, interviews
with agency staff members and outside participants, and responses to a survey questionnaire by wit-
nesses in several proceedings in which compensation was awarded.
The January, 1979 cutoff point was established primarily because the agency supporting this study,
the Administrative Conference of the United States, required sufficient lead time to produce and evalu-
19811
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tration of the compensation program and the criteria and procedures the
agency developed for awarding funding to public intervenors. This initial sec-
tion also examines the compensation statute and notes the ambiguity of pur-
pose inherent in its language. This examination suggests that a fundamental
tension between the "technocratic" and "democratic" objectives of the statute
hampered the FTC's development of funding criteria. The democratic and
technocratic views of the rulemaking process imply different approaches to de-
fining the types of persons and activities that should be funded, and the kinds
of controls that should be established over their participation. The article ar-
gues that without consensus or clear legislative guidance on the focus of the
compensation statute, the FTC was inevitably vulnerable to criticism.
Second, the article evaluates the FTC's actual implementation of the pro-
gram. The picture that emerges from this examination of the program's imple-
mentation is more complex and ambiguous than the generalities of the
political debate. This second section concludes that in administrative terms,
the FTC's implementation efforts were at least partially successful; many of the
Commission's difficulties were attributable to limited resources, and many of
these deficiencies were cured by 1979. Moreover, the fundamental ambiva-
lence in the statute and in the theory of public participation in rulemaking that
evolved in the 1970's left the FTC with questions which had no right answers.
Finally, the article attempts to assess the effects of the compensation pro-
gram, and concludes that the plan's ultimate success or failure is impossible to
establish because of the obscurity of its objectives. Assuming that a major
purpose of the drafters was balanced participation by all competing interests in
rulemaking proceedings, this final section analyzes the program's effect upon
balanced advocacy and upon final agency decisions. Although compensated
participants performed as competently as their uncompensated counterparts in
the proceedings studied, the article concludes that it is impossible to determine
whether the compensated participants affected the FTC's final rules because
there is no objective measure of a participant's influence on the final results of
a rulemaking proceeding. In addition, this section concludes that direct fund-
ing programs are not likely to succeed, or to be perceived as successful, unless
there is better legislative guidance as to the proper balance to be struck be-
tween technical competence and grassroots participation.
II. THE FTC ORGANIZES FOR IMPLEMENTATION\
When the Magnuson-Moss Act became effective, several basic implementa-
tion issues confronted the FTC. The most immediate task was to adapt the
agency's organization and procedures to the consideration of requests for
funding. The FTC needed to assign people to run the program, to establish
lines of authority and areas of responsibility, and to devise a process for col-
ate a report that it was required to submit to Congress by a fixed date. This cutoff date made it impossi-
ble to gather detailed information about public participation in some of the later (and most
controversial) proceedings, such as the Children's Advertising and Standards and Certification TRR's.
January, 1979, however, roughly corresponds to the point at which the FTC came under heavy public
and congressional criticism for its handling of the compensation program. Thus, the data reviewed in
this article provide a reasonably comprehensive picture of the compensation program's operation
before it became the focus of public controversy.
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lecting information and for ruling on funding applications. In addition, the
agency had to choose from among several different strategies for applying the
statute's broad standards29 to individual cases. At one extreme, the FTC could
seek to preserve maximum agency discretion by issuing vague operational
standards and by failing to explain individual funding decisions. Following an
intermediate course of action, it could confine its discretion by allowing de-
tailed standards to evolve on a case-by-case basis-that is, by ruling on ques-
tions as they arose, and by using these rulings as precedents. 30 Finally, the
FTC could have developed a highly detailed set of operational standards at the
outset and then have refined these rules as problems or omissions became
apparent.
The Commission faced another important set of decisions regarding the
level of information, advice, and support to give to potential applicants-in
short, what "outreach" policy to adopt. Some applicants would know about
the compensation program and would have definite objectives in particular
proceedings. In other situations, however, outreach activities might well deter-
mine the mix of applicants and the kinds of activities they proposed to under-
take. Finally, because the program involved the expenditure of public monies,
the FTC needed some oversight capability to ensure that the funds were used
properly.
In general, resource and time constraints influenced both the timing of the
FTC's response to these issues and, to a lesser extent, the content of agency
policy. With limited administrative resources and little time to deliberate,3'
the program administrators tended to respond to problems rather than to an-
29. In its entirety, the relevant section of the compensation statute provided:
The Commission may, pursuant to rules prescribed by it, provide compensation for reason-
able attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of participating in a rulemaking pro-
ceeding under this section to any person (A) who has, or represents, an interest (i) which
would not otherwise be adequately represented in such proceedings, and (ii) representation of
which is necessary for a fair determination of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole,
and (B) who is unable effectively to participate in such proceeding because such person cannot
afford to pay costs of making oral presentations, conducting cross-examination, and making
rebuttal submissions in such proceedings.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)(1976); see notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text (describing agency's develop-
ment of funding criteria under Magnuson-Moss Act).
30. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). During the early development of stan-
dards, however, these rulings would have provided applicants with little guidance because "action let-
ters" were neither readily available, nor were they informative as to the bases of the agency decisions.
Insufficient resources primarily accounted for these deficiencies. The operation and maintenance of a
precedent system would have required staff to write explanations of decisions, compile the decisions in
a manner accessible to users, and check later cases against them. Instead, the letters that were then
signed by the Bureau Director were not collected in any central system. One copy of the letter was sent
to the applicant, one placed in the public record of the proceeding for which the application had been
filed, and one retained in the central compensation files maintained by the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion (BCP). At the BCP, the action letters were intermingled with other documents relating to a partic-
ular compensation decision.
31. Time pressures were generated both internally and externally. When the Magnuson-Moss bill
neared enactment, a cluster of rulemaking investigations reached the point at which agency staff and
Commissioners were prepared to begin public proceedings. The FTC delayed these proceedings until
rules of practice were issued under the new statute. Thus, staffers responsible for establishing these
rules were understandably anxious to move quickly. Moreover, the Commission was under some pres-
sure from external constituencies and congressional oversight bodies to act swiftly on the pending rules.
See generally B. BOYER, ET AL., TRADE REGULATION RULEMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION §§ I-VI (May 1979) (unpublished report to Administrative Conference of the
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ticipate them, and to defer action on questions that did not require an immedi-
ate decision. As various difficulties arose during the early implementation of
the program, the FTC quickly and frequently changed its approach. The ap-
plication of standards moved from an informal, highly discretionary process
through a period in which decisionmakers provided relatively detailed expla-
nations to support their determinations. Finally, in 1977, the Commission
published a fairly detailed set of standards for ruling on compensation re-
quests. After it became apparent that a small number of repeat applicants
were receiving a substantial proportion of available funds, the agency also de-
veloped a systematic outreach effort. Audit procedures emerged very late; the
FTC did not establish a general audit program until the very end of the period
studied. Agency officials could have, and indeed had, anticipated many of
these needs early in the program. Unfortunately, these officials lacked suffi-
cient resources with which to solve problems at an earlier stage.
32
A. FINDING A HOME FOR THE PROGRAM
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission was organized and staffed primarily
as a prosecuting agency. Its experience in the administration of grant and con-
tract programs was modest, and confined primarily to the procurement of con-
sultants and other litigation-support services. As a result, no existing unit
within the agency could easily assume the administration of the compensation
program. The immediate need in the early days of implementation, therefore,
was to find an office with both adequate administrative resources to manage
the program, and sufficient incentive to make it succeed. At the outset, these
requirements eliminated several alternatives.
Two of the FTC's major operating units, the Bureaus of Competition and of
Economics, were suitably large to afford a reallocation of staff resources. They
were concerned almost exclusively, however, with the Commission's antitrust
mission. By contrast, the compensation authority was tied to rulemaking,
which was regarded as the domain of the Bureau of Consumer Protection.
33
Thus, both Competition and Economics were unenthusiastic about running a
program that did not contribute to their work. Some general support units
independent from the three major bureaus, such as the Office of General
Counsel and the Executive Director's office, might have had some interest in
the compensation program. They appeared, however, to possess neither the
resources nor the motivation to assume a leadership role. Therefore, by pro-
United States) (study of FTC rulemaking procedures under Magnuson-Moss Act) [hereinafter ACUS
PHASE I REPORT].
32. S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073,
1076 ("Initially, implementation of the compensation program was hampered by a lack of funds avail-
able for administrative staff"). After evaluating the FTC's implementation of the program, the ACUS
recommended that Congress specifically appropriate funds for the administration of any similar pro-
grams established in the future.
33. The possibility of conducting antitrust rulemaking proceedings occasionally was discussed both
within and outside of the FTC during the period covered by this study. See Statement of Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC, before the Annual Spring Meeting of the Antitrust Law Section of the
American Bar Association 8-10 (April 7, 1978) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). This interest,
however, never produced any antitrust rulemaking proceedings.
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cess of elimination, the Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) became the
compensation program's first organizational home.
The agency was not entirely comfortable with delegating this responsibility
to the BCP, because the Bureau often sponsored or supported the proposed
rules considered in the proceedings where compensation would be granted.
Bureau staff attorneys conducted pre-rulemaking investigations, drafted pro-
posed rules, appeared at hearings to sponsor and cross-examine witnesses, and
prepared final reports recommending action to the Commissioners. The BCP
leadership-the Assistant Directors responsible for particular program areas,
and the Bureau Director-reviewed and approved the staff's major decisions
during the course of a rulemaking proceeding. Thus, the Bureau, and more
particularly the staff attorneys, were likely to feel some commitment to serve as
advocates for any proposed rule. There was a risk that this role would influ-
ence the exercise of discretion in deciding whether to award compensation. In
fact, or in appearance, the program could be misused to support applicants
agreeable to the Bureau's position and to exclude applicants critical of pro-
posed rules.
The agency initially resolved this apparent conflict of interest by establishing
a coordinating committee to represent a variety of constituencies and view-
points. This group, at various times called the Screening Committee, the
Grant Funding Committee, and finally the Compensation Committee, was in-
tended to advise the Bureau Director, who then would "sign off" on particular
compensation decisions. 34 The committee included the Assistant Directors of
the BCP divisions from which rules originated, as well as representatives from
the General Counsel's Office, the Division of Management, and the Bureau
Director's personal staff.35 This committee system remained in effect, with mi-
nor changes, for approximately three years.36 The system had several advan-
tages. It provided a collegial forum in which high level agency officials with
different perspectives could wrestle with the meaning of the statute and the
manner in which to allocate funds. Moreover, it offered a means of sharing
responsibility-in the bureaucratic jargon, "getting a lot of fingerprints on the
compensation decisions"--which could be useful if the program became a tar-
get of criticism.
Nevertheless, the committee structure had its shortcomings. The primary re-
sponsibilities of the committee members lay elsewhere. Members lacked suffi-
34. Interview with Lee H. Simowitz, Assistant to Director, BCP (Jan. 27, 1976).
35. Through most of 1976, the divisions represented on the Compensation Committee were National
Advertising, Marketing Practices, Evaluation, and Special Projects. Late in 1976 the Committee was
expanded to include a representative from the Division of Special Statutes.
36. The system for providing support services to the Committee was modified during this period.
Initially, one of the Bureau Director's personal assistants collected documents, scheduled meetings, and
recorded decisions. By the spring of 1976, the position of Special Assistant for Compensation had been
created within the Bureau to manage the growing administrative workload. Interview with Bonnie J.
Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, BCP (Oct. 19, 1976). Early in 1978, a permanent Bu-
reau Director replaced two Acting Directors who had supervised the early stages of implementation.
After some initial involvement in ruling on compensation requests, the new Director delegated this
responsibility to a Deputy Director in the BCP. Statement of Gale P. Gotschall, Deputy Director for
Federal-State and Consumer Relations, FTC, on Senate Bill No. 707, Public Service Commission-
Citizen Participation, before the Economic Affairs Comm. of the Maryland State Senate 2 (Feb. 24,
1978) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
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cient time to read documents, to attend meetings, or simply to think about
issues raised by the compensation program. Consequently, it was often diffi-
cult to schedule meetings and to maintain reasonable continuity and consis-
tency in the program. In addition, the Assistant Directors were subject to
conflicting pressures when staff attorneys in their divisions felt strongly about
funding a particular applicant. A supervisor incurs an organizational cost
when he refuses to back subordinates' recommendations with higher levels of
authority. At the same time, however, the Assistant Directors were obliged to
protect both the Director and the agency against ill-considered or biased com-
pensation decisions.
This dilemma, admittedly not unique to the compensation program, was in-
herent in an Assistant Director's role as middle manager. But at times the con-
flict seemed particularly keen because the compensation program was only a
peripheral responsibility of the Assistant Directors. Refusing to support the
staff's compensation recommendation would make it more difficult to disagree
later on matters more central to the Assistant Director's function, such as the
choice of cases to bring or the selection of rule provisions and theories to de-
velop in TRR proceedings. Aware of these conflicts, the Compensation Com-
mittee adjusted for them in its funding decisions.
37
Finally, the Committee lacked a sufficiently broad range of expertise to deal
with recurrent compensation questions. Most Committee members had legal
educations and some experience in public administration. These backgrounds
did not equip the program administrators to develop formulae for calculating
overhead expenses reimbursable to consumer advocacy groups, or to decide
whether consumer surveys, which many applicants wished to conduct, were
methodologically sound. Expertise on such matters was generally lacking at
the FTC during the program's early phases, and the Committee clearly had no
access to the limited expertise that was available.
In the fall of 1978, upon appointment of a new FTC chairman and the com-
pletion of an internal review of the compensation program, responsibility for
the program was shifted to the General Counsel's Office.
38 No official expla-
nation was offered for this change,39 although it evidently was motivated by a
desire to give the compensation decisions greater independence from the Bu-
reau and the staff attorneys.40 Complaints that rulemaking staffs were single-
minded advocates engaged in an anti-business "vendetta" had become increas-
ingly widespread.4' The membership of the compensation committee also was
37. The Compensation Committee, aware of staff attitudes, may have weighted or discounted staff
recommendations accordingly. Interview with Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation
(Oct. 19, 1976); Interview with James V. DeLong, Assistant Director, BCP (June 11, 1976).
38. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,083 (1978).
39. The Presiding Officers in TRR proceedings were shifted simultaneously to the General Counsel's
office. The FederalRegister notice simply stated that "[t]his transfer is being made as a matter of policy
to enhance the management and work product of these programs." Id at 39,083-84.
40. Interview with Michael Sohn, General Counsel, and Barry Rubin, Office of the General Counsel,
FTC (Jan. 8, 1979) [hereinafter Sohn & Rubin Interview].
41. Similar charges figured prominently in congressional oversight of the FTC during 1979. See
generally Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1979, § D, at 9, col. 4. The Post described the situation as follows:
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Michael Pertschuk, fighting congressional attempts
to limit the powers of his agency, yesterday admitted to the Senate Commerce Consumer
Subcommittee that some FTC staffers had carried on a "vendetta" against certain industries,
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modified. The Assistant Directors were dropped, reportedly because of their
spotty attendance at committee meetings. A survey research expert from the
Office of Policy Planning, however, became available to critique research pro-
posals in compensation applications.42
The FTC's experience suggests that a funding program's structural indepen-
dence may have greater symbolic than practical significance.43 The critical
factors are adequate resources, expertise, and incentive. Formal insulation of
the decisionmakers from the operating bureaus provides only indirect assur-
ance that these conditions will be met. Moreover, regardless of a program's
location within the administrative hierarchy, the staff closest to an individual
proceeding always has a significant voice in the agency decisions. The proce-
dures and standards governing a compensation program are more likely to
determine how influential that voice will be.
B. DEVELOPING PROCEDURES
Practical considerations significantly influenced the FTC's initial develop-
ment of procedures for processing compensation applications, and ensured
that the process established was simple and informal. First, the agency fre-
quently made decisions under severe time pressures. 44 The FTC was pressed
for two reasons: the managing officials' primary responsibilities lay outside the
program, and a substantial backlog of proposed rules had accumulated during
enactment of the new statute. Moreover, many of the funding applicants
needed speedy decisions from the FTC because of the substantial lead time
necessary to collect and to analyze emipirical data from consumer surveys or
marketing practices statistics. Requests for funding, however, tended to arrive
relatively late in the process, only shortly before the hearings began.45 The
But, Pertschuk added, those staffers "are no longer at the agency," and he said the investi-
gations they were working on-particularly those involving funeral homes, hearing aides [sic]
and vocational schools--were ultimately not influenced by their alleged bias.
Id
42. Sohn & Rubin Interview, supra note 40.
43. The independence of a compensation program is an issue discussed not only in relation to the
FTC's program, but also in some general compensation proposals of the Ninety-Sixth Congress. Com-
pare S. 755, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., § 302 (1979) (each agency administers own compensation program,
with ACUS reporting to President on agencies "which have failed to make an effective use of the
authority") with S. 262, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., § 403 (1979) (ACUS administers compensation) and S.
1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1979) (ACUS provides financial assistance after consfiltation with
affected agency).
44. Throughout this study, interviewed applicants complained about both agency delays in decision-
making and insufficient time to prepare for hearings. E.g., Interview with Miles Frieden, CalPIRG,
Used Cars, Credit Practices, and Thermal Insulation Proceedings (Apr. 3, 1979); Interview with Irm-
gard Hunt, Consumer Action Now, Protein Supplements Proceeding (Apr. 3, 1979); Interview with
Robert Choate, Council on Children, Mdia and Merchandising, Food Advertising, OTC Drugs, OTC
Antacids, and Children's Advertising Proceedings (March 23, 1979); Interview with Mark Silbergeld,
Consumers Union, Funeral Practices and Food Advertising Proceedings (Feb. 7, 1977); Interview with
John Pound, Ken McEldowney & Karen Tomovick, San Francisco Consumer Action, Vocational
Schools Proceeding (Dec. 12, 1975); Interview with Katherine Meyer, Center for Auto Safety, Mobile
Homes Proceeding (March 20, 1979). Not all of the representatives interviewed, however, criticized the
FTC for tardiness. One interviewee reported that response time on the group's application was shorter
than at any other government agency. Interview with Edward Kramer, The Housing Advocates, Mo-
bile Homes Proceeding (March 27, 1979).
45. The agency's rules of practice under the new statute provided for a "two-step" notice prior to the
start of hearings. After completion of the staff investigation (or of an investigation adequate to support
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FTC's failure to publicize the program during its early stages, or to mention
the program in its Federal Register notices, may account for the tardiness of
some applications. 46 The limitations of some of the applicant groups also may
have contributed to the delays. Many of the consumer groups were small orga-
nizations managed by volunteers or over-worked staff for whom constructing
an adequate funding proposal required a major effort. In view of time limita-
tions, telephone or other personal contacts frequently were used to resolve
problems or omissions in written applications.
A second reason for the development of informal procedures was the need
to gather information about the applicant from sources within the agency. The
easiest method of getting this information was through conversations, meet-
ings, or internal memos. Since many of the proceedings had taken on a highly
adversarial tone, these informal contacts raised questions about the fairness
and impartiality of the decisiomaking process. From an applicant's written
submissions and follow-up contacts, the Committee could evaluate the nature
of the applicant organization, its resources, its position toward the proposed
rule, the type of participation planned, and the amount of funding necessary to
support such participation. The Committee, however, could not judge the
group's competence to perform the work it proposed, or determine the relation
between an applicant's proposal and other materials in the record of the pro-
ceeding. Only individuals familiar with the proceedings, and the theories and
evidence already developed, could make such assessments effectively. This
meant that recommendations must come either from the Presiding Officer or
from the staff attorneys assigned to the rule.
The initial Rules of Practice issued by the FTC suggested that the Presiding
Officer would evaluate an applicant's likely contribution to a rulemaking pro-
ceeding. The Presiding Officer was to review the applications and submit "ini-
tial findings" to the Bureau Director; the rules made no provision for
evaluations by the rulemaking staff attorneys.47 In practice, however, the
a decision to commence public proceedings), the Commission issued an Initial Notice of Rulemaking.
This notice invited interested persons to ropose "disputed issues of material fact" for consideration in
the public hearings. After considering tese submissions, the agency published a Final Notice which
designated the issues on which the hearings would focus, and also established a schedule for the hear-
ings. See generall, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-1.12 (1978). Generally, hearings were scheduled in several cities
over a period of weeks. The Final Notice also stipulated a time in advance of each local hearing by
which witnesses were to file summaries or outlines of their testimony so that "group representatives"
(designated spokespersons for the major constituent groups) could prepare for cross-examination. See
generally ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § I, at 19-28 (discussing selection of hearing dates,
locations, and affiliated 
problems).
Available figures indicate that in 14 proceedings conducted under these rules of practice during the
period this study covers, nearly 60% of the initial applications for compensation (those that were not
seeking a supplement to a prior grant were submitted between pubication of the Final Notice and the
start of hearings. Another 14 perent arrived during hearings. For these same proceedings, the time
between Initial and Final Notices averaged 10 monts (ranging from a low of 2.5 months to a high of
24); the time from Final Notice to start of hearings averaged just under 3 months (ranging from a low
of 2 to a high of 5.5). See ACUS PHA~sE I REPORT, SUpra note 31, at 89-90 app.
46. See 41 Fed. Reg. 10,232 (1976) (final notice of Protein Supplements Proceeding); 40 Fed. Reg.
41,14 (1975) (initial notice of Protein Supplements Proceeding). More recent rulemaking notices con-
tain a brief mention of the compensation program, and the name and address of a contact person. See
43 Fed. Reg. 57,283 (1978) (Standards and Certification Proceeding); 43 Fed. Reg. 17,972 (1978) (Chil-
dren's Advertising Proceeding).
47. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,969 (1975). The rule also stated that "[i]n connection with his determination the
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Compensation Committee solicited input from staff attorneys, and the submis-
sion of staff recommendations became a routine part of the Committee pro-
cess.48 Staff recommendations regarding compensation requests tended to be
somewhat more detailed and better informed than those issued by the Presid-
ing Officers, 49 because staff attorneys had spent long time periods conducting
rulemaking investigations. While in the field, staff attorneys became familiar
with the positions and track records of the major interest groups involved, and
with the evidence accumulated in the rulemaking record. By contrast, the Pre-
siding Officer was appointed to the proceeding only after the Initial Notice of
Rulemaking appeared in the Federal Register. During the prehearing period
when most of the compensation requests arrived,50 the Presiding Officer was
preoccupied with other matters. Not only did he have to familiarize himself
with the substantive issues in the proceedings, but he also had to manage the
complex, unfamiliar hearing procedures required by the new statute.
The growing advocacy role of the agency staff, in proceedings analogous to
adversary trials,51 threatened to compromise the fairness and impartiality of
the program. The staff was not short on incentives to abuse its Committee
influence. Some of the rulemaking staffs were frustrated by resource limita-
tions that had forced them to curtail their investigations. The compensation
program had a substantial budget which could be used to generate additional
evidence. Money was particularly tight for hiring contract consultants to gen-
erate technical evidence regarding the prevalence of certain commercial prac-
tices, the attitudes or behavior of consumers, or the economic effects of
proposed rule provisions.52 Many of the consumer groups that applied for
compensation, however, proposed to present this kind of testimony. In addi-
tion, witness credibility could be enhanced if witnesses appeared as spokesper-
sons for independent consumer groups rather than as "staff witnesses."
Finally, the compensation fund could be used to build momentum behind the
proposed rule by "stacking" the hearings with certain kinds of witnesses.
5 3
presiding officer may conduct such inquiry of the applicant or requir& the production of such docu-
ments as he deems necessary." Id
48. A sample of 84 initial compensation application files relative to the early TRR proceedings con-
ducted under the Magnuson-Moss Act indicates that in slightly more than one-half of the cases (43) the
staff had expressed on the record its views of the merits of the compensation requests. In addition, staff
opinions were expressed orally during a number of other situations. Interview with Arthur Angel, Staff
Attorney, Funeral Practices Rule (June 1, 1977); Interview with William D. Dixon, Special Assistant
for Rulemaking, BCP (Feb. 7, 1977). In one proceeding, the head of the operating division from which
the rule had originated delegated his Committee seat to a staff attorney assigned to a rule for which
numerous compensation applications were pending.
49. This is the general impression that emerges from a reading of the records relating to the program.
A considerable variance in the length and complexity of the recommendations submitted by categories
of agency personnel, however, should be noted. For example, some Presiding Officers made extremely
conclusory, one-or-two sentence recommendations that simply urged grant or denial of funding; others
made detailed findings on each of the criteria enumerated in the Rules of Practice, supported by careful
analysis of policy considerations; and in a few instances, some attended compensation committee meet-
ings to discuss policy questions raised by particular applicants. Confidential FTC Documents 22-26.
50. See note 45 supra and accompanying text (noting delays by agency).
51. See generally ACUS PHAsE I REPORT, supra note 31.
52. Confidential FTC Document 5. In addition, the procedures for contracting out research were
slow, cumbersome, and labor-intensive for staff. Confidential FTC Document 11.
53. Momentum for a rule might be increased if several consumer groups joined in support of it.
Moreover, having a strong consumer spokesperson push for a stricter rule could make the staff proposal
appear to represent a reasonable middle position.
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Surprisingly, however, there was little evidence that staff dominated the
compensation decisions. Statistically, the recommendations of the Presiding
Officers were upheld more frequently than those of the staff.5 4 Although the
staff occasionally scored a telling point for or against a particular applicant,
overall they exerted only slight influence over final funding decisions. Officials
administering the program, aware of the gamesmanship opportunities in staff
evaluations, 55 may have limited the staff's influence by discounting its recom-
mendations. Moreover, the staff's ability and incentive to manipulate the pro-
gram were more restricted than originally had been believed. In order to use
the compensation program as a source of funds for friendly witnesses, the staff
would have had to admit that its own investigation and advocacy were inade-
quate. In addition, consumer group intervention would have implied both loss
of control over the case, and additional work at the end of the proceeding
when the staff distilled the record into a final report and statement of basis and
purpose.56 Perhaps most importantly, the confused and rushed atmosphere in
which the program initially functioned was not conducive to successful staff
manipulation. Detailed funding criteria evolved rapidly within the Compen-
sation Committee and the Bureau Director's office. This information, how-
54. This conclusion is based on an examination of the files of 84 compensation decisions made prior
to February, 1978. For purposes of this tabulation, only initial applications were counted, and requests
for supplemental appropriations from successful applicants were ignored. In addition, partial or full
grants or grant recommendations on a particular request were treated as a "grant," and only an abso-
lute denial was recorded as a "denial."
Staff recommendations were present in 43 of the 84 cases; the FTC decision agreed with the staff
recommendation in 31 of these cases, or 72% of the time. Presiding Officer recommendations were
present in 76 cases; the FTC's decision agreed with those recommendations in 60 of these, or 79% of the
time. In seven cases in which the FTC followed a staffor Presiding Officer recommendation, however,
the rationale stated in the action letter differed significantly from the rationale of the recommendation.
Detailed breakdowns of the correspondence between recommendations and decisions are as follows:
In 42 cases, staff recommendations, Presiding Officer recommendations, and action letters were
present in the file:
Staff, Presiding Officer, and FTC Decision Agree: 28
Staff and Presiding Officer Agree, Decision Differs: 9
Staff and Presiding Officer Disagree, FTC Decision Follows Staff Recommenda-
tion: 2
Staff and Presiding Officer Disagree, FTC Decision Follows Presiding Officer
Recommendation: 3
In 34 cases, Presiding Officer recommendations and FTC action were present in the file, but staff
recommendations were missing:
Presiding Officer and Decision Agree: 29
Presiding Officer and Decision Differ: 5
In one case, the Presiding Officer's recommendation was missing from the file; in that instance, the
staff recommendation and the FTC decision agreed. In seven cases, files were too fragmentary to per-
mit the determination of any agreement between recommendation and action.
55. Interview with Bonnie J. Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, FTC (Oct. 19, 1976).
56. Here, as elsewhere, statements of general tendencies can mask significant variances among indi-
viduals and proceedings. Plainly, the staff's attitudes towards the compensation program and their rela-
tionships with advocacy group applicants varied a great deal. A significant portion of the stafi
however, seemed convinced that te costs of public interest participation both to themselves and the
agency (including the costs of a longer proceeding and a more complex record) exceeded any likely
benefits in support for, or in improvement of, the rule.
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ever, was not systematically communicated to the staff or the Presiding
Officers. Thus, their analyses and recommendations often failed to address the
points that most concerned the program administrators.
The staff could influence the compensation program more fundamentally by
shaping the array of applicants from which the agency could choose. Because
the FTC initially did not publicize the program,57 staff contacts were the sole
means for many potential applicants to learn about the program. By encour-
aging some groups to apply and discouraging others, staff could control the
pool of applicants for a particular proceeding. Moreover, staff attorneys could
use their knowledge of the issues raised and evidence presented in a proceed-
ing to persuade applicants that they should take a particular position, or pres-
ent certain kinds of evidence.58 Successful applicants described frequent
informal contacts with staff about their participation in the proceeding, and
occasional direct and active recruitment of certain persons or groups to apply
for funding.59 Thus, the influence exerted by staff attorneys through such in-
formal applicant contacts, although not determinable, was by every indication
significant.
Once FTC officials gained more experience and received more resources for
administering the program, they took measures to minimize the opportunities
for staff influence. Detailed funding criteria established in 1977 reduced appli-
cants' dependence on the staff for information on the program's operation, and
decisionmakers' reliance on the staff and the Presiding Officers for information
on the applicants. The addition of a survey research expert to the Compensa-
tion Committee enabled program administrators to evaluate funding proposals
more independently. Administrators began an affirmative "outreach" effort to
57. See note 46 supra and accompanying text (comparing former practice by agency not to publicize
program with brief mention now provided).
58. Although frequently misinformed on these matters, the staff had some sense of both the criteria
applied by the Committee, and the amounts of funding that could be awarded.
Several practical barriers prevented applicant groups from independently seeking this information.
The legal theories underlying the proposed rules were frequently vague; the explanations published in
the Federal Register with the Initial Notices often did not elucidate the theory behind the rule; the
prehearing rulemaking records, containing primarily investigative materials and public comments,
were huge and disorganized; and the records were in Washington, while many applicants were located
in other parts of the country. See generally ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § II (describing
prehearing record and its functions).
59. The following points are a fairly representative sampling of statements made in interviews with
successful applicants that reported contacts with staff:
(a) Staffsolicited group to testify or to apply for compensation. Interview with Lonnie Von
Renner, Counsel for the Americans for Democratic Action and/or the National Council of
Senior Citizens, Prescription Drugs, Funeral Practices, and Ophthalmic Goods Proceedings
(Feb. 15, 1977); Interview with Mark Silbergeld, Consumers Union, Funeral Practices and
Food Advertising Proceedings (Feb. 7, 1977).
(b) Staff provided information about criteria applied in compensation program. Interview
with Rebecca Cohen, Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies, Funeral
Practices Proceeding (Oct. 26, 1976); Interview with Glen Nishimura & Timothy Holcolm,
Arkansas Consumer Research, Funeral Practices Proceeding (March 9, 1977).
(c) Staff assisted applicant to develop participation strategy. Interview with Lonnie Von
Renner, Counsel for the Americans for Democratic Action and/or the National Council of
Senior Citizens, Prescription Drugs, Funeral Practices, and Ophthalmic Goods Proceedings
(Feb. 15, 1977); Interview with Mark Silbergeld, Consumers Union, Funeral Practices and
Food Advertising Proceedings (Feb. 7, 1977).
1981]
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notify groups and individuals affected by a proposed rule, to encourage them
to participate in the proceeding and, if necessary, to apply for compensation.
In addition, contacts between staff and applicants were minimized. Guide-
lines published in 1977 advised applicants to direct any inquiries to other parts
of the agency.60 The FTC designed internal procedures to prevent staff attor-
neys from contacting applicants for additional information and from negotiat-
ing with applicants that had filed funding requests.6 ' Interviews with
compensation applicants conducted after this new policy became effective indi-
cated that the agency's efforts generally were successful. 62 Questions relating
to procedures used in granting compensation were directed to the Special As-
sistant who administered the program, rather than to the staff.63 Contact be-
tween applicants and staff continued for the purposes permitted by the
Guidelines: to establish the types of material already in the record and the
kinds of testimony the staff expected to be introduced at the hearings.
64
The evolution of the FTC's decisionmaking procedures suggests that formal
procedures or structural independence for program administrators may not be
an effective way to ensure impartiality in the administration of a direct-fund-
ing program. Adequate resources were the most essential element to the exer-
cise of independent judgment by the FTC administrators. The relocation of
the program to an independent office or agency would not assure the availabil-
ity of the necessary resources. In some respects, independence could reduce a
program administrator's ability to control staff influence over compensation
awards. Administrators working in the same office or agency as the staff are
more sensitive to the personalities and incentives surrounding any given pro-
ceeding. As a result, these administrators can more easily regulate staff con-
tacts and take account of staff bias or gamesmanship than could be done from
a separate office. With support from the agency's leadership, FTC administra-
tors obtained an internal directive requiring staff to limit contacts with appli-
60. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,484 (1977) (Guidelines for Public Participation in Rulemaking Proceedings). In
pertinent part, the guidelines stated:
The staff will assist any prospective applicant only by describing information on the mate-
rial to be introduced into the rulemaking record. Direct your questions to the Assistant Direc-
tor for Rulemaking [i.e., the Chief Presiding Officer] and about the application process to the
Special Assistant for Compensation.
Neither the staff nor the Presiding Officer will help write an application, provide special
favors or services to any particular applicant, or penalize any applicant for takihg a position at
variance with that of the staff. In addition, neither the staff nor the Presiding Officer can
commit the Bureau to approving or rejecting a particular application.
Id
61. See Revision of FTC Operating Manual, ch. 7, § 3.14 (1978) (available in FTC record room)
(only assistance staff may provide applicants is to describe information expected to be introduced in
record).
62. See notes 86-164 infra and accompanying text (describing criteria Guidelines established and
applicants' reactions thereto).
63. Interview with Gerald Thain, Center for Public Representation, Used Cars, Thermal Insulation,
and Children's Advertising Proceedings (Apr. 5, 1979); Interview with Miles Frieden, CalPIRG, Used
Cars, Credit Practices, and Thermal Insulation Proceedings (Apr. 3, 1979); Interview with Katherine
Meyer, Center for Auto Safety, Used Cars and Mobile Homes Proceedings (March 20, 1979).
64. Interview with Edward Kramer, The Housing Advocates, Mobile Homes Proceeding (March 27,
1979); Interview with Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising, Food Advertis-
ins, OTC Drugs, OTC Antacids, and Children's Advertising Proceedings (March 23, 1979); Interview
wth Bruce Terris (March 8, 1979).
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cants, and also accounted for possible staff bias in effectuating decisions. An
independent agency administering a compensation program probably would
find it more difficult to understand or to influence the norms and practices of a
separate agency conducting the proceeding where compensation was sought.
C. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE
Translating the compensation program's legislative authorization into oper-
ational standards proved to be a more complex task than either establishing an
organizational base for the program or developing procedures to process indi-
vidual funding applications. The statutory language was broad, and rather
opaque. In its entirety, the major substantive section of the compensation pro-
vision stated:
The Commission may, pursuant to rules prescribed by it, provide
compensation for reasonable attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and
other costs of participating in a rulemaking proceeding under this
section to any person (A) who has, or represents, an interest (i) which
would not otherwise be adequately represented in such proceeding,
and (ii) representation of which is necessary for a fair determination
of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole, and (B) who is un-
able effectively to participate in such proceeding because such person
cannot afford to pay costs of making oral presentations, conducting
cross-examination and making rebuttal submissions in such
proceedings.
65
This section of the bill, which was added by the conference committee, is sim-
ply paraphrased rather than explained by the relevant portion of the confer-
ence report.66 Second-hand reports of the drafters' intent, however, indicate
that the "financing proviso emanated from the. . . conferees' belief that, since
the new statute substantially formalized the FTC's rulemaking procedures,
compensation for intervenors would better enable them to participate effec-
tively in the newly structured hearings." 67
Each of the three major factors mentioned in the statute-the interest of the
applicant, the adequacy of representation, and the financial inability of the
applicant-created a series of puzzles for the FTC to solve. In determining
whether the applicant "represents an interest.. .[the] representation of which
is necessary for a fair determination of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a
whole," the program administrators were compelled to define interests in a
65. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (1976).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 36, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7702, 7768 ("In order to provide to the extent possible that all affected interests be represented in
rulemaking proceedings so that rules adopted thereunder best serve the public interest, the FTC is author-
ized to provide compensation ....") (emphasis added). Five years later, during the 1979 oversight
hearings, a slightly different formulation of the congressional purpose was provided: "Congress estab-
lished public participation funding program to enhance the quality of Commission decisions by aiding
representation of small businesses and public interest groups which would not otherwise have an op-
portunity to participate." S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1073, 1075 (emphasis added).
67. Boasberg, Hewes, Klores & Kass, Policy Issues Raised by Intervenor Requests for Financial
Assistance in NRC Proceedings 38 (NUREG-75/071, July 18, 1975) (summarizing interviews of May 8,
1975 with staff of the Senate Commerce Committee).
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broad policy rulemaking proceeding, and to determine when it would be "fair"
to exclude a potential participant. The statute's emphasis on an interest's ade-
quate representation mplied a series of judgments regarding the technical
skills and participatory activities necessary for effective representation in a
complex "hybrid" rulemaking procedure.68 Having made those determina-
tions, the administrators would have to distinguish between financially needy
applicants and those who were simply unwilling to spend their own money on
the rulemaking proceeding. This question would have to be answered in many
different factual settings, because most of the applicants were ongoing organi-
zations with at least limited funds available to support their operations.
In determining how to apply the statutory language, the agency faced an
immediate tension between the "fairness" and "adequacy of representation"
criteria. Emphasis on the representation of interests essential to a fair determi-
nation of the proceeding suggests that the agency should focus on the appli-
cant's constituency and its stake in the rulemaking. Thus, the statutory phrase
might imply that the proceeding should be viewed as a democratic process in
which the clash of interests among disparate constituency groups produces an
acceptable compromise outcome. By contrast, the adequacy of representation
test could be construed as a direction to fund competent technocrats: lawyers,
social scientists, and other experts who would present evidence, analysis, and
argument addressed to the economic effects of the proposed rule, and to
whether particular trade practices were prevalent and harmful to consumers.
69
The FTC never completely resolved the tension between the technocratic
and democratic elements of the compensation program. As the program
evolved, administrators seemed to stress technical factors relating to applicant
competence. This emphasis coincided with the general character of many
TRR hearings conducted between 1975 and 1979.70 Moreover, the technical
68. FTC rulemaking proceedings had a mixed or "hybrid" character with respect to the procedures
the agency used and the nature of the underlying decision. The Magnuson-Moss procedures were
hybrid in that they provided more elaborate rights for interested persons to participate than the simple
notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). The FTC,
however, was not obliged to use the formal trial-type hearing associated with formal rulemaking. See
generally Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The 4P4, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT.
REv. 345; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirl.
calAnalysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975).
69. An Assistant Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection expressed the following view:
[I]t must be recognized that the public participation program, like rulemaking proceedings
themselves, has two aspects that do not always mesh smoothly. On the one hand it is a techni-
cal inquiry into what is oing on in a particular industry and what steps may be taken by the
Federal Trade Commission to alleviate consumer injury. This aspect requires legal analysis
of deception and unfairness, surveys into the prevalence of practices, economic analysis of
harm ... and so on. The other aspect is that a rulemaking proceeding often has a large
component of participatory democracy in it . . . . Technical studies, for example, cannot
substitute for the direct experience of consumers who have dealt with the used car sales system
.... Nor can technical studies substitute for asking consumers and consumer groups di-
rectly whether they feel a need for it.
In administrating [sic] the compensation program, we have tried to recognize both these
dimensions.
Letter from James V. DeLong, Assistant Director, BCP to David Rogoff 1-2 (Apr. 22, 1977). See also
Public Particioation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.A 3361 and Related Bills Before the Sub.
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 517-18 (1977) (statement of Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP).
70. As stated by one agency official, a TRR hearing could be viewed both as "a technical inquiry
into what is going on in a particular industry," and as a forum for "participatory democracy." Letter
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tests were much easier to apply than the nebulous "interest" or "constituency"
criteria. In the end, however, the agency incurred sharp criticism during the
legislative oversight process for failing to achieve a proper balance of interests
in its compensation decisions: too many Washington-based organizations, too
many "repeatplayers" appearing in multiple proceedings, and too few small
businesses ha received support.71 The agency might well have provoked
equally strong criticism, however, had it emphasized "grassroots" participation
and distributed funds to participants less technically competent to address is-
sues raised in the proceedings. These two confficting views of the program's
purpose forced the agency to travel a narrow and treacherous path.
Two distinct phases marked the Commission's effort to develop feasible
standards for awarding compensation. 72 The first phase lasted approximately
three years and relied on nebulous standards and broad agency discretion. In-
deed, the FTC's initial rules of practice simply tracked the statutory lan-
guage.73 During this period, many funding applicants were confused about
the standards used to rule upon their requests, and there was no other written
source of guidance for applicants.74 In some instances, applicants felt that they
from James V. DeLong, Assistant Director, BCP to David Rogoff, CalPIRG, Used Car Proceeding 1-2
(Apr. 22, 1977).
7 1. "These restrictions [imposed by the amendments to the compensation provision] will insure that
a small number of groups do not receive an inordinate share of the available funds, and that the funds
are provided to a broader cross section of the eligible small business and public interest applicants." S.
REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 1102, 1123.
See also S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1073, 1076 ("One criticism of the public participation program was its inability to attract large numbers
of applicants for funding, so, the early stages of this program are marked by many repeat applicants
and fewer small business applicants"); id at 17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1087 (additional views of Sen. Danforth) ('[W]hile there may be public interest groups in many parts of
the country and in many communities, the FTC gave ... 55.5 percent of all the money made available
to the groups in San Francisco and Washington, D.C.").
72. Unless otherwise indicated, this article refers only to the period of time this study covers, from
enactment of the Magnuson-Moss provisions in 1975 to January, 1979.
73. Draft rules of practice for the compensation program and for trade regulation rulemaking pro-
ceedings in general were published for public comment on April 4, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 15,238 (1975).
Approximately 30 comments were submitted in response to this notice. Only two of these comments,
however, discssed the compensation program at any length. Former FTC Commissioner Mary Gar-
diner Jones, at the time Professor of Law at the University of Illinois, submitted one of these comments.A cons rtium of public inter t gr ups he ded by Paul Gewirtz, an attorney for theCenter for Law and
Social Policy, joined by Charles Halper and Neil Levy of the Council for Public nterest Representa-
tion, prepared the other omment. FT C Docket No. 222-3-1 (summary of correspondence and com-ments in response t  prop sed regulation). These c mments did not affect the final rule, which varied
only stylistically from the version originally published for comment. SYee 40 Fed. Reg. 33,966 (1975)
(final version of rule). The only significant elaboration of statutory language related to the financial
inability standard. A person or organization seeking compensation was required to describe not 
only
its own resources, but also the resources "of the interest represented 
by the applicant," 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.17(c)(4)(ii) (1981), and "the feasibility of contributions to the costs of participation by individual
representatives of the interest." Id § 1. 17()(4)(ii). These requirements evidently were intended to
prevent a wealthy interest group from recruiting or creating an indigent "front" organization to 
apply
for compensation.
74. Interview with Jack Hale, Connecticut Citizen Research Group (March 18, 1977) (using 
draft
compensation guidelines, but FTC staff advised ignoring guideline formula 
for cost computation); In-
terview with Glen Nishimura & Timothy Holcomb, Arkansas Consumer 
Research (March 9, 1977)
(better definitions required of acceptable compensation proposal and 
of allowablerte aof compensa-
tion); Interview with William A. Dickert, United Consumers of the Alleghenies 
(March 9, 1977) (appl-
cation for compensation denied without explanation); Interview with 
David Swankin, Counsel to
National Consumers Congress (Feb. 1i, 1977) (letter rulings on compensation 
requests not informa-
tive); Interview with Mark Silbergeld, Consumers Union (Feb. 7, 1977) (some 
aspects of criteria require
clarification); Interview with John Pound, San Francisco Consumer Action 
(Nov. 10, 1976) (FTC un-
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actually had been misled. Several incidents occurred during the early phases
of program implementation in which staff attorneys had encouraged persons or
groups to apply for funding-if not assured them that their requests would be
granted-only for program administrators later to turn down the
applications.
75
This delay in developing standards was probably a result of the FTC's early
reliance on part-time administrators. A sustained effort to clarify standards for
granting compensation was not begun until one staff person was assigned to
clear on criteria); Interview with Rebecca Cohen, Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial
Societies (Oct. 26, 1976) (criteria lacked specificity); Interview with Ken Schorr, ACORN (undated,
summer 1976); Letter from Anthony DiRocco, Executive Secretary, National Hearing Aid Society to
Jamie Bennett 3 (Aug. 22, 1977).
75. Two incidents arose in the 1976 hearings on the Funeral Practices rule. Michael Hirsh, a televi-
sion producer who had worked on a documentary program critical of the funeral industry, applied for
compensation to become a consumer group representative at the Chicago hearing. As such a represen-
tative, he would have been eligible to cross-examine witnesses. After some time, the Presiding Officer
informally advised Hirsh that his application had been denied because Hirsh was not an attorney and
therefore presumably was unqualified to conduct cross-examinations. At Hirsh's request, the Presiding
Officer put this explanation in writing, and added that the application also had been rejected because
Hirsh was unaffiliated with a consumer group. Interview with Michael Hirsh, Executive Producer,
WTTW Channel 11, Chicago (May 11, 1976). Hirsh sought assistance from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, which requested reconsideration of Hirsh's application on the grounds that neither the
statute nor the rules of practice required that compensated consumer representatives be attorneys or
representatives of an organized consumer group. Letter from David Goldberger, The Roger Baldwin
Foundation of ACLU, Inc. to Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP (April 9, 1976). Three weeks
later, the FTC's Acting Bureau Director formally denied Hirsh's request, primarily on the ground that
his application lacked sufficient information regarding his projected expenses and the substance of his
proposed participation. The applicant's lack of affiliation with a consumer group was not mentioned.
Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP to Michael Hirsh (April 28, 1976). Bernstein also
noted that "[w]hile no other consumer representative has been authorized compensation for participa-
tion in the Chicago hearings," four consumer groups had been granted compensation for participation
in other phases of the rulemaking proceeding, and "[t]he statute does not require compensation of a
consumer representative at every individual hearing for which such a representative applied." Id
While the Hirsh application was pending, FTC staff attorneys actively solicited the Consumer Feder-
ation of America to apply for compensation as a participant in the Chicago hearings. Interview with
Kathleen O'Reilly, Consumer Federation of America (CFA) (Feb. 16, 1977). CFA applied for com-
pensation and began preparation for the hearing in reliance on the staff's assurances that the applica-
tion would be approved. A series of delays and problems developed, however, and CFA withdrew its
application shortly before the start of the Chicago hearings. Contrary to FTC policy outlined in the
Hirsh letter, the FTC staff then brought in as compensated consumer representative for the Chicago
hearings another consumer group which had earlier been granted compensation for the Washington
Funeral Practices hearings.
Not surprisingly, these two applicants criticized the FTC's administration of the compensation pro-
gram. Hirsh believed, based on information from sources within the FTC, that his application had
been denied because he had refused to follow the suggestions of staff attorneys who wanted him to
testify in support of one part of the rule. Interview with Michael Hirsh, supra. Similarly, the CFA
representative felt that the FTC had raised a series of minor objections to her participation because she
had not cooperated sufficiently in supporting the rule. Interview with Kathleen O'Reilly, suvpra.
Two further incidents followed the general pattern of the CFA application. In both instances, FTC
representatives from the Chicago Regional Office contacted individuals and urged them to apply for
compensation. The applications were denied by the compensation program administrators in Washing-
ton, D.C. Interview with Sidney Margolis, Syndicated Columnist, Food Advertising Proceeding (March
22, 1977); Interview with John C. Hendrickson, Attorney, Vocational School Proceeding (March 17,
1977). One applicant criticized the FTC for "arbitrary decision-making." Interview with Sidney Mar-
golis, supra The other felt he was the victim of a "hoax" or a "political decision." Interview with John
C. Hendrickson, supra In part, Hendrickson's request for funding was denied because the program
administrators doubted his ability to complete the work he proposed within the time he had estimated.
Ironically, he had limited his request for compensation to 80 hours of attorney time, although he ex-
pected to invest additional uncompensated hours, because the FTC staff had advised him that this was
the maximum the Commission would fund. Id
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administer the entire compensation program. Draft Guidelines for the pro-
gram were prepared, circulated, revised, and finally published in June, 1977.76
Publication of these Guidelines marked the second phase in the development
of standards. The Guidelines generally communicated the FTC's thinking to
prospective applicants,77 and generated more informative applications in re-
turn. They also seemed to improve the consistency and quality of agency deci-
sions. In some respects, however, the Guidelines highlighted rather than
resolved basic conceptual problems implicit in the statute.
1. Interest in the Proceeding
The Magnuson-Moss Act's directive that compensation be granted to par-
ticipants advocating "interests" that as a matter of fairness ought to be repre-
sented in the particular rulemaking forced the FTC to identify interests
sufficiently affected by a proposed rule to warrant funding. Although the con-
cept of "interest" has analogs in the law of standing to seek judicial review
78
and in the rules governing intervention in both judicial proceedings79 and ad-
ministrative adjudications,80 use of an interest test in administrative rulemak-
ing raised novel issues. Rulemaking procedures typically are designed to
avoid the definition-of-interest question, at least during the early stages. In the
familiar notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, for example, the agency
simply opens its record and welcomes all comers who wish to submit data,
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,480 (1977). The Preamble to the final guidelines reflects the Commission's con-
cern about publishing guidelines for public participation without providing a period for public com-
ment. It states: "The Bureau of Consumer Protection has solicited the viewpoints of interested parties
in preparing these Guidelines. As finally drafted, the Guidelines reflect extensive comments received
from consumer groups, industry, Congressional committees and members of the public." Id
77. In contrast to the confusion and uncertainty reported by applicants who had sought funding
prior to the issuance of the Guidelines, see note 74supra, later applicants generally found the standards
clear and comprehensible. Interview with Gerald Thain, Center for Public Representation (April 2,
1979); Interview with Edward Kramer, The Housing Advocates (March 27, 1979); Interview with Kath-
erine Meyer, Center for Auto Safety (March 20, 1979); Interview with Archie Richardson, Automobile
Owners' Action Council (March 19, 1979); Interview with Bruce Terris (March 12, 1979). The one
sharp criticism of the 1977 Guidelines contended that they were flawed and were designed for lawyers
rather than laymen. Interview with Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising
(March 23, 1979).
78. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 685
(1973) (students' pleadings showed sufficiently that they were "adversely affected" or "aggrieved"
within meaning of § 10 of Administrative Procedure Act); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739
(1972) (person has standing to seek judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act only if he
suffered or will suffer injury).
79. In the federal courts, anyone may intervene as of right in a civil action:
[wihen the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). See generally 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 24.08[2]-[6] (2d ed. 1980)
(discussing right to intervene and adequacy of representation).
80. Cf Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 379:
As Professor Shapiro accurately observed [in Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
.4gencies andArbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 721, 729 (1968)] "[at] the heart of almost every
intervention case is the nature and extent of the applicant's interest in the proceeding." The
intervenor's interest is significant both in determining whether exclusion is unfair to the inter-
venor... and [in determining] whether the intervenor is likely to have a separate and distinct
position to present, thereby making a significant contribution to the hearing.
19811
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views, or arguments. Participants are free from any threshold requirement to
demonstrate either a legally defined right or a particular stake in the outcome.
More significant than the procedural distinctions between rulemaking and
adjudication is a fundamental difference between the type of decisions made in
each setting. When an individual intervenes in a court proceeding, it is a rela-
tively simple matter to identify the interests at stake. Substantive legal stan-
dards single out persons or organizations with a colorable claim of right; the
subject-matter of the dispute is normally defined and reduced to a common
medium of exchange;8' and the outcome of the proceeding will allocate clearly
the economic goods, authoritatively defining rights and liabilities, "winners"
and "losers." In a sense, the proceeding is designed to refine, to elaborate, and
to choose among interests already clearly delineated by the applicable rules of
law. Administrative rulemaking, by contrast, generally addresses the antece-
dent problem of articulating general standards and values and creating inter-
ests that later are joined in particular disputes. Compared with an
adjudication, this latter type of proceeding affects a wider range of persons,
groups, and institutions, in a greater variety of ways.
When the FTC published its Guidelines, the agency recognized the difficul-
ties inherent in defining the interests at stake at the outset of TRR proceedings:
Most of the crucial issues. . . involve determinations of where the
consumer interest really lies. Industry representatives may argue that
the ultimate costs of a rule to consumers will exceed the benefits from
it, or that the rule involves undesirable transfers of money or risk
from one group of consumers to another. . . . [R]ulemaking pro-
ceedings often hinge on complex questions concerning whether par-
ticular practices occur with sufficient frequency to justify government
action, the efficacy of proposed remedies, the scope of the practices to
be covered, and their economic impact.
Disputes over such issues involve complicated relationships of
common interest and conflict between different segments of industry
and different types of consumers. For example, a proposed rule...
might raise costs and prices as the price of preventing certain decep-
tive practices. At least three distinct consumer interests may arise in
such a case: (1) those who want the protection and believe it worth
the increase in price; (2) those who prefer to look out for themselves
and buy more cheaply; and (3) those who would be priced out of the
market completely by the increase, therefore deriving no benefit from
the rule.8
2
In addition to these problems of defining economic stakes, the agency might
also encounter claims that noneconomic interests should be represented.
83
81. In an action for money damages, the medium of exchange is the dollar value; similarly, a dispute
over title to a particular piece of property involves narrow issues including precise allocations of the
right to possess and control the property in question.
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
83. For example, a coalition of environmental groups requested and received funding to participate
in a proceeding regarding disclosure requirements in the marketing of home insulation materials. The
groups believed that the rule would promote environmental values by encouraging consumers to insu-
[ate property and thus reduce both the demand for nonrenewable fuels and the pressure to extract fossil
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Faced with these conceptual difficulties, the FTC shifted the burden onto the
applicants to define their interests, 8 4 which typically were described as some
variant of "the consumer interest."85 The agency also relied more heavily on
the adequacy of representation criterion, for which some relatively detailed
standards existed. Thus, during the period studied, the definition of interest
only rarely was of major significance to compensation decisions. Two other
questions, however, did arise in the application of the interest test.
Narrow-focus versus broad-focus groups. By early 1976, the Compensa-
tion Committee clearly preferred to fund groups with a narrow or specialized
focus, as opposed to general-purpose consumer advocate groups. The FTC's
initial rationale for this preference was the belief that constituents of a group
with a particular, well-defined interest would monitor the group's activities
and thus provide the group with a strong, internal incentive to deliver high
quality advocacy.86 The 1977 Guidelines confirmed this preference for spe-
cialized groups, but relied on a kind of "conflict of interest" rationale.87 The
Guidelines suggested that specialization is preferred because the consumer in-
terest consists of diverse, conflicting strands that one representative cannot ef-
fectively or consistently advance.
88
A possible reason for this change in rationale was the sharp criticism of the
FTC's earlier theory by consumer groups that had received early drafts of the
Guidelines. Consumers Union, a broad-focus group certain to be disadvan-
taged by the preference, argued:
This presumption . . . is based solely upon the Bureau's ipse dixit.
We know of no evidence which suggests that members of narrow-
focus consumer organizations are more likely, or broad-focus con-
sumer organizations less likely, to make a more thorough case or use
fuels from unspoiled natural areas. Application of Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense Fund, Thermal Insulation (R-Value) Proceeding
2-3 (Jan. 16, 1978). Although it did not involve a compensation decision, the Funeral Rule's proposed
ban on the embalming of corpses without permission of next-of-kin was another TRR that affected a
noneconomic interest. This proposal drew support from religious groups opposed to embalming as an
article of faith. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FINAL
STAFF REPORT ON FUNERAL INDUSTRY PRAcTIcEs RULE 187 & n.l (June 1978) (for example, Ortho-
dox Judaism forbids embalming).
84. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(1) (1978) (compensation application should contain "description of the
interest the applicant has or represents in the rulemaking proceeding"); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977)
(Bureau will continue policy of funding "applications to represent consumers as a general class" but
"wil give preference to applicants who define their interest or point of view with greater specificity").
85. The FTC's 1977 Guidelines for public participation observe: "To date, most applicants have
claimed to represent the interests of consumers or large subgroups of consumers." 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482
(1977).
86. Interview with James V. DeLong, Assistant Director, BCP (March 9, 1976); Confidential FTC
Document 6.
87. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (disputes over issues involve complicated relationships of com-
mon interest between different types of consumer interests; in future, preference granted to applicants
who define their interest with greater specificity).
88. The Guidelines note that:
[G]roups may agree on a consumer protection goal but be opposed on their assessment of
the best way to attain it. An example is the conflict between those who want detailed regula-
tion in a particular area and those who favor a free market approach ... . Again, it is
difficult for one consumer representative to advocate the alternative approaches effectively.
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available resources better, based upon incentives. In fact, broad-focus
organizations may be viewed as such in some cases simply because
they specialize in several narrow-focus issues . ... If a more thor-
ough case has been made or resources better used by a narrow-focus
organization, the most likely explanations are 1) more experience and
expertise in the substantive area, or 2) better general performance
and competence .... The Bureau has already provided in the
guidelines. . . for consideration of these two criteria .... 89
These points seem cogent. To the extent that preference for narrow-focus
groups seeks to ensure a particular content or quality of presentation, other
criteria can achieve this end more efficiently. The narrow-focus preference also
may be counterintuitive and difficult for participants to understand. Well after
the FTC established the preference, instances arose in which compensation
applicants argued for funding9" and Presiding Officers designated applicants
as consumer representatives, 91 or recommended that they be granted compen-
sation,92 precisely because they were broad-focus groups speaking to a wide
spectrum of consumer experience.
On the other hand, the preference for narrow-focus groups could have both
theoretical and practical value to the FTC's administration of the compensa-
tion program. If a major purpose of the compensation fund is to enrich the
rulemaking record by encouraging advocacy of diverse and confficting view-
points, then a standard that encourages the funding of specialized groups hold-
ing disparate positions seems logical. 93 On a more pragmatic level, the
preference would serve to disburse funds more widely among many consumer
groups, rather than permitting concentration among large, multi-purpose na-
tional groups.94 Favoring the funding applications of narrow-focus groups
also could minimize the controversy that occasionally arose regarding the le-
gitimacy or authority of compensated consumer groups to represent "the con-
sumer interest." Participants and procedures tended to cast consumer groups
89. Letter from Mark Silbergeld, Attorney, Washington Office, Consumers Union to Bonnie
Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, BCP 4 (Nov. 15, 1976).
90. In seeking funding, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) reasoned: "Since CFA's mem-
bership includes numerous state and local organizations in every geographic region of the country, we
are uniquely suited to advocate on behalf of a widely representative cross-section of the American
consuming pubi. Application for Compensation of the Consumer Federation of America, Thermal
Insulation Proceeding 5 (Dec. 23, 1977).
91. In the Thermal Insulation proceeding, the Presiding Officer noted:
The California groups, that is, the California Public Interest Research Groups and the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission are deemed by me to be too narrow a base to be an appropriate
representative of consumer interests generally. Both of the other organizations, [the Con-
sumer Federation of America and the National Consumers League,] on the other hand, repre-
sent national constituencies and, given the broad nature of rulemaking in general and this
Rule in particular, I deem it advisable to select a Group Representative from an organization
with such a broad base.
Presiding Officer's Notice of Selection of Consumer Interest Group Representative, Thermal Insulation
Proceeding 2 (Jan. 19, 1978).
92. Confidential FTC Document 7.
93. It would not, however, assist in choosing among various groups. At the logical extreme, this
approach would argue for funding as many groups as possible, as long as they held distinguishable
positions with respect to the proposed rule.
94. An organization like the Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies, which ex-
ists solely to facilitate low-cost, prearranged funerals, would be unlikely to apply for funds in any
proceeding other than the Funeral Practices rulemaking.
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in this role-one that some uncompensated interests both challenged and re-
sented.95 With a clear, specific, and narrow mandate, the compensated group
would more likely be viewed as a legitimate representative of a particular as-
pect of the consumer interest, rather than as a spokesperson for an consumers.
Overall, the FTC's reliance on the narrow-focus test was not a marked suc-
cess. Because few specialized groups applied for funding, the test did not pre-
vent large, multipurpose groups from dominating the program.96 Moreover,
the agency was subjected to congressional criticism for favoring narrow, "un-
representative" groups. 97 On this charge, the Commission was entangled not
only by the tension between the technocratic and democratic elements inherent
in the compensation program, but also by the problem of determining how a
private group gains authority and legitimacy to represent a constituency in an
administrative proceeding. The latter issue surfaced again in the agency's de-
velopment of a second standard by which to define "interest."
Groups versus individuals. Program administrators created a strong pre-
sumption that organizations represented the interests of their members and
constituents, whereas individual applicants represented only their own inter-
ests. Neither the Rules of Practice nor the 1977 Guidelines established such a
preference, 98 but the distinction was clearly maintained in practice. 99
Although the eligibility of individual applicants never became a major prac-
tical problem for the FTC, the group preference and related issues raised ques-
tions about the basic purposes of a direct funding program. Through the group
preference, the FTC's compensation committee evidently tried to steer a mid-
dle course between extremes that seemed beyond the scope of the program.
The first of these extremes might be called "the pure entrepreneurial expert"--
the grant-seeker who viewed the FTC compensation fund as simply another
95. See Interview with Gary J. Kushner, Staff Counsel, Scientific Affairs, Grocery Manufacturers of
America, Inc. (Dec. 11, 1976); Interview with Howard Eglit, attorney for the National Council of Senior
Citizens, Chicago Hearing Aids Proceedings (July 5, 1976). One compensated consumer participant in
the Food Advertising Proceeding, appearing on behalf of the Indiana Home Economics Association,
expressed some surprise at being "lumped together" with consumer advocate groups at the hearings,
because home economists were hardly typical consumers. Interview with Mary Ruth Snyder, Indiana
Home Economics Ass'n (March 18, 1977).
96. See text accompanying notes 272-83 infra (describing "repeat player" phenomenon).
97. Senator Danforth asserted: "It would seem logical that groups that claim to represent the 'public
interest' should have broad as compared with narrow memberships." S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 16, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1073, 1087 (additional views of Sen.
Danforth).
98. See generally notes 161-64 infra and accompanying text. The Guidelines only refer to constitu-
ency support as a factor bearing on the adequacy of representation. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
99. Of the 16 individuals who applied for compensation in their own names during the period cov-
ered by this study, only three received any compensation and two of these received less than $300 each.
The following applicants were considered individuals for this purpose, although in a few instances
there were indications that they were affiliated with organizations that might be thought to have an
interest in the proceeding. In their applications, however, they did not purport to speak for the
organizations.
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target for proposal-writing.1° The other extreme is manipulation by agency
staff. Rulemaking staffs might try to funnel their witnesses through the com-
pensation program for the purposes of obtaining more support money or bol-
stering the credibility of staff witnesses.' 0 '
Requiring that the applicant be an established, independent organization
with a defined mission was undoubtedly valuable in avoiding either entrepre-
neur or staff dominance of the compensation program. The organizational
preference, however, was an imperfect means to accomplish this end. First,
the distinction between individuals and organizations was not necessarily
meaningful; an individual with a cause and modest resources can establish an
organization to advocate his viewpoint. 102 The Council on Children, Media
Proceeding Applicants Action
Care Labeling Seymore Goldwasser Denied
Food Advertising Wendy Gardner Granted
Food Advertising Mary Ruth Nelson Granted
Food Advertising Kurt Oster, M.D. Denied
Food Advertising Sidney Margolis Denied
Funeral Practices Michael Hirsh Denied
Holder in Due Course Prof. Richard Kay Denied
Holder in Due Course Prof. Richard Hesse Denied
Holder in Due Course David A. Scholl Withdrawn
Holder in Due Course Richard Victor Denied
Prescription Drugs Craig Sandahl Denied
Protein Supplements Chester Sutton Denied
Vocational Schools Joel Platt Granted
Vocational Schools Len Vincent Denied
Vocational Schools John C. Hendrickson Denied
Vocational Schools Mary A. Vance Withdrawn
This list omits the "San Francisco regional office witnesses" in the Vocational Schools rule because they
did not apply for compensation themselves; rather, the FTC's San Francisco regional office sought
funds on their behalf. It also omits two individuals' applications in the Children's Advertising proceed-
ing which were pending when data collection for this study ended in 1979. Additional information
about these applications is available in the tabular summaries of Appendix A.
Most of these individual applications were filed in the first wave of postamendment TRR proceed-
ings that went into hearings in 1975 or 1976. Later, as the correct interpretation filtered down to the
operational levels of the agency, individuals presumably were advised not to seek reimbursement
through the compensation program, but rather to apply for funding from allocations that the BCP
maintained to support staff witnesses. Confidential FTC Document 8.
100. A good example of this entrepreneurial effort is the application filed by several university
faculty members in the Food Advertising Proceeding. See Proposal to Federal Trade Commission from
R. Garth Hansen, Bonita Wise & Ann M. Sorenson, Utah State University (June 21, 1976). These
researchers proposed to update the data base for their computerized "Index of Nutritional Quality,"
and to use the index to analyze the nutrient density of traditional foods that the proposed rule's nutri-
tion advertising provisions would cover. The application reads much like the narrative portion of a
conventional research grant proposal, with no reference to any interest the researchers might represent,
or to the need for representation. Although the proposal evidently was of high quality and relevant to
the issues in the proceeding, the compensation committee concluded that the researchers did not repre-
sent any interest, and thus they were not funded. Confidential FTC Documents 9 & 10. As Appendix
A indicates, no "action letter" on this application could be located in FTC files. Commission records of
disbursements under the program, however, clearly indicate that this application was not funded.
101. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text (discussing potential for FTC staff conflicts of
interest).
102. A Ford Foundation study described one of the compensated participants in an FTC rulemakinp
in those terms. Preface to PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS at viii
(Weisbrod, Handler & Komesar eds., paper ed. 1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW].
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and Merchandising (CCMM), which received substantial sums to participate
in the Food Advertising, OTC Drugs, OTC Antacids, and Children's Advertis-
ing Proceedings, is an example. CCMM was characterized as the virtual "alter
ego of its founder and principal member, Robert Choate," who was quoted as
saying, "Washington is an organization town. The first question asked of one
going to his or her government with other than a purely personal matter is
'who are you with?' "103 The Council's application in the Food Advertising
Proceeding indicates that its "organizational base" consisted of thirteen per-
sons in addition to Mr. Choate.
1°4
A related issue arose when very small organizations received large grants for
extensive participation in major rulemaking proceedings. Often, the organiza-
tiot subcontracted most of its participation functions to persons or organiza-
tions that were ineligible for funding, such as law firms, survey research
companies, or individual experts-for-hire. One such example was the Con-
sumer Affairs Committee of the Greater Washington Chapter, Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA-CAC). Prior to becoming involved in trade regula-
tion rulemaking, ADA-CAC operated on an annual budget of approximately
$2,000.105 During the three-year period from 1976 to 1979, the group received
compensation to participate in six different rulemaking proceedings, with au-
thorizations totalling approximately $200,000.106
With such funding available, an organization risked becoming little more
than a conduit for the money it received, rather than an active participant that
shaped and controlled its contribution to the decisionmaking process.107 As in
other areas, the FTC needed to reach an equilibrium between assisting a par-
ticipant to obtain competent technical representation, and assuring that a
103. Thain & Snow, Non-Law Public Interest Advocacy:Advertising on Children's Television, in PUB-
LIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 102, at 473, 477 & 498.
104. Letter from Robert B. Choate, Council on Children, Media, and Merchandising to J. Thomas
Rosch, Director, BCP (April 24, 1975) ("The organizational base of the Council is the ad hoc group
represented by the names on this letterhead. Communication between Council members and the
Chairman takes place with some regularity"). The letterhead lists 14 members, including Mr. Choate.
105. Application for Compensation of the Consumer Affairs Committee, Greater Washington Chap-
ter, Americans for Democratic Action, Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding 3 (May 27, 1976).
106. See Appendix A (itemizing recipients of funding).
107. The ADA, for example, eventually applied for and received funding for some of its members to
work with outside counsel in formulating the group's position on a proposed rule. This request arose in
the joint application of ADA-CAC and the National Council of Senior Citizens for compensation in
the OTC Antacids TRR Proceeding. Letter from Ann Brown, Consumer Affairs Committee, Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, and David Marlin, National Council of Senior Citizens to Bonnie
Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation 6 (Nov. 18, 1977) (requesting supplemental funding for
Brown and Marlin to meet with attorneys from outside law firm representing them in proceeding "to
determine the positions which we will take on the various issues presented in this proceeding"). This
letter continues: "We win of course seriously consider the advice given by our attorneys.. . but we
must make the final decisions. We can only do so if representatives of each group acquaint themselves
with the issues and meet with each other, our attorneys and their consultant to discuss them." Id at 7.
The FTC's subsequent action letter conditionally approved this supplemental request:
If [Ms. Brown] volunteers her time, then her time obviously does not represent a cost to the
Committee, and it is not reimbursable .... However, if she would otherwise not participate
in this proceeding, and if the $15 per hour accrues to her, then it is reimbursable, because it is
a cost to her organization.
Letter from Richard C. Foster, Deputy Director, BCP to Ann Brown, Consumer Affairs Committee,
Americans for Democratic Action, and David Marlin, National Council for Senior Citizens 2 (Feb. 10,
1978).
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spokesperson legitimately represented a meaningful constituency. Seeking this
balance raised both practical and theoretical questions as to the meaning of
"representation" in a policy rulemaking proceeding.
2. Necessity and Adequacy of Representation
Needfor representatiorm For an applicant to be funded, the statute re-
quired that it possess or speak for an interest, and that "representation of [the
interest be] necessary for a fair determination of the rulemaking proceeding
taken as a whole."108 Early in the program's administration, both the appli-
cants109 and the agency 1 occasionally ignored this statutory requirement, or
provided only a cursory analysis of need."' Applicants more frequently ar-
gued that their opposing interests, "the other side," were well-funded and vig-
orously represented.112 At times this approach led to rather abstract "generic
balance" arguments wholly divorced from the array of interests in the particu-
lar proceeding.113 Other applicants, however, emphasized the aggregate dollar
108. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)(1976); see notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text (discussing difficulty
in determining interest to be represented). The initial Rules of Practice sifiply tracked the statutory
language, thereby requiring that applicants demonstrate the need for representation of their interests in
the first instance. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(2) (1978).
109. See generally Application for Compensation of the New York Public Interest Research Group
(NYPIRG), Funeral Practices Proceeding (Feb. 22, 1976).
110. Appendix A indicates that NYPIRG received a substantial grant of compensation to serve as a
group representative and to present testimony in the Funeral Practices rulemaking. As far as the docu-
mentary record indicates, the need for representation was never questioned.
111. For example, the relevant portion of one application for funding, in its entirety, reads as
follows:
Mobile home consumers are not represented nationally and therefore, a grant of funds is
necessary for the largest and best organized mobile home consumer group to participate m the
FTC hearings. On the other hand, mobile home manufacturers and dealers are represented
on a national level, and we anticipate that if mobile home consumers are not granted funds to
participate in the hearings that [sic] only one side of the issue in regard to the FTC mobile
home regulation will be presented.
Application for Compensation of the Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc., Mobile Homes
Proceeding (Oct. 20, 1976). This applicant received compensation. See generally Appendix A.
112. One applicant argued that:
Backed by billions of dollars in sales, the mobile home industry will easily find articulate
spokespersons to represent its interests. In fact, even before the TRR was published in pro-
posed form, the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association (MHMA) petitioned the Commis-
sion to abandon the proceeding, and the industry has already deluged the TRR docket with
comments highly critical of the proposed rule.
Application for Compensation of the Center of Auto Safety, Mobile Homes Proceeding 6 (Oct. 24,
1975); see, e.g., Application for Compensation of the Association of Physical Fitness Centers, Health
Spas Proceeding 5 (May 31, 1977) (at least one of several participating consumer groups is funded by
FTC and will condemn entire industry); Application for Compensation of the National Hearing Aid
Society, Hearing Aids Proceeding 2-3 (April 12, 1976) (small business person with annual income of
$15,000 cannot compete effectively against forces of federal government m protracted proceeding); Ap-
plication for Compensation of the Americans for Democratic Action & National Council of Senior
Citizens, Funeral Practices Proceeding 5 (Feb. 23, 1976) ("Based on past experience, the Commission's
informal hearing will be well attended by representatives of the funeral industry. ... It is obviously
essential that consumers of funeral items and services also be adequately represented").
113. For example, one application read as follows:
It is becoming generally recognized that the consumer interest will not be automatically
protected in the process of goverment and that special steps must be taken to assure adequate
representation of that interest.
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stake of the interests they represented, 114 the relevance of the information they
sought to present, 115 or the expertise they offered. 116 Few participants at-
tempted to demonstrate need for representation based on the record in the
particular proceeding," 7 or on the contents of compensation requests filed by
other applicants." 8 Given the difficulty of obtaining access to these materi-
als, 119 this omission is not surprising. There is no clear evidence that any final
compensation decisions turned on the adequacy of the applicant's claim of
need for representation.
The 1977 Guidelines continued to hedge on the question of what factors
adequately demonstrated need for representation, noting that "it is difficult to
define precisely when representation of an interest is 'necessary for a fair deter-
mination of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole.' "120 The Guidelines
did establish some boundaries, however, by sketching two situations in which
the FTC believed the test could be applied easily: "This requirement is met if
the proposed rule would significantly affect the [applicant's] interest," but it "is
not met when an applicant wishes a proceeding broadened to take care of its
particular concerns."' 21 Both situations deserve brief comment.
In the abstract, it is difficult to quibble with the proposition that an interest
needs representation when a proposed government action will affect it in some
concrete, substantial way. The difficulty here, however, as with the standing
doctrine, is making the threshold determination without becoming entangled
in the merits of the controversy. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the economic
impact of a proposed rule, particularly on the interests of small business and
The adversary process works well only when all sides are effectively and separately repre-
sented. This would not be the case if the agency responsible for weighing the evidence and
developing a final trade rule in the public interest were also the sole advocate of the consumer
interest.
Application for Compensation of the Automobile Owners Action Council, Used Cars Proceeding 11
(undated, date-stamped May 18, 1976 by the FTC).
114. See Applications for Compensation of the National Consumer Law Center, Holder in Due
Course Proceeding 2-3 (March 9, 1976) and Credit Practices Proceeding 2-3 (Feb. 26, 1976).
115. See Application for Compensation of the Association of Physical Fitness Centers, Health Spas
Proceeding 4 (May 31, 1977); Application for Compensation of the National Consumers Congress,
Food Advertising Proceeding 2 (May 11, 1976); Application for Compensation of the Consumers
Union, Funeral Practices Proceeding 3 (Oct. 28, 1975).
116. Application for Compensation of the National Consumer Law Center, Credit Practices Pro-
ceeding 3 (Feb. 26, 1976); Application for Compensation of the Consumers Union, Funeral Practices
Proceeding 3 (Oct. 28, 1975).
117. Application for Compensation of the California Citizen Action Group, Health Spas Proceeding
5-6 (Oct. 25, 1976). The California group presented its rationale in these terms:
The Commission record as of October, 1976, already includes over 100 industry comments.
To balance this heavy industry input, Citizen Action proposes to act as the representative of
the consumer interest. Thus far, the Commission's record has very few organized consumer
group comments, and of those that do exist few present an in-depth, substantive analysis of
the proposed rule, and few speak from the unique perspective of Citizen Action.
Id
118. See Amended Application for Compensation of the Americans for Democratic Action, Health
Spas Proceeding 5-6 (April 13, 1977) (no other consumer group proposes to find expert witnesses to
testify upon economic effects of proposed regulation).
119. See generally ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § III (section relating to rulemaking rec-
ord in TRR proceedings).
120. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
121. Id
19811
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
consumers, was one of the ultimate issues to be decided in a TRR proceed-
ing. 122 In the proceedings studied, this question had not been addressed sys-
tematically on the record prior to the commencement of public hearings.
Instead, the FTC often published multiple versions of a proposed rule, or mul-
tiple rule provisions, and there was considerable uncertainty as to their ulti-
mate economic effects on industry or consumers. 123 In this setting, prehearing
determinations of economic effect could be only rough guesses. Thus, program
administrators would have very little basis upon which to reject any applicant's
superficially plausible claim of economic threat to its interests. The situation
might have differed if the statute had required the FTC to have a tight theory
supporting each proposed rule provision, and to assess carefully the available
evidence at the beginning of the proceeding. 124 During the period this study
covered, however, the "significant effect" test was a perfunctory requirement.
It probably would have had little utility in any policy rulemaking proceeding
in which an agency exercised broad discretion over both legal theories and
evidentiary requirements.
The second situation in which the Guidelines found the need test readily
applicable was when "the particular interest [of the applicant] is not signifi-
cantly affected by the proceeding as bounded by the Commission."'25 This
"scope-of-proceeding" test was logically founded in FTC experience, but it
required agency personnel to make some elusive distinctions.' 26 One objective
of the funding program presumably was to generate fresh perspectives on con-
sumer problems. Any new approach or criticism of a proposed rule, however,
was likely to generate "new" issues previously not in contention. Thus, agency
resistance to enlarging the scope of a proceeding could frustrate a basic pur-
pose of compensation. These conflicting imperatives required the program ad-
ministrators to determine when the bounds of a proceeding were being overly
expanded. 127
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(1) (1976) (Commission's statement of purpose to accompany rule shall
include statements as to prevalence of practices treated by rule, manner and context in which such acts
are unfair or deceptive, and economic effect of rule, taking into account effect on consumers and small
businesses).
123. Confidential FTC Document 13. See also ACUS PHASE I REPORT, .rupra note 31.
124. The 1980 amendments to the Magnuson-Moss Act moved the agency toward such control by
restricting the use of open-ended unfairness theories and by requiring the Commission to issue prelinu-
nary regulatory analyses. See generally Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 10, 94 Stat. 374 (1980); notes 26-27 supra
and accompanying text (discussing changes wrought by amendments).
125. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (emphasis added).
126. The scope-of-proceeding test probably was inspired by the FTC's concern over the manageabil-
ity of TRR proceedings under the Magnuson-Moss Act. These proceedings frequently generate enor-
mous, unwieldy records and require several years to complete. With proceedings already so large and
slow, it is not surprising for the agency to have resisted attempts to broaden the scope of proposed rules.
Moreover, if a group were to enlarge the scope of a TRR, opposing groups might be able to have the
resulting rule invalidated for inadequate notice upon judicial review.
127. The following examples, which are based upon issues and positions observed in the proceedings
studied, illustrate the range of questions that could arise under this standard.
(a) A consumer group asserts that the rule as drafted will not protect and therefore might not
affect the consumer interest because the remedies provided will not halt abuses.
(b) A trade association that represents an industry covered by a proposed rule argues that the
rule should be expanded to include some competitors, for example, the nonprofit competitors
of proprietary vocational schools, because otherwise they would have an unfair economic
advantage that could lead to market distortions.
(c) A consumer group contends that the proposed rule, which covers certain deceptive prac-
[Vol. 70:51
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The scope-of-proceeding test apparently was developed primarily to handle
situations in which narrow-focus consumer groups charge that a proposed rule
fails to provide adequate relief to the groups' constituencies of particularly vul-
nerable consumers. Three applications raised this issue in the pre-guidelines
period. The Council on Children, Media and Merchandising (CCMM), which
sought special protections for children in the Food Advertising and OTC Drug
Proceedings, fied two of these requests; the Spanish Speaking/Surnamed
Political Association, which sought bilingual disclosure requirements in the
Food Advertising rule, filed the third. The FTC rejected the Hispanic group's
application, explaining that the problem of Spanish-speaking consumers "ap-
pears to apply to several rules, [and] is not a substantive, disputed issue as the
food advertising proposed rule is now construed."12 8 CCMM, however, ob-
tained funding in response to both of its applications, despite an initial denial
in the OTC Drug Proceeding based upon the irrelevance of children's advertis-
ing issues to the proposed rule.129 The FTC later commenced a separate
tices, should be broadened to include other such practices. The group reasons that the addi-
tional practices are functionally similar to those covered or are frequently used by the same
sellers.
(d) A narrow-focus consumer group charges that the proposed rule is deficient because it is
designed to help the average consumer, and fails to provide adequate relief for the group's
constituency of peculiarly vulnerable consumers, such as the elderly, children, or Spanish-
speaking persons.
128. Action Letter from Margery Waxman Smith, Actin& Director, BCP to Ricardo A. Callejo,
Counsel to the Spanish Speaking/Surnamed Political Association, Food Advertising Proceeding I (July
19, 1976).
129. Initially, the agency responded to CCMM's request in the following manner.
Your application does not indicate in what way, if any, the interests of children bear on the
question of whether claims prohibited by the FDA in labeling should be prohibited in adver-
tising, except for the statement that "the review of OTC drug labels both for wording and for
efficacy of the contents of the package must be accompanied by a similar overhaul of how the
products are advertised before large audiences, particularly on television." In other words, it
appears from your application that the issues you propose to raise cannot reasonably be re-
garded as within the scope of the issues in the rulemaking proceeding.
Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP, to Robert B. Choate, Chairman, Council
on Children, Media and Merchandising, OTC Drug Proceedings 1-2 (March 1, 1976). After some
intermediate correspondence, CCMM reapplied for reimbursement. Application for Compensation of
CCMM, OTC Drug Proceeding (Nov. 4, 1976).
Once again, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection rejected the application,
explaining that "[t]he proposed rule. . covers only affirmative claims by advertisers; it does not cover
warnings, contra-indications, or any language of that nature. I cannot find in your application evidence
that children, or the deaf, blind, or illiterate require separate representation in this proceeding, inas-
much as the rule does not cover" requirements that advertisers make specified disclosures. Action
Letter from Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP, to Robert Choate, Council on Children,
Media and Merchandising (Dec. 16, 1976). CCMM responded with a one and one-half page letter that
provided little additional information about the group's position. Letter from Robert B. Choate,
CCMM to Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP (Dec. 23, 1976).
After noting that CCMM personnel involved in the proceeding felt "there is a great need to examine"
the rule's theory that FDA labeling requirements could be extended to advertisements, the letter stated:
After discussions with your personnel I am concerned that the FTC's desire to keep these
hearings to a "sharp, limited focus" disregards a number of issues about drug advertising that
must be raised here and now. They may be raised again in the individual FDA monograph
hearings relative to warnings, but they must also be raised in regard to the affirmative claims
which are the subject of the immediate proceeding.
Id at 2. The FTC then approved CCMM's application. Action Letter from Margery Waxman Smith,
Acting Director, BCP to Robert B. Choate, CCMM, OTC Drug Proceeding (Jan. 21, 1977); cf. Confi-
dential FTC Documents 14-16.
1981]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
rulemaking proceeding to address some general problems of advertising di-
rected at children. 130 How these results can be reconciled, or which of these
seemingly conflicting approaches is the correct interpretation of the Guide-
lines, is unclear. That CCMM nonetheless received compensation to represent
the special interests of children and illiterates in the Antacids rulemaking,' 3 '
after the Guidelines became effective, suggests that at least in some cases the
FTC did not interpret the scope-of-proceeding requirement very strictly.
Adequacy of representation. Among the most detailed standards con-
tained in the Guidelines were those explicating the statutory provision that the
applicant must have, or represent, an interest "which would not otherwise be
adequately represented in the proceedings."' 32 Factors bearing on the ade-
quacy of available representation generally can be divided between those relat-
ing to activities the applicant proposed to undertake, and those concerning
characteristics or attributes of the applicant. As discussed below, these two
groups of standards rely upon differing assumptions regarding the nature of
interest representation in a rulemaking proceeding.
Activity tests related to information pro vided The statute did not explic-
itly require that the FTC examine the activities a compensation applicant pro-
posed to undertake. Nonetheless, from the outset this inquiry was a central
feature in the administration of the compensation program. The agency em-
phasized this factor because:
The Bureau cannot determine that an applicant's participation is
needed for adequate representation of the interest unless the appli-
cant's proposed activities are compared with the efforts of the staff
and other participants. . . . The adequacy clause of the statute re-
quires that replication of material already on the record or scheduled
to be put on the record does not meet the standard.
33
This interpretation of the statute had common-sense appeal; Congress hardly
could have intended to let the FTC spend public funds to produce cumulative
or redundant information. Nevertheless, this reading raised a series of subsidi-
ary questions.
First, the "new information" standard did not apply equally to all compen-
sable activities. Applicants sought, and were granted, compensation for partic-
ipating in each of the major public stages of a TRR proceeding: submitting
prehearing written comments, presenting testimony at the hearings, serving as
designated group representatives with the right to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, preparing rebuttal submissions, filing post-record comments on the
Presiding Officer's and staff's final reports, and making oral presentations to
the full Commission. Only three of these activities-prehearing comments,
hearing testimony, and rebuttal submissions-were designed primarily to gen-
130. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978).
131. Application for Compensation, CCMM, OTC Antacids Proceeding (Sept. 21, 1977); Action Let-
ter from Richard C. Foster, Assistant Director for Marketing Practices, BCP to Robert B. Choate,
CCMM, OTC Antacids Proceeding (Sept. 30, 1977).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
133. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
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erate "data" as opposed to "views or argument." Even for these data-generat-
i g activities, however, the new information standard sometimes proved
difcult to apply.
One question arose regarding the significance of the mode in which informa-
tion was presented. For example, if the prehearing comment record or the
investigative file material contained certain information, should compensation
be denied to an applicant wishing to present the same kind of data through
witness testimony at the hearing? In some cases examined in this study, the
answer seemed to be affirmative.' 34 This approach would be reasonable if all
parts of the record were treated as functionally equivalent in decisionmak-
ingm35 or if there were precise evidentiary standards in trade regulation
rulemaking. In practice, however, neither condition existed.' 36 Thus, agency
decisions based on this criterion were open to dispute.
The absence of clear evidentiary standards also left uncertain the absolute
weight of evidence necessary to support a rule. The statute required "substan-
tial evidence,"' 137 but there was no consensus as to what this requirement
meant in particular proceedings.' 38 This made it extremely difficult for a pro-
gram administrator to conclude that the record contained sufficient evidence to
support a rule, and that additional testimony would therefore be superfluous.
In addition, the new information test required program administrators to
know both the present and the future state of the rulemaking record.' 39 As a
practical matter, staff attorneys, being closest to the rule, had a virtual monop-
oly on this information. Therefore, the staff had some leverage to compromise
the independence of the compensation applicants, or to defeat applications by
134. For example, the Center for Auto Safety and the Americans for Democratic Action jointly
applied for compensation in the Used Cars Proceeding. They proposed, in part, to search the Center's
records of approximately 50,000 complaints from car owners, and to prepare a report that analyzed
complaints relating to used automobiles. Application for Compensation of the Center for Auto Safety
& Americans for Democratic Action, Used Cars Proceeding 9 (Nov. 5, 1976). The FTC denied funding
to the applicants because their proposal would have duplicated material already on the record. The
groups were advised that:
As you may be aware from the staff report and subsequent written submissions on this rule,
the present record contains a considerable amount of information on consumer complaints.
In addition, the record shows that the Automobile Owners' Action Council has been funded
to conduct the sort of file search that you have proposed. Therefore, I cannot find that this
further information will be a substantial contribution rather than duplicative.
Action Letter from Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP, to Thomas K. Wilka, Staff Attor-
ney, Center for Auto Safety, Used Cars Proceeding 2 (Dec. 21, 1976).
135. Regarding the relative weights of the comment record and the hearing testimony, an argument
could be made that written comments were entitled to less weight than oral testimony under the sub-
stantial evidence test because they had not been subjected to cross-examination. In addition, the
problems involved in gaining access to the record, as well as in locating and in obtaining relevant
material, were often greater with the comment record than with the hearing testimony. Thus, prehear-
ing comments were more likely to get lost or overlooked in the avalanche of documents in many
rulemaking records.
136. For a general discussion of the evidentiary and record-access problems in trade regulation
rulemaking, see ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § III.
137. The statute required "substantial evidence" to support a rule. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(e)(3)(A) (1976)
(court may set aside rule if not supported by substantial evidence in rulemaking record).
138. Applying the substantial evidence test to a rulemaking record is a problem common to many
contemporary statutes. See generally DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and
Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1588, 1589-90
(1976).
139. This approach was thought necessary because "replication of material already on the record or
scheduled to be put on the record does not meet the standard." 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
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disfavored groups. This situation gave disappointed applicants grounds for
attacking the integrity of compensation decisions.
140
Activity tests related to advocacy pro vided The legislative history of the
Magnuson-Moss Act suggests that cross-examination in TRR hearings was
provided to protect those parties who would be regulated by a proposed
rule. 41 As soon as the compensation program came into existence, however,
applications arrived indicating that consumer groups expected the same proce-
dural right. The issue arose for the first time in the Vocational Schools Pro-
ceeding, when the FTC decided that the statutory language was sufficiently
broad to permit funding of applicants who wanted to serve as group represent-
atives with rights of cross-examination. 142 Authorizations for "procedural par-
140. The FTC's handling of the Center for Auto Safety's application in the Mobile Homes proceed-
ing illustrated these problems. The FTC initially denied compensation for two proposed activities on
the basis of redundancy. An economic study was rejected because "the Commission staff proposes to
introduce material that is likely adequately to explore the same economic issues," and consumer com-
plaint testimony was refused unless the applicants could provide "additional information that will show
that the witnesses will not simply duplicate the testimony of homeowner witnesses to be called by the
staff." Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP, to Michael M. Landa, Center for
Auto Safety, Mobile Homes Proceeding 2 (Jan. 19, 1976). The applicants responded angrily, ques-
tioned the authority of the FTC to dictate the content of a compensated group's presentation, and
requested discovery of the staff's "case" so they could dispute the claim of duplication. The group
charged:
[The compensation provision] was not intended toprovide Commission staff an opportunity
to control the participation of outside counsel and witnesses, or to use those [who arel granted
compensation merely to fill in what Commission staff regard as gaps in the rulemaking record.
On the contrary, as Congress recognized, adequate representation is possible only when the
client and his/her representatives-and not the FTC--determine what submissions are neces-
sary to support the client's position ...
...[S]ince we do not know either what testimony staff mobile home owner witnesses will
present or what material the staffwill introduce that is "likely to explore" the economic issues
we have raised, we cannot now demonstrate that our witnesses and economic study will [pro-
vide new information] .... Indeed, given this information vacuum, we do not see gow
anyone would make the showing you require. We therefore request that the Commission
specify (I) the testimony staffhomeowner witneses will present and (2) the economic material
the staff will present.
Letter from Clarence M. Dittow, III & Michael M. Landa, Center for Auto Safety to Joan Z. Bernstein,
Acting Director, BCP 2 (Feb. 26, 1976). The level of detail and the burden to the FTC staff that this
discovery request encompassed is suggested by the Center's specifications on the economic issues, for
which the following information was sought:
(1) How consumer effects are to be defined and measured;
(2) Whether the question of impact of the rule on concentration of market power will be
addressed, [and] if so how it will be handled;
(3) How the costs and benefits of the rule will be defined and measured;
(4) What other specific economic issues the staff will raise, the nature of the economic models
to be used in all cases in structuring the analysis, the data to be employed.
Id at 2-3. To the extent that these specifications would require the FTC to take a position on un-
resolved questions of evidentiary standards or burden of proof, they provided the agency with an addi-
tional incentive to avoid a confrontation. This particular controversy was resolved through informal
negotiations between the applicant and the staff. See generally Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting
Director, BCP to Clarence M. Ditlow, III & Michael M. Landa, Center for Auto Safety (April 12,
1976). It did illustrate effectively, however, the dilemmas of applying a new information standard.
141. See, e.g., Consumer Warranty Protection: Hearings on H. 20 and HA 5021 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 156-59, 197 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Eckhart); id at 707 (statement of Rep. McCollister); Id at
64-65, 69 (remarks of Rep. Broyhill).
142. Confidential FTC Documents 18-19; Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director,
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ticipation" soon became a regular feature of the compensation program. 143
The presumption in favor of consumer group representatives participating at
all hearings became so well established that both staff and Presiding Officers
occasionally solicited consumer groups to apply for compensation when no
consumer spokesperson was slated for the hearing. 144 At least one consumer
representative was present at a majority of the hearings in thirteen of the first
fourteen TRR proceedings conducted after passage of the Magnuson-Moss
Act. 1
45
Once the FTC had established that procedural participation was compensa-
ble, the question arose whether the agency as a general policy should fund
different local groups to represent the consumer interest at each of the regional
hearings on a particular rule, or conversely, whether it should fund one group
to participate in all of the hearings. In the early proceedings, most consumer
group applicants requested funding to serve as group representatives at no
more than one or two regional hearings. Both the Presiding Officers and the
consumer groups soon found this system ineffective for representing consumer
interests. The Presiding Officers generally preferred for one group to represent
the consumer interest throughout the proceeding. The Officers believed that a
single representative would be familiar with the procedural ground rules of the
hearing, and would be less likely to duplicate points established at earlier hear-
ing sites. 146 Similarly, as consumer group lawyers gained experience in
Magnuson-Moss rulemaking, they realized that entering in the middle or late
stages of an ongoing proceeding was a serious handicap, and resulted in frag-
mented consumer representation. 47
Some consumer groups began to seek funding to participate at all stages of
the proceedings. They argued that without this continuity of representation
the consumer advocates could not achieve equality with the other participants:
[Funding different consumer representatives in different cities] se-
verely interferes with effective cross-examination since material ad-
BCP to Kay Pachtner, San Francisco Consumer Action, Vocational Schools Proceeding (Nov. 24,
1975).
143. See 1977 Guidelines, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,481 (1977) (funding available for "participating as a party
in the informal hearing, with a right to examine or cross-examine witnesses as allowed by the Presiding
Officer).
144. Interview with Kathleen O'Reilly, Consumer Federation of America, Funeral Industry Pro-
ceeding (Feb. 16, 1977) (FTC solicited CFA because no other strong local consumer group); Interview
with James Turner, counsel for Consumer Action, Inc., Food Advertising Rule (Aug. 16, 1976) (Turner
contacted after application period for designated party status had closed).
145. See generall, ACUS PHAsE I REPORT, supra note 31, at 199-217 app. The exception was the
Protein Supplements Proceeding. In that hearing a consumer group representative was present in the
audience and submitted written questions for the Presiding Officer to ask during at least part of the
hearings. Interview with Margaret Godwyn, San Francisco Consumer Action, Protein Supplements
Proceeding (Nov. 8, 1976).
146. Interview with William D. Dixon, Special Assistant for Rulemaking, BCP (Feb. 7, 1977).
147. Interview with Lonnie Von Renner, wounsel to Americans for Democratic Action, Prescription
Drugs, Funeral Practices, and Ophthalmic Goods Proceedings (Feb. 15, 1977); Interview with James
Turner, counsel for D.C. Consumer Action, Food Advertising Proceeding (Dec. 2, 1976); Interview
with. David Swankin, counsel for National Consumer Congress, Care Labeling Proceeding and Conti-
nental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies, Funeral Practices Proceeding (Nov. 23, 1976);
Interview with Michael Schulman & John Reed, California Citizen Action Group, San Francisco
Ophthalmic Hearings (July 30, 1976); Interview with John Pound, Kenneth McEldowney & Karen
Tomovick, San Francisco Consumer Action, Vocational Schools Proceeding (Dec. 12, 1975).
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duced at earlier hearings cannot be used as the basis of questions. It
also prevents the use of cross-examination or direct testimony to fill
...gaps in the record since consumer attorneys cannot know what
gaps exist. Similarly, it is impossible for consumer attorneys to pre-
pare effective rebuttal since they do not know what evidence needs to
be rebutted ....
Perhaps most important, there is no way for consumer attorneys to
prepare adequate [post-hearing] written comments [on the Presiding
Officer's and staffs reports] without being familiar with the entire
record. If consumer attorneys have not participated at all the hear-
ings, they will have to read a voluminous record later. This is waste-
ful in both time and money ....
...No industry organization would consider itself adequately
represented if it did not have the same counsel participate throughout
the proceeding-planning a strategy before the hearings begin; ob-
taining witnesses to support this position; having counsel cross-ex-
amine witnesses at all the hearings; preparing rebuttal to respond to
important adverse evidence; and drafting detailed written comments
which use the entire record to present forcefully the group's entire
case. 148
This description of the proceedings is fairly accurate. 149 Most hearings did
not have a distinct regional focus, and many uncompensated group representa-
tives adopted a strategy for developing evidence and arguments in support of
their "case" throughout the series of hearings. Moreover, effective participa-
tion in the later stages of the proceeding, particularly during oral arguments
before the Commissioners, seemed to require detailed knowledge of what had
come before. Consumer group officials, however, did not unanimously support
the single representative policy.
Some consumer spokespersons thought the FTC should try to fund diverse
local groups, so as to support more "grassroots" participation in rulemak-
ing.' 50 They contended that smaller local and regional groups might be un-
willing or unable to assume the responsibilities of group representation
throughout a long and complex proceeding.' 5 l Moreover, fundifig only one
consumer representative could breed conflict among public interest groups
148. Joint Application for Compensation of the Center for Auto Safety & Americans for Democratic
Action, Used Cars Proceeding 6 (Nov. 5, 1976).
149. This opinion is based on hearing observations and other data collected in this study.
150. Interview with Margaret Godwyn, San Francisco Consumer Action, Protein Supplements Pro-
ceeding (Nov. 8, 1976); Interview with Rebecca Cohen, Continental Association of Funeral and Memo-
rial Societies, Funeral Practices Proceeding (Oct. 26, 1976). Some FTC officials involved in the
compensation program disagreed. They found the prehearing comment records and hearing testimony
adequate to give the Commission an understanding of "grassroots" sentiment in TRR proceedings, and
felt that adequate technical expertise, including legal skills, was necessary for the effective representa-
tion of the consumer interest. Sohn & Rubin Interview, supra note 40.
151. Interview with Mark Silbergeld, Consumers Union, Funeral Practices & Food Advertising Pro-
ceedings (Feb. 7, 1977) (not all consumer groups could afford preparation and consultation time to
provide lawyer for all hearings); Interview with Margaret Godwyn, San Francisco Consumer Action,
Protein Supplements Proceeding (Nov. 8, 1976) (consumer groups have limited staffs and may be over-
extended if they try to serve as consumer representative at all hearings); Interview with Rebecca Cohen,
Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies, Funeral Practices Proceeding (Oct. 26,
1976) (nit always possible for group to be available for all hearings); Interview with John Pound, San
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were they to begin competing with one another for the right to be the sole
consumer spokesperson.'
52
From its later funding decisions and from statements by agency officials, 1
53
it became clear that the FTC had opted for technical competence over grass-
roots representation. This policy probably contributed to the concentration of
compensation awards among the relatively few organizations and law firms
that comprised a specialized "pro-consumer FTC bar."
154
The "new information" test was not a useful standard for ruling upon pro-
posals for procedural representation in hearing and post-hearing stages of
TRR proceedings, and therefore the FTC needed to develop additional criteria
for evaluating such applications. The 1977 Guidelines, however, provided
only limited insight: "Evidence that the applicant has a point of view, not
already represented by the FTC staff attorneys or any other party, that would
Francisco Consumer Action, Ophthalmic Hearings (Aug. 2, 1976) (proceedings should be more region-
alized; when record is in Washington, difficult for consumer groups to work with it).
152. Some indication of this appeared in the Children's Advertising Proceeding. One consumer
group sent a letter to the FTC's Special Assistant for Public Participation, with copies to the Bureau
Director and Commission chairman, urging that compensation funds not be disbursed too widely
among consumer groups:
It is our understanding that a number of groups are being encouraged to apply for reimburse-
ment in this proceeding. Since there is undoubtedly a limited amount of money available, we
are concerned that, if the money is divided among a large number of groups, no one group
will be able to participate fully throughout the [proceeding].
We simply hope that no prejudgment has been made by the FTC on how to divide the
money ....
Letter from Peggy Charren, Action for Children's Television to Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for
Public Participation, FTC (March 22, 1978). Soon thereafter, a competing consumer group filed a
Freedom of Information Act request for this correspondence. Letter from Harry Snyder, Consumers
Union, West Coast Office to Barbara Keehn, Freedom of Information Unit, FTC (April 4, 1978).
153. Sohn & Rubin Interview, supra note 40.
154. See notes 272-83 infra and accompanying text (noting geographic and political concentrations
of funding awards). The FTC received considerable criticism during the 1979 legislative oversight
process for allowing the program to be dominated by a few repeat applicants. In the 1980 amendments
Congress responded by limiting the total funding any single applicant could receive in any rulemaking
proceeding. Section 10(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 provides that
no person may receive more than $75,000 of compensation funds for any single rulemaking proceeding,
or more than $50,000 in any single fiscal year. Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 374 (1980). This
limit is sufficiently high so as technically not to preclude the FTC's continuation of its one-representa-
tive policy. It does, however, encourage the distribution of funding in any single proceeding. Thus, the
amendment's principal effect might be either to raise the total cost of procedural representation because
of the additional preparation time each separate regional representative would need to become familiar
with the issues and evidence, or to fragment and to reduce the effectiveness of consumer representation.
As the table below indicates, in 17 proceedings that reached some stage of public participation during
the period this study covered, lawyers' fees and related support costs exceeded the $75,000 statutory
limit twice. The $50,000 yearly limit was exceeded in 11 of the 17 proceedings.
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help illuminate [key] issues can be [a] favorable [factor]."' 55 Documentary
records of the compensation program do not indicate how the "unique point of















































































(This table is derived from an FTC chart entitled, "Attorney Fees and Costs Compared to Total
Budget as of Feb. 1, 1979")
Since proceedings usually ran for several years and many of the legal fees did not greatly exceed the
$50,000 yearly limit, monetary considerations probably would not bar continuation of the single repre-
sentative policy. Moreover, near the end of the period this study covered, the FTC decided to hold
fewer regional hearings. Sohn & Rubin Interview, supra note 40. This policy also would reduce the
total costs of procedural representation. Continuation of the single representative policy, however,
probably would force groups to choose between procedural representation and presentation of empiri-
cal evidence. Between 1975 and 1979, many groups received funding for both activities.
Consumer representatives who had questioned the funding of a single consumer representative in
each proceeding suggested several alternatives the agency might adopt to make shared representation
effective. For example, the FTC could designate a "lead" consumer group representative and require
that spokesperson to keep in contact with smaller regional or local groups, and thus more accurately
represent their interests at the hearings. Interview with James Turner, counsel to D.C. Consumer Ac-
tion, Food Advertising Proceeding (December 2, 1976). Alternatively, the Commission could compen-
sate multiple consumer representatives and provide sufficient funding for them to meet periodically to
develop a common strategy. Interview with Michael Schulman & John Reed, California Citizens Ac-
tion Group, San Francisco Ophthalmic Hearings (July 30, 1976). A similar technique would compen-sate regional represe tatives to attend and observe hearings preceding those for which they already
have been funded. See Supplemental Application for Compensation of Golden State Mobilhome Own-
ers League, In., Mobile Homes Proceeding (June 7, 1977) (requesting $1,843.00 additional funding for
attorney to observe hearings in Washington, D.C. before participating in San Francisco hearings). But
see Action Letter from Albert H. Kramer, Director, BCP to Golden State Mobilhome Owners League,
Inc. (July 13, 1978) (agency granted $500.00 for purchase of transcript of Washington hearings instead
of funding attorney's personal observation). Depending upon the size of the hearing and the number of
participants involved, these approaches could increase markedly the costs of the compensation pro-
gram. One suggestion to offset these increased costs is to fund consumer representation only in major,
controversial proceedings. See Interview with David Swankin, counsel to National Consumers Con-
gress, Care Labeling Proceeding (February 11, 1977) (agencies should determine which proceedings
would benefit most from public participation, as well as amount to be spent in each of these high
priority proceedings).






















view" test was applied. The applicant presumably would at least be required
to show that it favored an outcome different from that supported by staff, in-
dustry, or other applicants.156 In practice, however, grants to engage in proce-
dural representation seemed to depend more heavily on factors relating to the
status of the applicant.
Status tests. The 1977 Guidelines included six criteria relating to the
characteristics or status of the applicant. 157 These factors relate either to the
representative qualities or to the technical competence of the applicant.
Three qualifications relating to technical competence were to be weighed in
an applicant's favor: expertise in the substantive area covered by the proposed
rule, experience in trade regulation matters, and general performance and
competence in areas other than trade regulation. 158 Because these criteria
were reasonable factors to consider in estimating the utility of a group's partic-
ipation,1 59 no significant problem or controversy involving their application
developed. The emphasis on demonstrated expertise, however, particularly in
FTC issues, tended to create a preference for "repeat players"-groups that
previously had received funding. A repeat applicant had several advantages
over an inexperienced group: a successful grant application format to copy in
later applications, a reputation within the agency for competence, access to
program administrators and staff attorneys, and the precedential value from
the agency's previous determination that the applicant met the status tests.'
60
156. One law professor addressed the point by writing: "I am not aware of any other individual who
shares my views on this subject. Therefore, these views could not be adequately otherwise repre-
sented." Application for Compensation of Professor Richard S. Kay, Holder in Due Course Amend-
ment Proceeding (Feb. 26, 1976). The agency denied him compensation on the ground that his"participation would be more in the nature of an expert witness rather than as a representative of an
interest." Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP to Richard S. Kay (March 30,
1976).
157. These factors were: the applicant's point of view, the specificity of that view, expertise in both
the substantive area and in trade regulation matters generally, the relation between the applicant and
the interest, the applicant's constituency, and the applicant's willingness to spend his own money on the
proceedings. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977).
158. See generally Id In addition, the Guidelines noted with regard to an applicant's general per-
formance and competence that: "An applicant requesting funds to perform survey research should
prove its competence in conducting surveys, or in knowing whom to hire for survey work. A request for
funds for cross-examination should establish the expertise of the proposed cross-examiner." Id
159. The Guidelines set forth the agency's reasoning as follows:
[Tihe statutory requirement that without the particular applicant the interest will not be ade-
quately represented means that the quality of an application is relevant. The Bureau must
determine that it is reasonably likely that the applicant can competently represent its interest.
... The test is not whether a particular applicant will make representation of an interest
fully adequate, but whether the representation will make a substantial contribution to the
adequacy of representation.
id
160. On occasion, both FTC personnel and applicants suggested that receipt of a prior grant of
compensation indicated that questions regarding the applicant's status or characteristics had already
been resolved, and did not need to be re-examined. See generall, Application for Compensation of the
California Citizen Action Group, Health Spas Proceeding 8 (Oct. 25, 1976) ("In regard to the question
of financial assistance, it should be noted that on three previous occasions, the FTC determined that
Citizen Action could not effectively participate without financial assistance"); Confidential FTC Docu-
ment 21. Statistically, repeat applicants were highly successful in obtaining compensation. Ten groups
applied for funding in three or more rulemaking proceedings. Of the 42 total applications this group
ified, the Commission approved 35. Even this figure understates the momentum resulting from a prior
1981]
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In this respect, the FTC's attempts to ensure the applicants' technical compe-
tence left the agency vulnerable to criticism for allowing a few large groups to
dominate the compensation program.
The second group of status tests concerned the relationship between the ap-
plicant and the interest it purported to represent. The Guidelines required that
the applicant be a bona-fide spokesperson for the interest in question.16' Fac-
tors to be considered in an applicant's favor included its status as a member-
ship organization, its receipt of contributions from its constituency, 62 and its
willingness to spend some of its own funds to participate in the proceeding.1
63
The emphasis on constituency ties may be explained by two rather different
rationales. First, a group accountable to its membership or contributors might
be pressured to produce quality work. Second, the existence of a defined con-
stituency could perform a legitimizing function: when questions in a rulemak-
ing proceeding involve policy tradeoffs or value preferences, it may be
desirable or necessary to ensure that the representative group has actual au-
thority to speak on behalf of its constituents. 64
These justifications, however, are subject to a variety of practical criticisms.
As a factual matter, rank and file members of consumer organizations or other
voluntary groups tend neither to participate in this kind of proceeding, nor to
monitor the quality of representation. 65 Decisions regarding the positions,
grant, because two of the denials in the Prescription Drug TRR, the Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA) and the Consumers' Union West Coast Office (CU), were rejections of the groups' first applica-
tions. ADA subsequently received six compensation awards without any rejections, and CU success-
fully applied for funding in two later applications. In summary, only four out of 42 applications by
repeaters who had succeeded on a prior application were rejected, and one was withdrawn by the
applicant.
161. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977). The Guidelines explain that "fa]n industry trade association that
claims to represent consumers would be viewed skeptically, and vice versa, for example." Id
162. See id (willingness of individuals to support applicant demonstrates that applicant responsive
to their interests). See also Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 45 Ad. L. 2d 133, 142 (D.D.C. 1979)
(court denied standing to seek judicial review to Nader-affidiate organization that had no members,
only contributors). In reaching its decision, the court reasoned:
So long as the courts insist on some sort of substantial nexus between the injured party and
the organizational plaintiff-a nexus normally to be provided by actual membership or its
functional equivalent, measured in terms of control-it can reasonably be presumed that, in
effect, it is the injured party who is himself seeking review ....
...T Ihere is a material difference of both degree and substance between the control exer-
cised by masses of contributors tending to give more or less money to an organization depend-
ing on its responsiveness to their interests, or through the expression of opinion in the letters
of supporters, on the one hand, and the control exercised by members of an organization as
they regularly elect their governing body on the other.
Id at 140-41 (emphasis in original).
163. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (Section E(8)).
164. Documentary records and interviews with FTC officials suggest that in practice, the dominant
consideration of agency decisionmakers was "quality control," and not ensuring legitimization of the
representative groups.
165. The practical obstacles to such participation are formidable, both because of the complexity of
the issues involved in determining whether or how to participate in an administrative proceeding and
because of the difficulties in polling a dispersed membership on these matters, or even providing ad-
vance notice of the representative's activities. Also, members are unlikely to have access to detailed
information about the proceedings and the conduct of the group's representatives, except through the
association and its publications. Members usually will have expectations about the basic objectives the
organization pursues and will form impressions about its &eneral level of success in realizing those
objectives. Tfiey are unlikely, however, to become involved m the details of representation. See gener-
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strategies, and tactics to be adopted in a particular controversy usually are
made by the staff of the organization in conjunction with boards of directors or
executive committees, or by the lawyers and other technicians participating in
the proceeding. Membership influence probably derives more from the choice
between "exit" and "loyalty" than from opportunities for "voice" within the
organization.1 66 Moreover, inferences drawn from this sort of evidence are at
best ambiguous. 167 Therefore, in order to determine whether the varying rela-
tionships between public interest groups and their constituencies are properly
relevant to FTC funding decisions, it is necessary to consider briefly some the-
oretical aspects of the representative relationship.
Theoretical considerations. In large measure, the lack of focus and co-
herence in the FTC's funding criteria may reflect an unresolved debate regard-
ing the kind of representation the program was intended to foster. Despite its
familiarity and frequent use in discussions of public participation, the concept
of representation-whether of persons or of interests-is complex and varies
from one context to another. For present purposes, two dimensions of the con-
cept of representation should be considered in relation to the FTC compensa-
tion program: the functional and the formalistic aspects of the representative's
status.
Functional considerations refer to the relationship between the characteris-
tics or activities of the representative, and the kinds of decisions being
made. 168 Regulatory decisions, including those in trade regulation rulemak-
ally J. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE (paper ed. 1977); S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS
AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY: USES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (paper
ed. 1974); T. Lowi, THE POLrrIcs OF DISORDER (paper ed. 1974); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (paper ed. 1970).
166. One consumer group spokesperson interviewed felt that opinions expressed in constituents' let-
ters provided more reliable "feedback" for the organization than attempts to determine how to keep a
constituency happy. Interview with Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising
(March 23, 1979). The Council is a non-membership organization.
167. Members may join, or leave, an organization for a great variety of reasons, some of which are
totally unrelated to the group's position on particular issues. Even assuming that an organization's
participation in a given proceeding does influence membership decisions, the proper interpretation of a
rise or fall in membership is arguable. The compensation application of the National Hearing Aid
Society (NHAS), a membership association of hearing aid dealers, illustrates this problem. NHAS
argued that it should be funded to continue its participation in the Hearing Aids rulemaking because it
had taxed its members to the limit and it has been unable to raise the money necessary to pay its
lawyers. As evidence of its financial inability to participate, NHAS noted that its dues had nearly
tripled over a three-year period, and that several hundreds of members had refused to pay either these
increased dues or a special assessment to support participation. Application for Compensation of the
National Hearing Aid Society 1-2 (May 4, 1976). A rival association, however, argued that "the ac-
knowledged drop in NHAS membership... may be a product of dealer dissatisfaction with the direc-
tion and substance of NHAS advocacy efforts, and not, as NHAS suggests, the result of increased
NHAS membership dues." Letter from the American Speech and Hearing Association to G. Martin
Shepherd, Presiding Officer, BCP (May 21, 1976).
168. One commentator on political representation explains this relationship in the following terms:
The more a theorist sees political issues as questions of knowledge, to which it is possible to
find correct, objectively valid answers, the more inclined he will be to regard the representa-
tive as an expert and to find the opinion of a constituency irrelevant. If political issues are like
scientific or even mathematical problems, it is foolish to try to solve them by counting noses in
the constituency. On the other hand, the more a theorist takes political issues to be arbitrary
and irrational choices, matters of whim or taste, the less it makes sense for a representative to
... ignore the tastes of those for whom he is supposed to be acting. If political choices are
1981]
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ing, can be ranked on a continuum ranging from the normative to the expert.
The location of a particular decision on this continuum implies the kind of
representation that is most appropriate. When the decision is predominantly
technical or scientific, the representative should be an expert in the relevant
discipline. If, on the other hand, the decision is intended to produce a bar-
gained outcome or a "pure" policy choice, the representative's influence
should depend largely upon the constituency purportedly represented.
The conceptual difficulty the FTC confronted, as some agency officials have
realized, 169 was that most issues raised in trade regulation rulemaking fall at
neither extreme of this continuum. A few proceedings included relatively nar-
row technical inquiries. 170 Somewhat more frequently, TRR proceedings
raised issues that could be described as pure policy questions.'
7
1 Nevertheless,
the majority of issues in trade regulation rulemaking lie between these ex-
tremes, mixing normative and expert considerations. For these middle-range
questions, the "political" or "technical" character of a particular issue is
largely a matter of discretion.' 72 Moreover, as the FTC was forcefully re-
minded, the rulemaking process occurs within a larger political context. Even
if the agency believes its decision on a proposed rule should be based solely on
technical considerations, it still has to generate sufficient political support to
allow its final product to survive congressional oversight.
The mixed and shifting character of issues involved in FTC rulemaking
probably renders it impossible to develop simple, uniform standards that rec-
oncile the conflicting bases of representation outlined above.
173 In theory,
however, the representation tests could be utilized to give appropriate empha-
sis to the kind of presentation the applicant proposed to make. Thus, if the
applicant planned to develop technical information, such as survey research
data or economic modeling, its expertise would become a predominant factor
in the agency's decision. If, on the other hand, the applicant sought to address
like the choice between, say, two kinds of food, the representative can only please either his
own taste or theirs, and the latter seems the only justifiable choice ....
* . * Political issues, by and large, are found in the intermediate range. . . . Political ques-
tions are not likely to be as arbitrary as a choice between two foods; nor are they likely to be
questions of knowledge to which an expert can supply the one correct answer.
H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 211-12 (paper ed. 1972).
169. See note 69 supra and accompanying text (discussing technocratic and democratic aspects of
rulemaking proceedings).
170. The Protein Supplements Proceeding, for example, addressed the issue of processes by which
humans metabolize amino acids. See generally Report of the Presiding Officer, Protein Supplements
Proceeding 14-30 (June 15, 1978).
171. The Credit Practices rulemaking discussed the proper regulatory policy to be adopted if eco-
nomic theory shows that abolition of creditors' summary remedies will raise the cost of credit, reduce
the availability of credit for low income consumers, or both. See 40 Fed. Reg. 16,349 (1975).
172. One could, for example, convert the policy question concerning creditors' remedies described
above into a factual question whether the projected economic effects and other possible costs or benefits
in fact would occur. These issues then could be resolved through field research on the behavior of
lenders and borrowers and comparisons of experience in states that had abolished summary remedies
with those that had not.
173. It is theoretically possible that choice or conflict between these two bases of representation could
be avoided if a large enough number of orga tion willing to participatepossessed a broad member-
ship which was both knowledgeable of technical issues, and involved sufficiently in the organization to
participate in decisions regarding the group's advocacy positions in a given proceeding. This condition
apparently did not exist in the proceedings conducted by the FTC during this study, and because of the
practical difficulties previously described, it probably does not exist in many regulatory fields.
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policy issues, its ability to speak for an affected constituency would become the
key factor. The 1977 Guidelines were generally consistent with this approach,
although they neither explicitly required it nor clearly elaborated upon it.
174
Whenever the policy or value-preference component of a funding appli-
cant's proposed participation warrants examining the applicant's ability to
speak on behalf of a particular constituency, it becomes necessary for the
agency to investigate the formalistic aspects of the group's representative rela-
tionship. In other words, the agency should consider whether an adequate
mechanism exists to ensure the legitimacy of the applicant as a spokesperson
for the interest it purports to represent.1
75
The occasional criticism that public interest groups are "self-appointed
spokesmen" for the consumer interest176 reflects concern for the formal au-
thority of an organization to represent a constituency. This concern also mani-
fested itself in the lines of questioning some industry spokespersons used to
challenge the legitimacy of compensated consumer group witnesses during
TRR hearings. 177 Even the consumer groups seemed to have varying concepts
of their representational role. Thus, groups funded to participate in TRR's
174. Seegenerally 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (factors used by agency to determine funding decisions
address applicant's expertise and competence, as well as constituency support and representation).
175. Professor Richard Stewart has described the problem in the following manner.
There are two possible responses to the realization that legislative discretion is exercised by
agencies .... One might somehow attempt to require the legislature to take back the discre-
tion it has delegated; but such a program overlooks the inability of any single elected body to
resolve more than a small proportion of the major issues of collective choice in a developed
society. On the other hand, agencies could be invested with the legitimizing rituals of election.
However, the formal one-person, one-vote principle which sustains the legislature is too brittle
to permit its wholesale application to numerous agencies enjoying substantial measures of
discretionary power-hence the effort to develop other modes of representation in administra-
tive decision by resort to individuals or organizations that purport to speak for broad classes
of private interests. But this stratagem simply pushes back the problem of representation to a
prior stage; because the interests of broad categories of individuals, such as "consumers," are
not self-defining, we cannot say that a given litigant or organization truly speaks for "consum-
ers" unless there is some mechanism that ensures this.
Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican ,4dinistrative Law, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 1667, 1806 (1975).
176. See enerally A. McFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISION-MAKING ON ENERGY
(paper ed. I976) (discussing public interest groups as representatives of specialized interests that conflict
with general welfare); Public Paricipation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.R. 3361 and Related
Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 563 (1977). The public interest spokespersons, however, also havetheir supporters. A. MCFARLAND, supra, at 67 ("Critics refer to [Ralph] Nader as a 'self-appointed
spokesman for the consumer,' but such a description can be misleading. He has a constituency which
gives him support, just as other politicians do.").
177. The following excerpt from the Eyeglass Rule hearing transcript is a fairly typical, if lengthy,
example of this concern. Mr. Markey, counsel for the National Association of Optometrists and Opti-
cians, is interrogating Ms. Schletter, a witness from San Francisco Consumer Action. She had con-
ducted two field surveys of price advertising among sellers of ophthalmic goods and services. The
import of her direct testimony was that the proposed rule's removal of state bans on price advertising
would not, by itself, increase price competition among sellers.
MR. MARKEY:... What consumers do you represent?
MS. SCHLETTER: You want their names?
MR. MARKEY: How many consumers do you represent? That was the question.
MS. SCHLETTER: Thirty-two hundred.
MR. MARKEY: What are they, paid members?
MS. SCHLETTER: Yes.
19811
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employed diverse tactics to develop and validate their positions in the FTC
proceedings. Some groups met with individual consumers who would be af-
fected by a proposed rule,178 or discussed the rule with other consumer organi-
zations;179 others informally surveyed consumer opinion on particular rule
provisions, 180 or maintained tentative positions pending completion of their
research for the proceeding.181 A number of groups either required staff mem-
bers working on a rule to seek approval of their recommendations from a
Board of Directors, 82 or adopted a position only when they could achieve
MR. MARKEY: Thirty-two hundred consumers. What is the population-is this the Bay
area, or just San Francisco?
MS. SCHLETTER: I think this is in the record.
iMR. MARKEY: Can anybody be a consumer advocate or are there certain special require-
ments attendant to being a consumer advocate?
MS. SCHLETTER: By FTC requirements or what?
MR. MARKEY: In this area.
MS. SCHLETTER: I don't know.
MR. ARKEY:. . . Is [your testimony] the position of the thirty-two hundred people you
represent? In other words, how many people participated in this and came to the conclusion
that this is what is good for consumers and this is what is in the public interest?
MS. SCHLETTER: It was a study team. We didn't have an election on it.
MR. MARKEY: How many people?
MS. SCHLETTER: Approximately twenty.
MR. MARKEY: Did you take a vote?
MS. SCHLETFER: A vote? Everybody has read it and has acceded to the results and had
input and conversations before we debated and argued and came to these conclusions in a
very open way.
Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding, Transcript 6401-02, 6406 (available in FTC record room),
This line of cross-examination is notable both for its implicit assumption that there are, or should be,
formal criteria for authorizing the representative to represent, and for its confusion in suggesting what
those criteria ought to be. The questions can be read to imply that San Francisco Consumer Action is
both too elitist and too undifferentiated from the mass. The examination mixes issues concerning the
characteristics of the group's membership with questions relating to its internal decisionmaking
procedures.
178. Interview with Edward Kramer, The Housing Advocates, Mobile Homes Proceeding (March
28, 1979) (Housing Advocates frequently returned to its constituents for input to ensure representation
of their interests).
179. Interview with Miles Friedan, California Public Interest Research Group, Used Cars Proceed-
ing (April 3, 1979) (organization "distilled a consumer view" from contacts with many consumer
groups).
180. Interview with Irmgard Hunt, Consumer Action Now, Council on Environmental Alternatives,
Protein Supplements Proceeding (April 3, 1979) (consumer survey conducted to ascertain whether con-
sumers believed they were informed sufficiently to make decisions on rule).
181. See Interview with Jack Hale, Connecticut Citizen Research Group, Food Advertising Proceed-
ing (March 17, 1977) (formulating position on rule involved some problems of identifying and accom-
modating subgroups of consumers, especially when objective data unavailable); Interview with Lonnie
Von Renner, counsel to Americans for Democratic Action & National Council of Senior Citizens,
Prescription Drugs, Funeral Practices, and Ophthalmic Goods Proceedings (February 15, 1977) (when
evidence indicates consumer interests not uniform, group's position should be flexible to accommodate
evidence offered at hearing; firm position can be delayed until post-hearing comment stage of proceed-
ings); Interview with Rebecca Cohen, Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies, Fu-
neral Practices Proceeding (October 26, 1976) (proposed to hire economist to investigate whether
disclosures mandated by Funeral Rule would raise prices to consumer, as industry claimed).
182. Interview with Gerald Thain, Center for Public Representation, Used Cars, Thermal Insula-
tion, and Children's Advertising Proceedings (April 5, 1979) (Center required to obtain Board approval
for projects exceeding specified dollar amount); Interview with Glen Nishimura & Timothy Holcmb,
Arkansas Consumer Research, Funeral Practices Proceeding (October 26, 1976) (decision to participate
made by Board of Directors on recommendation of staff; board elected by members of local memorial
societies).
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consensus of the staff members.18 3 In a few groups, the legitimacy question
did not arise because the organization already had adopted an official position
on the issues prior to becoming involved in the FTC proceeding.
184
To analyze these competing notions of authority to represent, it is useful to
analogize the consumer group's role to more familiar representative relation-
ships. The most significant factor in these relationships is whether the repre-
sentative is expected to have a formal, specific mandate to act on behalf of a
principal. In the common law master-servant relationship, for example, the
employee's scope of authority to bind the employer is formally circumscribed
by contractual and legal standards. The servant's actions are totally
subordinate to the directives of the employer. Somewhat less constrained and
specific is the lawyer's authority to act on behalf of a client. The relationship
remains essentially contractual, and the client retains control over important
decisions. The lawyer, however, has more latitude for independent judgment
as a result of technical expertise and professional responsibilities.18 5 Both the
master-servant and the lawyer-client relationships typically involve situations
in which the represented party is either a natural person or a hierarchy, and in
both relationships the represented party has access to most of the information
needed to make decisions.
When the focus of the relationship shifts to the representation of dispersed
groups, or from personal to political representation, the need for prior ap-
proval of particular decisions tends to decrease, and the representative's inde-
pendence increases. Three forms of such representation can be distinguished:
obbying, electoral representation, and "descriptive representation." Accord-
ing to one commentator, lobbying is functionally similar to the lawyer-client
183. Interview with Mark Silbergeld, StaffAttomey, Consumers Union, Funeral Practices, and OTC
Antacids Proceeding (February 7, 1977) (position arrived at colegially by discussions between staff
lawyers and technical experts); Interview with Margaret Godwyn, San Francisco Consumer Action,
Protein Supplements Rule (November 8, 1976) (all policy decisions presented to group staff for debate
and vote; policy decisions required consensus rather than majority vote).
184. Interview with Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising (March 23,
1979) (ad hoe group formed nonprofit corporation to represent specific, limited interests).
185. One seasoned Washington lawyer has described the interplay between client desires and lawyer
judgment in the following terms:
[An] inherent part of the lawyer's function in being "for" his clients is helping determine what
exactly is their interest in a particular set of circumstances. Certainly, when a corporate client
comes to a Washington lawyer with a problem, the lawyer is charged with furthering his
client's "interest." But often a client knows only in a general sense what the interest is, and
seeks the lawyer's skills and knowledge in defining as well as implementing that interest. ...
The definition of this interest is not forged in a vacuum, divorced from considerations of
public policy. Here the Washington lawyer in particular has an obligation to present to his
client constructive alternatives for harmonizing corporate and public goals. So his job is at
least in part that of a mediator seeking a congruence between the public interest and the
client's interest.
Califano, The Washington Lawyer: *hen to Say No, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 187, 190 (R. Nader &
M. Green eds. 1976). Another view of such relationships has concluded that:
There are two ideas about the proper distribution of power in professional consulting relation-
ships. The traditional idea is that both parties are best served by the professional's assuming
broad control over the solutions to the problems brought by the client. The contradictory
view is that both client and consultant gain from a sharing of control over many of the deci-
sions arising out of the relationship.
D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT- WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7 (1977).
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representation described above, with somewhat broader latitude accorded the
lobbyist to translate the diverse, inchoate wants of his constituency into a uni-
fied position.18 6 Other observers have noted that lobbying organizations and
similar voluntary associations tend to become staff-dominated or "oligarchi-
cal" in form, with little opportunity for the rank-and-file members to influence
policy directly. 187 There are several practical reasons why this situation exists.
A voluntary association usually consists of numerous dispersed "principals"
with little direct involvement in the political environment in which their
"agent" lobbyist operates. Moreover, the tactical decisions that the lobbyist
makes can neither be specified easily in advance, nor subjected to membership
ratification within the limits of available time and resources. To be effective, a
lobbyist must have considerable discretion to define and to advance the group
position; occasionally, even limited disclosure of his activities is not feasible.
The elected representative's role is in many ways comparable to that of the
lobbyist. The number of issues on which a typical legislator has a true man-
date from his constituency is probably small; few political issues are suffi-
ciently visible or important to affect the outcome of an election. Even when
specific policies are widely desired, a consensus might not be reached on the
best means with which to achieve or to implement them. 88 Consequently, the
elected representative must exercise independent judgment in representing the
interests of his constituency.
Finally, a different form of political representation, "descriptive representa-
tion," avoids the problem of providing the representative with a mandate by
structuring the representative body to mirror the composition of the constitu-
186. This commentator notes that:
The act of lobbying is, in very general terms, an act of representation. Like the votes of
members of Congress, however, the strategic decisions of lobbyists are not simply mirror
images of constituent preferences. An interest group is an intermediary between citizens and
government; and it is the task of the organization to convert what it perceives to be the desires
of its constituents into specific policies and goals. The choice of issues by the organization is
the conversion process by which resources and policy objectives are converted into specific
acts of interest articulation and representation.
J. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE 5 (paper ed. 1977).
187. This tendency has been described in the following manner.
In few areas of political life is the discrepancy between formal juridical guarantees of demo-
cratic procedure and the actual practice of oligarchic rule so marked as in private or voluntary
organizations such as trade umons, professional and business associations, veterans' groups,
and cooperatives .... almost all such organizations are characterized internally by the rule
of a one-party oligarchy. That is, one group, which controls the administration, usually re-
tains power indefinitely ....
S.M. Lu'sET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 1 (1956). See also R. MICHELS, POLITICAL
PARTIES (1958) (stating how political organizations become naturally oligarchic). Distinguishing be-
tween a "representative" and a "democratic" organization, one commentator noted that: "An associa-
tion is 'representative,' but undemocratic, if member interests are congruent with leadership policies but
the members do not, as a practical matter, choose these leaders in meaningful elections or participate in
the formulation of leadership policies." J.Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 237-38 (1973). See
generally T. Lowi, THE POLITICS OF DISORDER 73 (paper ed. 1974) (comparing alternative pluralistic
social processes with traditional political government).
188. See generally Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POLITICAL ScI. R EV.
45 (1963) (discussing theories of representation and analyzing measure of control local constituencies
exert over specific actions of representatives).
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ency.189 Just as a scientific sample epitomizes the universe from which it is
drawn, the representative body inherently reflects the preferences, values, and
knowledge of the larger group, and thus dispenses with the need for directives
or consultation. 190
Ordering typical representative relationships in this fashion implies certain
realities about consumer representation in administrative proceedings. If a
representative's legitimate discretion to act without a prior, specific mandate
expands as his constituency grows and diversifies and disperses outside the
confines of a hierarchical organization, then consumer representatives neces-
sarily would be expected to exercise a high degree of independent judgment.
Even relatively narrow consumer protection issues, such as the sales practices
of hearing aid dealers or advertisements promoting protein supplements, can
affect geographically dispersed, unorganized individuals. Moreover, consumer
protection is, at least in some respects, a "collective good"'191 for which eco-
nomic theory posits major disincentives to organized action.
192 Thus, it seems
clear that consumer representatives need considerable independence if they are
to represent their constituencies effectively. The difficulty is reconciling this
independence with the need to hold the representatives answerable for the po-
sitions they advocate.
The representative relationships described above suggest that common
189. It has been argued that
true representation. . . requires that the legislature be so selected that its composition corre-
sponds accurately to that of the whole nation; only then is it really a representative body. A
representative legislature, John Adams argues in the American Revolutionary period, "should
be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act
like them."
. . . For these writers, representing is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to
account, or any kind of acting at all. Rather, it depends on the representative's characteristics,
on what he L or is like, on being something rather than doing something. The representative
does not act for others; he "stands for" them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection
between them, a resemblance or reflection.
H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-61 (paper ed. 1972) (emphasis in original).
190. The cross-examiner quoted in note 177 above apparently was using this theory when he sought
to contrast the membership of San Francisco Consumer Action with the population of the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area.
191. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (paper ed. 1977) (present-
ing notion of "collective good"). For discussions of the theory in the context of public participation in
administrative or political decisionmaking, see A. MCFARLAND, supra note 176, at 27-40; Snow &
Weisbrod, Consumerism, Consumers, and Public Interest Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 395, 401-06
(Weisbrod, Handler & Komesar eds., paper ed. 1978).
192. These disincentives are explained in the following manner.
[Tihere are. . . three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups from furthering
their own interests. First, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the total group
benefit any person acting in the group interest receives, and the less adequate the reward for
any group-oriented action .... Second, since the larger the group, the smaller the share of
the total benefit going to any individual, or to any (absolutely) small subset of members of the
group, the less the likelihood that any small subset of the group, much less any single individ-
ual, will gain enough from getting the collective good to bear the burden of providing even a
small amount of it; in other words, the larger the group the smaller the likelihood of oligo-
polistic interaction that might help obtain the good. Third, the larger the number of members
in the group the greater the organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle that must be
jumped before any of the collective good at all can be obtained.
M. OLSON, supra note 191, at 48.
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methods for ensuring the accountability of a representative share two general
characteristics. First, as the constituency becomes large and diverse, the repre-
sentative generally must account for decisions made or actions taken after the
fact, rather than obtaining prior authorization. The elected representative does
not receive detailed instructions from his district. He realizes, however, that he
would be replaced if his votes or public positions diverged too sharply from
constituent preferences. Similarly, the executive of a voluntary association un-
derstands that the leadership cannot often take positions distasteful to the
members without witnessing a decline in the organization's membership, re-
sources, and influence. A second characteristic of representative relationships
is that accountability tends to become general rather than specific as the inter-
est represented shifts from personal to diffuse. When the constituency group is
large and dispersed, the representative need not seek clearance or approval for
each decision he makes; instead, the general quality of his performance is re-
viewed periodically.
Thus, although it would seem nonsensical to criticize a consumer group for
failing to poll its membership regarding particular issues raised in a rulemak-
ing proceeding, it is feasible and appropriate to require some assurance that
the leaders are exposed to the risk of membership disaffection by public advo-
cacy of certain positions in a proceeding.1 93 This assurance would involve a
showing that the organization obtains a substantial proportion of its revenues
from membership dues or public contributions,1 94 and that its constituents
have been informed, or will be informed, of the positions the group is advocat-
ing. Whether a group has advocated positions in the past similar to that taken
in a present proceeding would be an important consideration in determining
constituency accountability. When the organization has no prior history of
involvement in the particular subject matter, either the funding recipient
should be requested to file reports of its communications with its membership,
or future grants should be conditioned on a showing that the organization has
informed constituents of positions taken under prior compensation grants.
Finally, the role of "descriptive representation" in a compensation program
like the FTC's should be considered. This theory would require an inquiry
into the composition or characteristics of the applicant relative to the constitu-
193. This statement is accurate, however, only as long as material the group submits is not so purely
technical that constituency ties are irrelevant.
194. Organizations that provide noncollective goods or services present a special problem under this
approach. For example, Consumers Union is financed principally by sales of the Consumer Reporls
magazine. Application for Compensation of the Consumers Union, Food Advertising Proceeding I
(Sept. 23, 1975). Many trade or professional organizations provide valuable information, advice, and
assistance to their members. Some public interest organizations sponsor trips, social events, or product
discounts. When the noncollective goods are basically incidental to a predominant advocacy purpose,
such as Sierra Club outings or calendar sales, their provision should not materially affect the accounta-
bility of organization spokesmen. The situation becomes less clear, however, when the product sale
component seems predominant. For example, as to Consumers Union it could be argued that because
proceeds of the magazine sales finance advocacy efforts, the purchase price of the magazine represents
bath a sale of goods and a contribution to advocacy efforts. Because the contribution is "tied" to a sale
that seems likely to be the dominant feature in constituent decisions, however, it may well be that the
organization's accountability to its constituency for advocacy positions is fairly attenuated. Agencies
that administer compensation programs might consider requiring applicants to provide information
about their dues structure and the nature of any noncollective goods or services they provide to
members.
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ency it purports to represent. The objective of the inquiry would be to deter-
mine whether the membership of the consumer group adequately reflected the
relevant consumer population. 195 Depending upon how technically the sam-
pling notion were pursued, the issues could become unmanageably com-
plex. 196 Instead of seeking existing groups whose memberships constitute
acceptable samples, the agency could obtain a more efficient and reliable opin-
ion sampling by commissioning a survey research firm to select and poll a
random sample of the relevant population. This does not suggest that agencies
should be indifferent to the constituencies of groups that actively participate in
rulemaking proceedings. An expressed preference for a particular rule provi-
sion by a group whose members comprise a large and typical segment of inter-
ested consumers or businesses would be entitled to more careful consideration
than if the organization's constituency were small and atypical. Nevertheless,
this practice should be the general norm in rulemaking, rather than a feature
unique to a compensation program. The composition of a group's constitu-
ency normally should not serve to include or exclude the group's participation;
rather, decisionmakers should only consider it in determining how to weigh
the group's position. This approach would preserve the role of the compensa-
tion program in increasing the number and diversity of constituency positions
actively pressed.
197
195. The political science literature suggests that consumer-group members generally are not typical
of the average population. Individuals who join organizations engaged in advocacy related to political
or governmental affairs usually are, like those who vote in general elections, disproportionately upper-
middle class in terms of income, education, and status. See generally D. IPPOLITO, T. WALKER & K.
KoLSON, PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRACY (1976); L. MILBRATH, POLITICAL PARTICI-
PATION 110-141 (paper ed. 1969); S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DE-
MOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (paper ed. 1972). In the present context, however, it is unclear
whether, or in what ways this socio-economic "bias" should be presumed to affect the policy positions
of group members. By joining an advocacy group, members haave demonstrated their disregard for the
economic incentives described in the theory of collective goods. Consequently, their policy preferences,
as reflected through the group, appear to be based on noneconomic or altruistic considerations.
196. For a group like San Francisco Consumer Action that does not recruit members on a national
scale, it presumably would be necessary either to establish a relevant "geographic market," or to deter-
mine that there were no significant regional differences to bias the sample. Moreover, apart from the
rare and probably nonexistent marketing practice that affects all consumers with absolute uniformity, it
arguably would be necessary to create a stratified sample to account for specially affected subgroups.
Sample stratification is a potential slippery slope, because a critic with a modest amount of ingenuity
quickly can proliferate variables on which one plausibly could argue that the sample should be strati-
fied. To continue with the example of the Ophthalmic Goods rule, which removed state bans on the
price advertising of eyeglasses, the following arguments suggest points that could be raised in a strict
sampling approach:
(a) Because visual problems tend to increase with age, the sample has to account for the age
distribution of eyeglass wearers.
(b) The cost of eyeglasses absorbs a proportionately greater share of the income of the poor
than of the wealthy, and the benefits and burdens of the rule are likely to be felt dispropor-
tionately by low-income consumers. Consequently, the sample should be stratified by income
level.
(c) Price advertising through the mass media is considerably more important to consumers
lacking the mobility to comparison shop, either because they are physically handicapped, be-
cause they lack transportation, or because they live in rural areas. The sample should be
structured to account for these consumer differences.
197. "'Public interest' advocates. . . do not represent-and do not claim to represent-the interests
of the community as a whole. Rather they express the position of important, widely-shared (and hence
public) interests that assertedly have not heretofore received adequate representation in the process of
agency decision." Stewart, supra note 175, at 1764.
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3. Financial Status of the Applicant
The most detailed eligibility standard in the Magnuson-Moss Act concerned
the financial status of the applicant. Funds were to be granted only to persons
"unable effectively to participate in such proceeding because [they] cannot af-
ford to pay costs of making oral presentations, conducting cross-examination,
and making rebuttal submissions in such proceedings."'198 Both the Rules of
Practice and the Guidelines translated this standard into three general require-
ments. First, the applicant needed to provide information describing the eco-
nomic stake of the interest it wished to represent, as compared with the cost of
participation. The Commission assumed that a group with a small economic
stake, or a noneconomic interest, would encounter difficulties raising funds to
participate. 199 Second, when the interest's economic stake was large in com-
parison to the cost of participation, the applicant was obliged to bear its own
costs. The rule provided an important exception, however, "when a large total
stake" was "divided among many separate people so that each individual" had
"little incentive to participate." 2°° Applicants claiming this "collective goods
exception" were required to demonstrate that they could not raise funds to
participate through individual contributions. Finally, the applicant was re-
quired to provide information about its own resources. The Guidelines re-
flected the notion that well-funded organizations should make stronger
showings of need for support to participate in rulemaking proceedings. 20'
Again, however, an exception provided that:
[A] group with substantial resources can be eligible if it is unable to
participate because its resources are already committed to other ar-
eas, if it has undertaken to cover too many different activities to focus
resources on a project as large as an FTC rulemaking, or if other
factors would preclude participation.
202
Despite the prominence accorded to financial inability in the statute, the
Rules of Practice, and the Guidelines, in practice this standard played a sur-
prisingly minor role. Only two compensation applications apparently were re-
jected because the applicant was financially able. The first of these applications
was submitted by an individual witness sufficiently candid or unsophisticated
to admit to the FTC that he would testify whether or not he was reimbursed. 20 3
The second application was submitted by an industry trade association.204 In
a third situation, an initial compensation award to a trade association was not
used. The FTC had required that the award be offset by membership dues and
198. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (1976); see note 29 supra (text of relevant section of statute).
199. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(4)(i) (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482-83 (1977) (if applicant represents rich
interest, there should be other means for it to obtain funds).
200. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,483 (1977).
201. Id (well-funded organization or interest has more difficult time making requisite showing of
inability to participate effectively without FTC compensation).
202. Id
203. Application for Compensation of Dr. Kurt Oster, Food Advertising Proceeding (Aug. 16, 1976);
Letter from William D. Dixon, Presiding Officer to Kurt Oster (Sept. 23, 1976); Action Letter from
Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP to Kurt Oster, Food Advertising Proceeding (Nov. 12,
1976).
204. See Action Letter from Albert H. Kramer, Director, BCP to Jimmy D. Johnson, Association of
Physical Fitness Centers, Health Spas Proceeding (July 14, 1977).
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contributions, and the association raised more money from these sources than
the grant would have provided.20 5 The association later submitted a supple-
mental application containing updated budget information and received fund-
ing to participate in the post-hearing stages of the proceeding.
20 6 The FTC
apparently did not invoke the financial inability standard more frequently for
two reasons. First, the FTC did not demand, and often did not receive, very
detailed financial information from applicants. Second, and more important,
the Commission interpreted and applied the financial inability standard so as
to render unnecessary a detailed examination of applicant finances.
Applicants in the later proceedings generally tended to provide more exten-
sive financial information than those who sought funding in the early
Magnuson-Moss TRR's. 20 7 Nevertheless, in 1977 and 1978 some applicants
205. See Action Letter from Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP to Anthony DiRocco,
National Hearing Aid Society, Hearing Aids Proceeding (July 20, 1976) (budget attachment, foot-
note*); Letter from Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP to Anthony DiRocco, National
Hearing Aid Society (Oct. 29, 1976) (total reimbursable amount to be reduced by total member contri-
butions received between application filing date and submission of reimbursement claim); Letter from
Anthony DiRocco, National Hearing Aid Society to Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP
(March 30, 1977) (grant was nullity in light of requirement that any NHAS solicited funds offset
amount of funding).
206. Supplemental Application for Compensation of the National Hearing Aid Society, Hearing
Aids Proceeding (Sept. 26, 1977); Letter from Timothy J. Waters, Counsel for the National Hearing Aid
Society to Bonnie J. Naradzay, BCP (Sept. 30, 1977) (supplying further information in reference to
NHAS's supplemental application for funds).
207. For example, one application had stated simply that: "The ICL [Iowa Consumers League] is a
volunteer, non-profit, corporation serving the public. It is supported by low dues, and a great deal of
volunteer work. No funds are available to the Executive Secretary at this time for travel expenses."
Application for Compensation of the Iowa Consumers League, Food Advertising Proceeding (March
22, 1976).
The staff home economists of the Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley applied successfully for fund-ing in the Protein Supplements rulemaking. They provided little, if any, more detail than ICL. Seegenerally Application for Compensation of the Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc., Protein Sup-
plements Proceeding 3 (Feb. 4, 1976) (financial assistance limited because budget limited). As Appen-
dix A indicates, both of these applicants were successful. Although these grants involved relatively
modest amounts and might have been submitted by applicants inexperienced i proposal-writing, tiswas not always the case. For example, San Francisco Consumer Action (SFCA), which received sev-
eral grants during the period studied, initially applied for over $20,000 in the Used Cars Proceeding; it
obtained approximately one-half of this amount. Application for Compensation of San Francisco Con-
sumer Action, Used Cars Proceeding (Oct. 3, 1976); Action Letter from Marjorie Waxman Smith, Act-
ing Director, BCP to Kathryn Pachtner, San Francisco Consumer Action (Dec. 14, 1976). In
addressing the financial need issue, SFCA's application asserted that the costs to consumers from prac-
tices covered by the rule "probably total to hundreds of millions of dollars annually," and concluded
that:
It is not feasible to expect any contributions to the costs of participation by individual con-
sumers. Most are not in a position to individually provide significant support for others to
represent them. Similarly, the applicant organization operates on a modest and fully commit-t d budget. SFCA has no sources of general revenue which can be tapped for activities of this
ki... .. Without reimbursement for expenses, our participation in the hearings would beseverely curtailed and would certainly not adequately represent consumers.
Application for Compensation of SFCA, Used Cars Proceeding 3 (Oct. 3, 1976). The Golden State
Mobilhiome Owners League was awarded nearly $30,000 for participation in another rulemaking al-
though it had reported an annual budget in excess of one-half million dollars. See Application for
Compensation of the Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc., Mobile Homes Proceeding (Oct.20, 1976) (annual revenue anticipated at $510,000); Action Letter from Albert H. Kramer, Director,
BCP to Dennis Kavanaugh, Golden State Mobilhome Owners League (June 6, 1977). "However," the
application states
all of the funds obtained [from] membership are spent for designated budget categories. Acopy of the bu get for the year 1976 is enclosed for your pursal -sic], and you can see thse
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submitted only cursory financial data and were granted compensation. 208 The
vagueness with which some applicants described their financial resources was
attributable to the lack of direction provided by the Guidelines as to the kind
of information necessary to demonstrate financial need.20 9 Ironically, the
Guidelines contained a standard budget form for applicants to use in setting
forth their funding requests, 210 but provided no comparable standard form on
which to detail the resources applicants already had.
Minor changes in program administration could have increased both the
quantity and quality of financial data provided by applicants. What the FTC
would have done with more detailed information, however, is unclear. As pre-
viously noted, the agency had concluded that the statute did not limit compen-
sation to applicants who were absolutely indigent.21' Senators Magnuson and
Kennedy supported the FTC's interpretation in a formal comment on the
Guidelines.212 Moreover, practical reasons favored the Commission's con-
struction. A conclusion that the Act required absolute unavailability of re-
sources probably would have excluded all but the smallest or narrowest
membership income was spent on various budgeted items. The budget for 1977 does not
anticipate or contemplate any participation in national mobile home warranty regulation
hearings.
Application for Compensation of the Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc., Mobile Homes
Proceeding 2 (Oct. 20, 1976). The documentary record does not indicate whether the FTC questioned
this assertion, or sought any further explanation from the group.
208. The "financial need" section of one application in the Children's Advertising Proceeding, for
example, stated in its entirety:
Media Access Project is a non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation with tax-exempt, tax deductible
status. Virtually all our activities are funded by foundation grants. All existing operating
funds are earmarked for specific projects not directly related to this study. MAP has no gen-
eral funds to support research of the type contemplated, nor do any of the participants in this
project. This project could not be undertaken by Media Access Project, its consultants or its
grassroots organization clients without direct financial assistance from the FTC.
Application of the Media Access Project, Children's Advertising Proceeding 13 (June 15, 1978). No
balance sheet, annual report, or other financial information accompanied this application, which was
funded for the full amount requested. See Appendix A (comparing amounts requested and amounts
actually funded). Another successful application indicated that the applicant's current fund balance was
almost $22,000. Application for Compensation of the National Consumers League, Thermal Insulation
Proceeding (Dec. 29, 1977) (attachment with Statement of Income and Expenses and Changes in Fund
Balance, Jan. 1, 1977-Oct. 31, 1977). The applicant did not truly explain why it could not finance its
participation with these funds. Instead, it stated conclusorily that the group would "devote many un-
compensated hours" to the proceeding, and that "[w]ithout financial support, we would be unable to
participate beyond filing a statement and/or appearing as a witness at a hearing. Even then, no re-
search would underpin our statement." Id at 3.
209. See generaliy 42 Fed. Reg. 30,483 (1977) (section of application explaining need for compensa-
tion should include information on applicant's operating budget, financial statements describing
sources and uses of funds, and any other pertinent information).
210. Id
211. A group could be considered unable toparticipate if it had committed its available resources to
other activities. See generally text accompanying note 202 supra.
212. Letter from Senators Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Commerce Committee, and Edward M.
Kennedy, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure to Margery Waxman
Smith, Acting Director, BCP (Oct. 27, 1976). The Senators wrote that:
The statute, by its very language, is concerned solely with the necessity for representation of
a particular interest or interests in a given proceeding. It does not require the Bureau to make
judgments as to the value of an applicant's commitment of its own resources to other issues or
endeavors. All the Bureau is required to do... is to judge whether or not the applicant is
able-based on its resources then available-to afford the costs of effective participation.
Id at 5.
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organizations from the compensation program. The FTC's interpretation,
however, forced the agency to distinguish between an applicant that was
financially unable to participate and one that was unwilling to devote its own
funds to participation.
Applying the financial inability standard involved two conceptually related
inquiries: whether the applicant could "reprogram" funds in its existing
budget to finance participation, and whether it reasonably could raise addi-
tional money. This analysis, however, was likely to be both sensitive and be-
yond the expertise of the FTC. Barring extreme situations, in which the
applicant had virtually no operating resources or had all of its operating funds
contractually committed to perform specific projects for other grantors, the
theoretical possibility existed that the applicant could re-allocate funds. Nev-
ertheless, whether reallocation was also a practical possibility was unclear.
Program administrators had no standards to rely on in evaluating the practical
possibility of reallocation. A consumer organization's decision to shut down
an ongoing research, advocacy, or complaint-handling project in order to par-
ticipate in a rulemaking proceeding involved considerations of staff expertise,
interests, and morale, as well as questions of internal governance procedures,
sunk and opportunity costs, membership disaffection, and the likelihood of
attracting new volunteers. These issues were largely matters of management
discretion.
213
Whether an applicant could raise additional funds for participation involved
similar, and perhaps more difficult, management decisions. To raise member-
ship dues, to impose a special assessment, to increase the price of a service or
product,214 to undertake direct-mail fundraising, or to borrow against future
revenues, would all entail significant financial risks to the organization with
varying chances of success. An agency like the FTC could not easily say that
the applicant ought to bear such risks before it became eligible for funding.
215
213. When the applicant is a large-budget organization engaged in multiple activities, these tradeoffs
can be extremely complex. The coalition of environmental groups that applied for and received fund-
ing in the Thermal Insulation proceeding perhaps best illustrates these problems. Four national envi-
ronmental organizations-the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Natural Resources Defense Council,
and Environmental Defense Fund-submitted a joint application for compensation. Application for
Compensation of the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and
the Environmental Defense Fund, Thermal Insulation Proceeding (Jan. 16, 1978). In 1977, these
groups had aggregate annual budgets of more than 10 million dollars, and the largest of them, the
Sierra Club, had annual expenditures of six and one-half million dollars. Id at 9-10. Yet, all of the
groups plausibly claimed to operate at deficits or to have experienced severe budget cutbacks. Id An
organization like the Sierra Club not only is large, but is engaged in extremely diverse activities. The
Club's funds were devoted to "studying and influencingpublic policy, information and education activ-
ities, outdoor activities,. . . public law activities .. aministrative costs,. . . costs of servicing mem-
berships, and fund raising activities." Id at 10. Its revenues are derived from "membership dues and
admission fees ... contributions.. . sales, principally of publications. . . royalties on publications
... and advertising, investment and other income." Id To review such a group's decisions regarding
the feasibility of diverting funds from these other operations to finance participation in FTC rulemak-
ing would be a massive undertaking for the Commission. The Commission could rule that large-budget organizations are ineligible, on the theory that entities with sufficient amounts of gross revenues
should be able to divert the resources for participation from somewhere m their budgets. Exactly where
to draw the line and whether the statute permits it to be drawn at all, however, isby no means clear.
214. Many public interest organizations provide services or products both to their membership and
the public at large. For example, the Consumers Union finances its advocacy efforts through sales of
Consumer Reports. Application for Compensation of the Consumers League, Food Advertising Pro-
ceeding 1 (Sept. 23, 1975).
215. An interesting variant of this problem arose when FTC compensation applicants received gen-
eral budget revenues, as opposed to project grants or targeted contract funds, from government appro-
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A futher difficulty with a strict interpretation of the financial inability stan-
dard was the likelihood that it would favor groups whose members had mini-
mal stakes in the outcome of the proceeding over those groups comprised of
individuals more seriously threatened by a proposed rule. Such an application
of the standard would cut against the "interest" test. A group with a strong
financial interest in a rule, for example a trade association composed of small
retailers who feared the rule would drive many of them out of business, might
not meet the test; the overwhelming threat theoretically should motivate mem-
bers to dig into their pockets in support of group participation. On the other
hand, a "collective goods" consumer group whose individual constituents had
a minimal pecuniary interest in the outcome could more easily convince the
agency that increased dues or other fundraising activities to support participa-
tion were not practicable. A strict interpretation therefore was theoretically de-
fensible, 216 but it would have invited public criticism of the program's fairness.
As it was, Congress became sufficiently concerned about the FTC's failure to
fund small business participation that it set aside twenty-five percent of the
program's authorization for representation of regulated industries, and di-
rected the Commission to develop a special "small business outreach" effort.
217
priations. Two such applications were submitted in the Holder In Due Course amendment proceeding,
and their outcomes seem difficult to reconcile. First, an Assistant Attorney General from the Office of
Consumer Protection in the Wisconsin Department of Justice sought travel expenses to testify at the
hearings. He claimed that he had "previously requested permission from. . . superiors to testify on
this matter in Washington" and had been "advised that departmental funds cannot be authorized for
this purpose." Application of Richard A. Victor, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department
of Justice, Holder in Due Course Proceeding 2 (Feb. 26, 1976). The FTC explained the denial of this
request by stating:
The statute is silent on the question of whether governmental entities can be considered
financially unable to participate .... I believe there is sufficiently serious doubt that Con-
gress intended these funds to be used for governmental officials acting within the scope of
their official duties that compensation cannot be authorized in such a situation.
Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP to Richard A. Victor, Assistant Attorney
General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Holder In Due Course Proceeding (March 30, 1976), On
the same day this letter was mailed, another action letter granted compensation to the National Con-
sumer Law Center, Inc. (NCLC) for participation in the same proceeding. Action Letter from Joan Z.
Bernstein, ActinZDirector, BCP to the National Consumer Law Center, Inc., Holder In Due Course
Proceeding (March 30, 1976). NCLC had originated as a "backup center" under the Office of Eco-
nonic Opportunity's Legal Services program. At the time, it received all of its operating funds from the
federal Community Services Administration (CSA) for the purpose of training, publishing, and litigat-
ing for the Legal Services Corporation. Application for Compensation of the National Consumer Law
Center, Holder In Due Course Proceeding 1 (March 9, 1976).
It is doubtful that these two applications are distinguishable. In form, the NCLC is a nonprofit
corporation; in fact, it is arguably as much a government entity as the Wisconsin Department of Justice.
As a matter of policy it is also questionable whether the FTC is a more appropriate body than NCLC's
parent agency, CSA, to determine whether the Center should be funded by the government to partici-
pate in trade regulation rulemaking. As far as the written record reflects, however, these questions were
never considered by the FTC. Later decisions seem to follow the same pattern. See generally Appendix
A (applications of NCLC, Vocational Schools & Credit Practices Proceeding, and applications of Con-
sumer Protection Division, Department of Attorney General of Massachusetts, Mobile Homes Proceed-
ing). The 1977 Guidelines seem to imply, however, that state and local government entities are eligible
for compensation. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,481 (1977) ("Under these definitions, any entity except a part of
the Executive branch of the U.S. Government can apply for compensation").
216. If, as posited by the theory of collective goods, the principal purpose of a compensation provi-
sion is to remedy the disincentives to joint protection of small, diffuse interests, then funding logically
should be denied to those with sufficient incentive to organize and to support participation-as trade
association members would have if they each faced a sut-ciently high probability of being driven out of
business.
217. Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 10(b)-(c), 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
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Timing problems also could have developed under rigorous application of
the financial inability standard, because program administrators would have
had to decide when an applicant's budget truly was "committed" to other ac-
tivities. In proceedings lasting several years, the participants passed through
several budget cycles in which they had some latitude to reallocate their funds
in response to changing priorities. Thus, the agency could have limited any
grant of funds to the current fiscal cycle of the applicant organization and re-
quired a fresh justification for later claims of financial inability. Moreover,
current requirements that agencies periodically publish regulatory agendas
describing their plans for future rulemaking proceedings complicate the deter-
mination of whether an applicant knew of the rule in time to modify its
budget.
Finally, the administrative costs of applying a strict financial inability test
probably would have been prohibitive. The agency not only would have
needed to collect and to analyze detailed financial data under ambiguous stan-
dards, but also could have become embroiled in collateral disputes over public
disclosure of this information. Few organizations are willing to have their
financial secrets exposed to rivals or opponents, as was illustrated by one Free-
dom of Information Act dispute over financial data in a compensation applica-
tion.218 More disputes over disclosure might have arisen had the FTC
.-collected more detailed information about the financial management and re-
218. This problem arose when a dealers' assocation that had received some financial shpport from
manufacturers sought compensation from the FTC. See generally Application for Compensation of the
National Manufactured Housing Federation (NMHF), Mobile Homes Proceeding (November 28,
1977). A trade association that represented manufacturers requested disclosure of the applications
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See Letter from Richard C.
Foster, Deputy Director for Operations, BCP to C.W. Quincy Rodgers, Leighton & Conklin, Mobile
Homes Proceeding (February 8, 1978) (counsel to Manufactured Housing Institute submitted FOIA
request dated January 19, 1978 for copy of NMHF's application for compensation). The dealers' asso-
cation urged the FTC to deny the request, arguing that disclosure might compromise its independence
and temper its advocacy in the proceeding. Counsel for the association wrote that:
[Tihe dissemination of information providing details [on financial inability]. . . may render a
participant vulnerable to subtle pressures in the proceeding.
... To reveal the confidential financial information contained in the application would work
a great prejudice to mobile home dealers .... Indeed, such information could conceivably
be put to uses which might make it difficult for the [applicant] to continue in the proceed-
ing.... The public interest in adequate dealer participation would not be served by such a
result, and the Commission's duty to protect the fairness and adequacy of its own proceedings
would be violated.
Letter from Quincy Rodgers, Counsel for NMHF to Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Public
Participation, BCP (January 20, 1978). The FTC denied release of a portion of the financial informa-
tion requested on the ground that it was exempt as confidential financial information whose release
would cause competitive harm. See Letter from Richard C. Foster, Deputy Director for Operations,
BCP to Quincy Rodgers, Leighton & Conklin (February 8, 1978) (under § 552(b)(4) of FOIA informa-
tion withheld as competitively harmful). Whether this interpretation could withstand a court challenge,
however, is unclear, especially if the application in question were not submitted by a business group.
These confidentiality disputes continued into the subsequent stages of the proceeding, when NMHF
applied for supplemental funding. See Letter from Michael R. Lemov & Quincy Rodgers, Counsel for
NMHF to Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Public Participation, BCP (January 31, 1978) (re-
questing confidential treatment for attorneys' time sheets as pnvileged work product); Letter from
Michael R. Lemov & Quincy Rodgers to Bonnie Naradzay (February 1, 1978) (requesting confidential
treatment of application for supplemental funding for post-hearing stages because lawyers' strategies
are confidential work product); Letter from Michael R. Lemov to Bonnie Naradzay (April 24, 1978)
(recjuesting confidential treatment of financial information under § 552(b)(4) of FOIA); Letter from
Quincy Rodgers to Bonnie Naradzay 2 (May 11, 1978) (requesting confidential treatment of billing
information that reflects applicant's financial condition and attorneys' strategies).
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:51
source allocations of its applicants. Considering these many problems, the
FTC was reasonable in according a relatively minor role to the financial in-
ability standard, and in accepting at face value applicants' assertions of
financial need. Other agencies operating direct funding programs appear to
have adopted similar approaches. Although the wording of the eligibility cri-
teria varies widely, the financial inability tests amount to whether an appli-
cant's claim of financial need seems reasonable to the agency. 219 Barring the
adoption of a completely different approach to funding participation, 220 such
discretion cannot easily be confined.
D. MANAGING THE MONEY FLOW
The final implementation task the program administrators faced was to es-
tablish a system regulating the disbursement of funds to compensated partici-
pants. The administrators also needed to address tangential questions relating
to the amounts to be paid, the timing of the payments, and assuring proper use
of the funds. As in other areas of implementation, the statute provided little
guidance to the program administrators who were hampered both by their lack
of experience and by lack of staff.
219. The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) compensation rules, for example, require the ap-
plicant to submit more detailed information than those of the FTC. See 44 Fed. Reg. 23,053-54 (1979).
The FDA rules, however, then direct the decisionmakers to assess the information under a broad rea-
sonableness standard. Id at 23,055. They must find that "[t]he applicant does not have available, and
cannot reasonably obtain in other ways, sufficient resources to participate effectively without reim-
bursement." Id The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) temporary compensation rules under
the Toxic Substances Control Act generally direct applicants to show how they comply with the stat-
ute's financial eligibility requirements, but they also require applicants to provide some detailed discus-
sion of potential "opportunity costs" that would be incurred. 42 Fed. Reg. 60,911 (1977). The
regulation provides that:
It will be helpful if, in cases where eligibility is asserted on the grounds of small financial
interest, rather than total inability to participate if compensation is not granted, the applica-
tion also sets forth what other planned activities of the applicant will have to be curtailed if
compensation is not granted. Such a statement of curtailment should be supported by a
budget ....
Id
This novel approach presumes that the applicant will curtail other activities and participate in the
proceeding if funding is denied. In such a case, it would be difficult to find the applicant truly
financially unable to participate. The Department of Agriculture's proposed compensation regulations
relative to financial eligibility criteria are somewhat longer than the FTC's or EPA's, but nevertheless
simply direct the decisionmakers to consider "[t]he amount of an applicant's assets that are firmly
committed for other expenditures." 44 Fed. Reg. 17,510 (1979).
One agency that has adopted compensation rules to address the "absolute indigency" situation also
relies on a reasonableness test. The Federal Communications Commission's standards provide:
The group [seeking funding] would be required to show that it cannot meet the necessary
expenses of participating and "simultaneously carry on reasonable activities."
In the case of an intervening group, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis shall contain
specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the moving party . .. cannot pay the ex-
penses of litigation and still be able to carry out the activities and purposes for which it was
organized.
In re Rules and Policies to Facilitate Participation of Indigent Persons in Commission Proceedings, 61
F.C.C. 1143, 1144, 1148-49, app. A., § 1.224(c)(2) (1976).
220. An alternative approach would provide matching funds for specified categories of applicants
without regard to their available resources.
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1. Levels of Compensation
Disputes over the maximum levels of reimbursement that could be awarded
for compensated activities were the source of continuing friction between the
FTC and the compensation applicants. This conflict centered on two related
issues: maximum attorneys' fees and the computation of overhead.
The Magnuson-Moss Act authorized the Commission to "provide compen-
sation for reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of
participating in a rulemaking proceeding."' 221 As program administrators tried
to give content to the "reasonable fees" standard, the FTC and the public in-
terest bar divided over what each considered the proper method for calculating
reimbursement of staff counsel fees to public interest groups. This question
technically turned on the construction of two phrases in the Act. The Commis-
sion emphasized the statute's reference to "costs" of participation and declared
that staff lawyers could be compensated only for their actual salaries. The
applicant groups argued that "reasonable fees" ought to be determined by ref-
erence to the current market rate for lawyers with comparable qualifications
and experience. By 1978, the agency reconsidered its construction of the stat-
ute and requested a ruling from the Comptroller General.
222 The Comptroller
General confirmed the accuracy of the FTC's initial interpretation: to grant
compensation in excess of the fee actually incurred "would represent a Federal
subsidy to an interest group, and the Commission may not use its appropria-
tions for such a purpose without statutory authority."
223
Because of the substantial gap between the market rate earned by private
lawyers representing business interests and the fees charged by the "public in-
terest law firms" retained by many successful compensation applicants, a simi-
lar problem arose regarding the maximum fees reimbursable for outside
counsel services. The FTC consistently asserted that maximum fees should be
set below the general market rate, but it had considerable difficulty determin-
ing exactly what that ceiling should be. After trying several approaches, the
Commission eventually settled on a fee scale extrapolated from government
lawyers' salaries, which had sliding limits based on an attorney's years of expe-
rience. 224 Representatives of the public interest bar criticized this position,
complaining that the FTC's fee schedule gave inadequate recognition to the
limited number of billable hours most public interest lawyers accumulated and
the relatively high overhead costs many of them incurred.
225 This charge
shifted the focus of the dispute to permissible overhead rates, which proved
surprisingly difficult both to calculate and to establish.
The diverse collection of organizations dealt with by the FTC created some
of this difficulty. These organizations ranged from small shoestring operations
221. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(h)(1), 88 Stat. 2183-2203 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)
(1976)).
222. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the
United States (April 11, 1978).
223. In re Attorneys' Fees-Federal Trade Commission, 57 Comp. Gen. 610, 612 (1978).
224. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1977) (maximum hourly rate of $42 per hour for attorney with more
than five years experience).
225. Observation Report of Meeting Between FTC Staff and Representatives of the Council for Pub-
lic Interest Law (April 30, 1976) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
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with minimal staffs and rudimentary accounting practices to sophisticated enti-
ties with annual budgets totalling several million dollars. Thus, tremendous
variances were not uncommon either in the percentage of overhead expenses
incurred while participating in TRR proceedings, or in the ability of the
groups to present detailed breakdowns of their overhead costs. The Guidelines
compromised on the overhead question by offering applicants three alternative
methods of computation. 226 Although program administrators were not en-
tirely satisfied with this rather cumbersome system, they could devise no other
workable alternative.
2. Timing of Disbursements
Awarding compensation to an applicant involved a two-step process for the
FTC. First, the agency committed funds for the activities the applicant pro-
posed to undertake, then it actually disbursed the money. Agency policy was
conservative with regard to making early funding obligations, but was liberal
with regard to providing advance payments once agency resources had been
committed.
By 1977, the FTC had established a firm policy of deciding upon only those
portions of funding requests that related to the next immediate stage of the
proceedings. If an applicant sought funding for a later stage, the program ad-
ministrators would defer their decision and treat this portion of the application
as a "supplemental request" to be acted upon as the relevant stage of the pro-
ceedings drew near.227 This practice had several administrative advantages.
The agency maximized the resources available for other applicants by avoid-
ing the premature commitment of funds that might not be expended in the
same fiscal year and thus would revert to the Treasury. Deferral also allowed
the FTC an opportunity to eliminate funding if the recipient had performed
poorly in the early stages of a proceeding. Despite the additional administra-
tive burdens the supplemental applications imposed on the FTC and the appli-
cants, and the difficulty involved in meshing the compensation decisions with
the schedule of the proceedings,228 on the whole this system worked reason-
226. If the organization had an audited rate established by the General Accounting Office, it could
apply that rate; alternatively, the group could use a flat rate of 25% of employee salaries (excluding
secretarial), or it could try to justify a different overhead rate. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1977).
227. The Guidelines provided:
You need not file a complete application at the outset. You may ask for compensation for
one type of participation immediately and broaden your application after further study.
You should not submit an application for post-hearing rebuttal participation until after the
hearings are over. At that time, you will be able to state with some specificity which issues
you have determined to rebut.
Your application for post-hearing comments should come after you have read either the
Presiding Officer's report or the final staff report or both.
Id at 30,483.
228. For example, the Rules of Practice provided 60 days after issuance of the posthearing staff
report during which interested persons could submit final comments. These reports were often several
hundred pages long, with copious citations to the record. As a practical matter, it would have been
impossible for an applicant to review this document carefully, apply for compensation, await the
agency's decision, and still have any time remaining in which to prepare final comments within this 60-
day period. The program administrators responded to this problem by acting on applications for final
comments before the staffhad issued its report, but after the Presiding Officer had made his final report
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ably well.
Delays in disbursement could cause hardship to the applicants, and perhaps
undermine effective participation. Many consumer groups, and some trade as-
sociations, seemed to operate on minimal budgets with insufficient "front
money" to prepare their presentations. The'FTC recognized this problem, and
in its initial Rules of Practice the agency authorized advance payments to com-
pensated groups.229 Yet even with this advance funding policy, some con-
sumer groups reported serious cash flow problems when payment of
compensation funds was delayed.230
3. Audit and Quality Control
The final money management task the program administrators faced was to
design an adequate monitoring system to prevent the misuse of public funds.
This system involved two related operations: auditing, to ensure that claims
for reimbursement were consistent with agency standards and were supported
by adequate documentation; and quality control, to ensure that the compen-
sated groups performed competently. In addition, a good monitoring system
could expose more general problems in the program, and suggest areas need-
ing improvement. Program administrators recognized the need for adequate
follow-up capability from the early days of implementation,23' but they had
difficulty finding the necessary personnel to carry out their plans. In 1977, the
performance of compensated groups was evaluated systematically in prepara-
tion for congressional hearings on bills providing for direct funding authority
to other agencies. Program administrators solicited reports from both
rulemaking staffs and presiding officers on the quality of work produced by
available. See generally Action Letter from Albert H. Kramer, Director, BCP to Bruce J. Terris, Coun-
sel to the National Council of Senior Citizens, Inc., the Consumer Affairs Committee of Americans for
Democratic Action, the New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc., the Continental Association of
Funeral and Memorial Societies, Inc., Arkansas Consumer Research, and the Central Area Motivation
Program-Consumer Action Project, Funeral Practices Proceeding (Sept. 30, 1977).
Timing problems also developed when the FTC began to experiment with modified procedures that
substituted a single rulemaking notice for the two-stage Initial and Final Notice procedure embodied in
the Rules of Practice. In the first proceeding to use a single notice approach, the agency rejected two
applications because it did not believe the proposed research could be completed within the available
time. Action Letter from Richard C. Foster, Deputy Director for Operations, BCP to Miles Friedan,
Executive Co-Director, California Public Interest Research Group, Thermal Insulation Proceeding
(Jan. 24, 1978) (sufficient preparation time a problem); Action Letter from Richard C. Foster, Deputy
Director for Operations, BCP to Albert Stemam, Special Projects Director, Arizona Consumers Coun-
cil, Thermal Insulation Proceeding (Jan. 24, 1978) (reimbursement for proposed questionnaire denied
because lack of sufficient time to carry out survey of professional quality). In contemporary rulemak-
ing, the regulatory agenda and advance notice of proposed rulemaking can serve the function of the
FTC's two-notice procedure if the advance notice is publicized adequately. Cf The FTC Improve-
ments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 8, 94 Stat. 374 (Commission required to publish and transmit
to Congress advance notice of proposed rulemaking).
229. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (1978) ("The Commission may make any payments under this section in
advance where necessary to permit effective participation in the rulemaking proceeding").
230. Eg., Interview with Irmgard Hunt, Consumer Action Now-Council on Environmental Alterna-
tives (April 3, 1979) (cash flow from FTC to compensated groups must move faster); Interview with
Dennis Kavanaugh, Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc. (March 28, 1979) (same); Interview
with Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising (March 23, 1979) (biggest time
problem is delay in receiving advances and reimbursements); Interview with John Pound, Consumer
Action of San Francisco (Aug. 2, 1976) (same).
23 1. Interview with Bonnie J. Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, FTC (Oct. 19, 1976)
(initially, oversight too sporadic).
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compensated participants. The results of this investigation were presented in
congressional hearings held during the spring of 1977. At these hearings, FTC
officials announced their intention to audit groups that had received compen-
sation.232 Although audits began shortly afterward,233 the first audit was not
completed until the spring of the following year,234 and an auditor was not
assigned to work full time on the compensation program until February,
1979.235
This delayed audit of compensated groups' expenditures caused some re-
sentment among organizations that had participated in the early proceedings.
They complained, with some justification, that they were being held accounta-
ble to standards that either had not been explained to them, or that had not
even existed when they spent the money.236 The Guidelines markedly
changed the advice and information provided to applicants. Prior to 1977, the
FTC's rules of practice 37 and action letters on particular applications
238 con-
tained only vague statements concerning a recipient's responsibility to main-
tain suitable records. The Guidelines, however, instructed applicants to retain
all financial records relating to expenditures for the proceeding for a period of
three years,239 advised them that the presiding officer would evaluate the qual-
ity of their work and the reasonableness of their claims, 240 and informed them
of their right to an administrative appeal of an adverse audit report.
24' Some
disputes might have been avoided if similar notice had been furnished to early
232. Public Particiation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H A 3361 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Conm on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 520 (1977) (statement of Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director, BCP, FTC).
Ms. Smith asserted that:
As the Comptroller General made clear three months ago, many Federal agencies, especially
the smaller ones, lack adequate audit capability. A public participation program will auto-
matically create a need for auditing and monitoring that agencies will have difficulty provid-
ing .... [Recipient groups] will need technical help, for their own sake, and careful
monitoring, for the governments'.[sic]. Whatever the final structure of any program enacted
by Congress, the necessary administrative infrastructure should be created concurrently.
Id See also id at 531 (next fiscal year's budget includes request for additional fiscal officer to audit
compensation awards; agency plans to audit all recipients).
233. Interview with Robert Walton, Deputy Director, Division of Budget and Finance, FTC (July
19, 1979) (FTC undertook internal auditing function) [hereinafter Walton Interview].
234. Confidential FTC Document 32.
235. Walton Interview, supra note 233.
236. See Letter from David A. Swankin, Swankin & Turner to Margery Waxman Smith, Executive
Director, FTC 2 (Nov. 30, 1978) (grossly inequitable to apply guidelines in ex post facto manner),
237. The original rules of practice contained only the following paragraph relating to this topic:
"The Commission will compensate the applicant only for those authorized expenses actually incurred.
Appropriate proof of actual expenditures may be required by the Commission. . . . Payment will be
conditioned upon the execution by the applicant of an appropriate agreement setting forth the terms
and conditions of the compensation." 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (1978). The suggestion in the latter sentence
that the recipient's obligations would be specified in contractual form was never fulfilled; rather, the
application and the FTC's action letter constituted the specification of activities approved for funding.
238. See generally Action Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director, BCP to Kay Pachtner,
Executive Director, Consumer Action of San Francisco, Vocational Schools Proceeding 2 (Oct. 24,
1975). This letter, which followed the general format of early action letters, simply advises the appli-
cant that: "The amounts claimed for actual reimbursement could be subject to final audit for reasona-
bleness and conformance to federal regulations by the Federal Trade Commission and the General
Accounting Office." Id
239. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,484 (1977).
240. Id
241. Id (written appeal must be filed with Director of Bureau of Consumer Protection within thirty
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compensation recipients. Many of the reimbursement disallowances that re-
sulted from the first wave of audits242 were attributed to the groups' failure to
maintain sufficiently detailed records243 and to their uncertainty over the treat-
ment of donated services under the compensation program. 2 " The FTC's fail-
ure to conduct timely audits also concerned the 1979 congressional oversight
committees; consequently the General Accounting Office was directed to con-
duct full field audits of all funding recipients. 245
III. SUMMARY: EVALUATING THE FTC's IMPLEMENTATION
The most visible shortcoming in the FTC's implementation of the public
participation funding program was its tardiness in elaborating the criteria for
granting compensation, in providing advice and assistance to applicants, and
in monitoring the use of compensation funds. These delays were largely at-
tributable to staff shortages, and most of the deficiencies were cured by the end
of the period covered by this study. Viewed purely in administrative terms, the
implementation effort was at least partially successful; the program adminis-
trators performed as well as could be expected with the resources available to
them. It is less clear, however, that their interpretations of the statute were
substantively sound.
The language of the Magnuson-Moss Act was sufficiently broad to encom-
pass the two different theories of public participation that have been described
as the "technocratic" and "democratic" forms of representation. In practice,
the program administrators seemed to place primary emphasis on the technical
competence of the applicant and the quality of evidence or argument it wished
to present. Several reasons could explain the primacy of this concern for the
technical quality of participation. The procedures and issues in most of the
proceedings were complicated, and it was doubted that unsophisticated "grass-
roots" participation would contribute much to the agency's final decision.
Many of the applicants were eager to undertake technically complex activities
such as survey research or cross-examination, and this interest reinforced the
days). After administration of the compensation program was shifted to the General Counsel's office,
appeals were taken to the FTC's Executive Director. Walton Interview, supra note 233.
242. According to the Deputy Director of the FTC's Division of Budget and Finance, the rate of
disallowance in the rulemaking compensation program was not disturbing. Walton Interview, supra
note 233.
243. Id
244. In one instance, a recipient organization that received funding for consultant services was asked
to repay the money when an audit revealed that the consultant had not been pald. The recipient group
asserted that the consultant had donated his services to the organization, and that for FTC purposes the
economic effect of the transaction was the same as if the consultant had been paid and then had made
an equivalent cash donation to the group. The FTC denied reimbursement on the ground that no real
cost had accrued to the organization when they had neither been billed for nor paid the fee. Confiden-
tial FTC Document 33.
In another incident, a law firm appealed disallowance of overhead expenses for one of the temporary
personnel it had hired for a particular proceeding. The FTC denied reimbursement because the person
was an independent contractor rather than an employee whose salary could be included in the over-
head computation. The firm argued that its relationship to the person was functionally similar to that
with other temporary employees they had added for TRR proceedings, and that had they known of the
FTC's strict interpretation, the firm both could and would have structured this relationship as em-
ployer-employee. The FTC denied the firm's appeal. Confidential FTC Documents 34 & 35.
245. S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1073, 1077.
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belief held by some program administrators that the FTC needed better tech-
nical evidence in its rulemaking proceedings. Finally, standards relating to the
applicant's competence and the quality of proposed research generally were
easier to apply than the nebulous "interest" tests. The pattern of funding that
resulted from this emphasis on technocratic factors, however, left the agency
vulnerable to charges that its administration of the compensation program was
neither balanced nor impartial. Part Two of this article addresses the meaning
of "balance" in a program of this nature, and whether it can be measured.
PART Two: RESULTS
I. THE GOALS OF THE PROGRAM
In order to evaluate the effects of a program and the wisdom of an agency's
decisions implementing it, the logicdl starting point is to determine the object
of the program. The Magnuson-Moss compensation provision, however, never
clearly indicated the objectives of the drafters.246 The only available indica-
tion of intent was an unconfirmed report that some legislators feared that the
more formalized procedures required by the Act would hinder the participa-
tion of consumer organizations and other constituency groups in trade regula-
tion rulemaking. If this report is accurate, the compensation provision seems
premised on a belief that agencies will make more informed decisions if partic-
ipation is balanced properly among all competing interests.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs noted in its regulatory re-
form studies that agencies often hear only the regulated industry's side of a
controversy and rarely receive much information from consumers or other
public constituencies. 247 This view suggests two possible bases for evaluating
246. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text (examining conflicting objectives of Magnuson-
Moss statue).
247. The situation was portrayed thus:
Agencies must often depend on outside sources of information and political support. This
outside input largely comes from regulated firms with a great stake in regulatory decisions.
By contrast, the personal stake of individual citizens in these decisions is usually too small to
warrant intervention-or even attention ....
Thus, we do not need to subscribe to the theory of regulatory "capture" in order to explain
this tendency toward industry domination. Rather, the reason appears to be simply in the fact
that regulatory agencies respond to the inputs they receive-in the same fashion as any other
decisionmaking body. And, until the recent past, the source of almost all input to the agencies
was the regulated industries.
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. III: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. Doc. No. 71, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1977). The report described the following example of imbalance involving the FTC:
There is substantial evidence that this imbalance of representation does, in fact, exist to the
detriment of the regulatory process. Robert Pitofsky, former director of the Federal Trade
Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection has stated that, "In vast areas of Commission
regulatory activities, no consumer input was ever felt by any Commissioner or staff member to
my knowledge."
For example, on flammable fabrics standards, Pitofsky stated that industry representatives
were constantly urging the Commission to modify standards and increase exemptions from
standards, but there was no input from consumer representatives. That this is a problem
found not only in Federal agencies, but generic to regulatory agencies in general, is suggested
by former Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg who stated, alter his
first 2 years as commissioner, that he had never encountered an insurance expert representing
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the program: (1) whether compensation grants affected the array of interests
represented in proceedings, and (2) whether this participation significantly in-
fluenced the agency's final decisions.
In the FTC setting, both of these expected effects are extremely difficult to
assess. Detailed statistics are available for some factors, such as the balance of
testimony and advocacy in the proceedings, but they are subject to conflicting
interpretations. Moreover, no objective measures exist to determine the im-
pact of compensated participants on a final decision; assessment must depend
upon the subjective judgments of participants and observers who were close to
the proceedings. The difficulty of quantifying or demonstrating convincingly
the program's actual accomplishments may have contributed to the FTC's
problems during the 1979 legislative oversight process. Discussion at those
hearings focused primarily on perceived imbalances that were readily mea-
sured, such as concentrations of grants to groups on the east and west coasts,
24 8
or to groups that supported the agency's position.249 In other words, balance
in the pattern of funding decisons was easier to understand and measure than
balance in the underlying proceedings. This congressional criticism repre-
sented a fundamental shift in premises; if, as originally assumed, compensation
was needed to offset systematic imbalances in the proceedings, one would not
expect perfect balance in the funding decisions. The FTC and other support-
ers of the program, however, were unable to gain acceptance of this reasoning.
Congress ultimately imposed controls designed to achieve a more even distri-
bution of the funds.
250
A. BALANCED ADVOCACY
In. order to analyze the effect of the compensation program upon balanced
advocacy and upon final FTC decisions, seven early proceedings in which
compensation was awarded were examined in detail.251 Although the charac-
teristics and activities of compensation participants were readily identifiable,
less detailed information was available regarding the program's impact on
agency decisions because only one of these seven proposed rules had reached
final agency action when data collection for this study ended.
252
The two most important activities performed by the compensated partici-
consumer groups. He contrasted this situation to the daily presence of "dozens of insurance
lobbyists" that present the views of the insurance industry.
Id
248. See S. REP. No. 184, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1073, 1087 (additional views of Sen. Danforth).
249. See Senate Panel Grills Pertschuk on Funding of fTC Consumer Groups, [1979] 907 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 5, § A (Senators urged FTC to seek out wider variety of groups to fund).
250. See S. REP. No. 500,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1102, 1123 ("These restrictions will insure that a small number of groups do not receive an inordinate
share of the available funds, and that the funds are provided to a broader cross section of the eligible
small business and public interest applicants"). For a summary of the 1980 amendments to the compen-
sation provision, see notes 26-27 & 124 supra.
251. The proceedings are Food Advertising, Care Labeling Amendment, Holder in Due Course
Amendment, Protein Supplements, Ophthalmic Goods, Funeral Practices, and Hearing Aids. To study
these proceedings and to collect information about the characteristics and activities of compensated
participants, the author relied on witness survey questionnaires, hearing observations, and interviews.
252. See ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § I.
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pants were presenting witness testimony and serving as "group representa-
tives." The group representatives resembled parties in litigation. Through
counsel they examined and cross-examined witnesses at the hearing, submitted
documents for the record, commented on the reports of the staff and presiding
officer, and made oral presentations to the Commissioners. Often the same
group was funded both to present testimony and to act as group representative
in a given proceeding.
253
1. Witness Testimony
Most compensated groups sought and received funding to present witness
testimony.254 Nonetheless, the consumer "presence" at hearings, as measured
by the number of individual consumers and consumer group spokespersons
who testified in the seven proceedings, was relatively modest. Individual con-
sumers, for example, comprised only eleven percent of the total number of
witnesses who testified, and consumer group representatives accounted for
only another seven percent.255 These aggregate figures, however, reveal little
about the compensation program because some of these consumer and con-
sumer group witnesses appeared without compensation, while other types of
witnesses, such as experts or government officials, were recruited and sup-
ported by compensated consumer groups.
Before examining data on the costs of testimony and the sources of support
for witnesses, it may be useful to compare the overall proportions of various
types of witnesses who appeared in trade regulation rulemaking before and
after passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act. As Table A below indicates,
256 the
most dramatic changes occurred in the "industry" and "expert" categories. Al-
though industry had dominated the pre-amendment hearings with more than
253. See generally Appendix A.
254. Only nine out of 68 applicants did not receive reimbursement for witnesses. See Appendix A.
Of those groups that unsuccessfully sought funding, four of them were granted compensation after the
hearing stage-when it was too late to present testimony. Id
255.
Kinds of Witnesses Testifying in Proceedings
Percent
Witness Constituency Category Number Total
Individual Consumer 107 11%
Consumer Group Spokesperson 67 7%
Retailer or Fee-for-Service Professional 238 24%
Manufacturer or Wholesaler 43 4%
Trade or Professional Association 74 7%
Government-Special Jurisdiction Agency 101 10%
Government-General Jurisdiction Agency 18 2%




256. Data on witness characteristics in pre-Magnuson-Moss proceedings were taken from the cover
sheets of FTC hearing transcripts, and therefore may be somewhat less accurate than data on post-
amendment witnesses, which were generated by questionnaire responses, hearing observations, tele-




Comparison of Witness Mix Testifying Before and After






Representatives Association). Officials Experts Others
N % N % N % N % N %
All TRR Hearings
Before Magnuson-
Moss Act* 112 15.3% 368 52.0% 105 14.8% 86 12.2% 37 5.2%
First Nine Hearings
After Magnuson-
Moss Act* 226 17.8% 465 36.5% 253 19.9% 251 19.7% 78 6.1%
Percent Change +2.0% -15.5% +5.1% +7.5% +0.9%
* Excluding Vocational Schools, in which part of the hearing was held before passage of the
Magnuson-Moss Act, and part after.
one-half of all witnesses, this figure dropped substantially after the statutory
amendments. Industry witnesses remained the largest single category, but com-
prised only about one-third of the total. The most substantial increases were
reflected in the proportions of experts and government officials. These in-
creases correspond with the more technical nature of some of the post-amend-
ment proceedings. 257 Thus, the effect of the compensation program on the
mobilization of expert witnesses should be a matter of particular interest.
The compensation statute assumed that costs deter public testimony in FTC
proceedings. To determine the average participation costs, witness question-
naires asked respondents to report their total out-of-pocket expenses for testi-
fying in a proceeding, and to estimate what amount of the total would be
reimbursed. For those witnesses who did report expenses, the median cost
figure was $175. Nearly one-half of the witnesses (45.3%) incurred expenses of
$125 or less. The distribution of costs was fairly uniform among the primary
257. These aggregate trends mask considerable variances from one proceeding to another. One way
to illustrate this variance is to compare the high and low percentages of different witness types in the
Magnuson-Moss hearings with the comparable percentages in the rarger, more recent pre-amendment
hearings:
1981]
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interest groups-industry members, trade associations, consumer groups, and
expert witnesses. Government officials and individual consumers, however, re-






























The aggregate increase in expert witnesses in the post-amendment hearings is almost entirely attributa-
ble to two proceedings, Food Advertising and Protein Supplements, in which more than 60% of the
witnesses were experts; none of the other post-amendment hearings had more than 21% expert
witnesses.
258. The costs reported were relatively low, in part because the FTC held a number of regional
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Total costs are less significant than unreimbursed expenses in assessing the
effectiveness of the compensation program, because the prospect of uncompen-
sated expenses is most likely to deter potential witnesses from testifying. Table
B summarizes these anticipated costs for some of the primary interest groups.
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These figures can be interpreted in various ways. For example, the relatively
low proportion of witnesses reporting uncompensated expenses of more than
$125 may indicate either the generally low cost of testifying in FTC rulemak-
ing, people's reluctance to spend much money without some prospect of reim-
bursement, or the effects of the compensation program. Fortunately, more
direct information concerning the number and type of witnesses funded under
the program is available.
Responses to the witness questionnaire show that only six percent of the
respondents expected to receive compensation from a consumer group.259 The
most frequently cited sources of compensation were trade associations (22%),
employers (16%), and the FTC (14%). More than forty percent of the respon-
dents anticipated no reimbursement of their out-of-pocket expenses. Table C
shows more specifically that the compensation program supported the testi-
mony of some consumer group representatives and a few experts and individ-
ual consumers.
259. The complete breakdown of questionnaire responses is as follows:
Frequencies of Sources of Compensation
(Survey Respondents in 7 Proceedings)
No Compensation 272 (41%)
Compensated by FTC 95 (14%)
Compensated by
Consumer Group 37 (6%)
Compensated by








and Employer 7 (1%)
656 (100%)
If the respondents traced the funding back through the consumer group to its ultimate source in the
FTC, these responses may reflect some under-reporting in the "compensated by consumer group" cate-
gory and corresponding over-reporting in the "compensated by FTC" category. The questionnaire was
open-ended on this point. Witnesses were asked, "Will you be compensated or reimbursed for any of
these expenses? If yes, by whom?" Responses were coded according to the categories noted above and,
when feasible, they were checked against witness lists obtained from the FTC and compensated con-
sumer groups. Needless to say, compilation of these kinds of statistics would be much easier and
cheaper if the FTC and other agencies administering compensation programs required compensated
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Overall, then, the compensation program could not have shifted the balance
of witnesses very far in any direction. The notion of balance, however, implies
more than the proportions of different types of witnesses who testified. In a
proceeding designed to produce a reasoned decision, the content of testimony
is a more significant consideration.
The witness survey inquired whether the respondent generally favored or
opposed the proposed rule. In the aggregate, pro-rule witnesses predominated:
56.5 percent of all respondents supported the rule in whole or in part, and 43.5
percent thought it would be harmful or ineffective.26° Most of the witnesses
supported by compensation funds would be expected to favor the proposed
rule because the consumer groups were the only applicants funded to testify in
the seven core proceedings. It is not surprising that the consumer groups al-
most exclusively recruited and compensated pro-rule witnesses. Nevertheless,
as Table D indicates, the FTC staff in these proceedings did virtually the same
thing, on a larger scale. More than ninety percent of the witnesses who re-
ported that they were funded in whole or in part by the FTC supported the
proposed rule. Moreover, the FTC compensated more than double the number
of witnesses the consumer groups did.
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The trend is even more pronounced when the focus is narrowed to the ex-
perts, probably the most important class of witnesses to testify in the proceed-
ings studied. Table E demonstrates that the FTC staff was the most active
recruiter of expert witnesses, and that almost three-quarters of all experts who
responded to the witness survey261 favored the proposed rule. Thus, if the
compensation program was supposed to achieve a balance of pro-rule and
anti-rule witnesses, it apparently was unsuccessful.
TABLE E
Compensation of Experts in Relation to Attitude Toward Rule
Experts Favor Oppose
Compensated By Rule Rule Total Number
N % N %
FTC 45 93.8 3 6.3 48
Consumer Group 9 100 0 0 9
Trade, Professional
Association 7 30.4 16 96.6 23
Employer 10 47.6 11 52.4 21
FTC and Trade Asso-
ciation 1 100 0 0 1
FTC and Employer 1 50.0 1 50.0 2
Trade Association and
Employer 1 50.0 1 50.0 2
No Compensation or
No Data Available 41 77.4 12 22.6 53
Total 115 72.8 43 27.2 158
These simple measures of support and opposition to a proposed rule tell
nothing about the cogency of the presented testimony. When witnesses are
subject to cross-examination and rules must be based on substantial evidence,
a witness who supports a rule incompetently may be useless to the rule's pro-
ponents. This issue merges into the determination of the influence exerted by
compensated participants over agency decisions. First, however, it is necessary
to consider whether the compensation program altered the balance of advo-
cacy in the proceedings studied.
2. Group Representation
The second major expenditure by the compensated paticipants was for rep-
resentation by counsel. Overall, more than $800,000, or nearly one-half of the
total compensation funds awarded during the period of this study, were for
attorneys' fees and related costs. 262 It is difficult to establish how these abso-
261. A total of 234 experts testified in the core proceedings. As Table E indicates, 158 responded to
the survey-a response rate of 67.5%. The response rate among all witnesses was 67.7%.
262. See next page.
FUNDING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Attorneys' Fees As A Proportion of Total Costs Authorized for Reimbursement
Total Amount Total Amount Atty's Total
Proceeding Atty's Fees (%) Fees & Related Cost (%) Authorization
Vocational 17,924.49 24,677.49 33,654.25
Schools (53%) (73%)
Prescription 630.00 910.00 2,070.00
Drugs (30%) (44%)
Holder in Due 1,248.10 2,703.60 3,073.25
Course (40%) (87%) •
Hearing Aids 78,083.50 83,289.50 95,880.93
(8 1%) (87%)
Funeral 78,045.50 90,782.50 141,363.38
Practices (55%) (64%)
Protein 4,050.00 5,455.00 33,970.30
Supplements (12%) (16%)
Ophthalmic 40,343.00 54,591.00 127,274.33
Goods (32%) (43%)
Food 46,368.00 63,712.00 153,075.48
Advertising (30%) (42%)
Care Labeling 19,200.00 21,506.00 57,948.67
(33%) (37%)
Used Cars 36,990.00 51,308.20 131,930.11
(28%) (39%)
OTC Drugs 37,265.00 38,015.00 93,403.03
(40%) (41%)
Credit 56,275.00 69,789.00 141,986.24
Practices (40%) (49%)
Health Spas 48,934.00 56,601.00 87,399.00
(56%) (65%)
Mobile Homes 46,945.00 64,928.00 154,558.81
(30%) (42%)
R-Value 56,617.00 58,048.00 93,488.07
(60%) (62%)
OTC Antacids 34,461.00 54,339.00 126,884.63
(27%) (43%)
Children's 65,115.00 72,308.20 325,690.20
Advertising (20%) (22%)
TOTAL 668,494.59 812,963.49 1,803,670.38
(Table derived from FTC chart entitled "Attorney Fees and Costs Compared to Total Budget as
of Feb. 1, 1979").
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lute and relative amounts compare to the legal expenses of uncompensated
participants. There is some indication, however, that the compensated groups
generally spent less on lawyers' fees than the non-compensated groups.
263
The activities the lawyers undertook for compensated groups are more sig-
nificant than the dollar amount spent. Consumer group representatives gener-
ally played negligible roles in the prehearing "motions practice" when lawyers
for participants proposed "disputed issues" to be designated for hearing and
sought discovery of FTC records and documents. 264 At the hearings, however,
the attorneys played a prominent role in cross-examining witnesses, making
objections, and arguing points before the Presiding Officer. In purely quanti-
tative terms, this participation did help to balance the hearings because pro-
rule and anti-rule witnesses consequently were subjected to roughly equivalent
periods of questioning. Hearing observations and review of the transcripts in-
dicate that the presence of the compensated consumer groups also contributed
to a qualitative balance. The FTC attorneys were generally younger and less
experienced than their industry counterparts, and the quality of their question-
ing was uneven. The compensated consumer group lawyers were often more
experienced than the staff, and they frequently developed lines of questioning
that had not been fully explored in agency staff examination of the witness.
265
263. Some information was obtained from the FTC regarding staff hours logged to the core TRR
proceedings. A large proportion of the hours clocked represents staff-attorney time. For purposes of
ustration, a rate of thirty dollars per hour was applied to the number of hours recorded to generate
dollar comparisons with the attorneys fees of compensated participants reflected in note 262 supra. The
results suggest that the FTC's legal expenditures were substantially greater than those of compensated
participants. It must be remembered, however, that the staff had additional responsibilities, such as
writing the staff investigative report, helping to compile the rulemaking record, scheduling hearings,
and responding to public inquiries.
Total
Prehearing Imputed Cost Hearing Imputed Cost Imputed
Proceeding Manhours (at $30/hr.) Manhours (at $30/hr.) Cost
Food
Advertising 15,500 $465,000 5,500 $165,000 $630,000
Funeral
Practices 6,800 $204,000 4,800 $144,000 $348,000
Holder in Due
Course 2,800 $ 84,000 (not available) $ 84,000
Protein
Supplements 4,100 $123,000 4,100 $123,000 $246,000
Care Labeling (not available) 600 $ 18,000 $ 18,000
Hearing Aids (not available) 3,500 $105,000 $105,000
Ophthalmic
Goods (not available) (not available) (not available)
264. In the seven proceedings, a total of 94 disputed issue proposals were filed. Of these, industry
representatives filed 78, and consumer spokespersons filed one. Similarly, of 107 prehearing motions,
industry filed 104 and consumer spokespersons filed two. For a general discussion of "motions prac-
tice" in trade regulation rulemaking, see ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, § IV.
265. The presence of consumer representatives possibly influenced the behavior of agency staf attor-
neys. Some FTC lawyers might have prepared less carefully or questioned less thoroughly because
they knew a consumer group spokesperson was waiting to make a particular point.
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In the post-hearing stages, the balance of advocacy was rather mixed. Two
forms of post-hearing participation, the filing of rebuttal submissions and the
preparation of "post-record comments" that critiqued the final staff and Pre-
siding Officer reports, were not confined to lawyers. Legal representatives,
however, were generally able to use these opportunities more effectively. As a
result, general statistics that relate to the number of submissions at these stages
are not very meaningful. 266 Nevertheless, a selective review of these docu-
ments suggests that although the compensated consumer groups were unable
to match the resources that the industry lawyers devoted to rebuttal and final
comments, the compensation program enabled them to play a significant role.
Finally, compensated consumer group spokespersons participated very ac-
tively in oral arguments before the Commissioners in 1roceedings that reached
the final stages during the period of this study.
267
These final stages, when the issues were clearly defined, were the most cru-
cial for the participants and their lawyers. Effectiveness at this stage, however,
required familiarity with the massive record, either through participation at
the hearing, reading of documents, or, in most instances, through both. Awards
for attorneys' fees and related costs averaged just under $50,000 per proceed-
ing during the period covered by this study.268 Without compensation, it is
unlikely that the consumer groups participating in these proceedings would
have found the resources to master the records. In this respect, the compensa-
tion program allowed consumer groups to participate on a reasonably equal
basis with industry representatives.
B. BALANCE IN FUNDING PATTERNS
During the 1979 legislative oversight hearings, Congress appeared most con-
cerned about imbalances in the distribution of compensation funds. Congres-
sional charges took two general forms: complaints that the agency allocated a
disproportionate share of funds to a small cluster of "insider" organizations,
and claims that the FTC only funded groups that supported the agency posi-
tion.269 As previously noted, the assumption that funding decisions should be
balanced in these respects is at best questionable. The original basis of the
266. Of 103 total rebuttal submissions filed in the seven proceedings, 15 came from consumer groups
and 69 from industry spokesmen. On the other hand, consumers and consumer groups held an 853 to
622 edge over industry in the post-record comments. This lead is largely attributable, however, to two
proceedings, Food Advertising and Funeral Practices, in which the consumer groups apparently made a
concerted effort to mobilize public comments supporting the rule. In these and other proceedings,
many post-record comments were not useful to the agency. The final round of comments is meant to
analyze the existing rulemaking record and to focus issues for Commission deliberation. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.13(h) (1980) (comments should be confined to material already in record and requests for Commis-
sion review of Presiding Officer's determinations). A substantial proportion of the final comments re-
viewed in this study, however, tried to introduce new evidence, repeated points that had been explored
thoroughly on the record, or simply stated that the writer favored or opposed the rule.
267. The Ophthalmic Goods and Funeral Practices proceedings were the only two of the seven rules
to reach the Commissioners before data collection ended. In these two proceedings, seven consumer
group spokespersons appeared, as compared with nine industry representatives and three other
participants.
268. This average was computed from data compiled in note 262 supra.
269. See FTC Public Parlicipaiion Funding is Focus ofCommerce Commillee Actions, [1979] 913 AN-
TITRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 18-19, § A; notes 248-49 supra and accompanying text (discussing
congressional criticism of FTC). It was reported that:
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compensation provision seemed to be a concern that more complex procedures
would increase the costs of participation and thereby worsen the existing im-
balance of representation, already unfavorable to consumer interests. 270 The
statute therefore placed a twenty-five percent ceiling on the amount of com-
pensation funds that could be awarded to business interests. Beyond this ceil-
ing, the legislature did not limit the kinds of groups to be funded or the
amounts to be given to particular applicants. The statute's broad definition of
reimbursable costs, however, reasonably could have been interpreted as a di-
rective to commit whatever resources were necessary to assure effective partici-
pation in a proceeding. Congress had agreed to underwrite the full range of
costs of representation. Thus, the FTC did not misread a clearly expressed
congressional intent when it undertook the pattern of funding decisions that
emerged during the period covered by this study.
Whether or not the original compensation program implied a notion of bal-
anced allocation, the 1980 amendments to the FTC's compensation authority
and their legislative history clearly established the concept.27' Although no
empirical basis exists by which to assess these amendments, one of their pri-




To a considerable extent, the statistics support the contention that compen-
sation awards have been relatively concentrated in a few repeat applicants. In
the proceedings studied, seventy-seven compensation awards were granted to
Both [Senators] Danforth and Long said they were bothered by the fact that, according to
Danforth's figures, only 10 percent of FTC participation funds in 1976 and 1977 had been
used to solicit information from small businessmen. According to Danforth, 49 percent of the
money had been used by Washington-based groups and 41 percent goes to consumer groups
which represent a very small segment of the population.
F7'C Public Funding of rivate Groups Comes UnderAttack in Senate Hearing, [1979] 912 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 12-13, § A ("Another question raised about the program has been why these
groups have received a large share of the funding").
270. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text (noting problems in allocating funding).
271. Congress took three major steps to ensure more widespread distribution of the compensation
funds: allocation of a minimum proportion of funding for small businesses, establishment of a maxi-
mum funding limit for any single participant, and encouragement of FTC "outreach" efforts to attract
more applicants. The amendments provided that no person could receive more than $75,000 for partic-
ipating in any single FTC rulemaking, nor more than $50,000 in any fiscal year. Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 374. Moreover, the FTC was
required to set aside 25% of the compensation fund for those parties or their representatives that would
be regulated by the proposed rule. Id § 10(b). Finally, the Act directed the FTC to establish a small
business outreach program through which the agency could:
(A) solicit public comment from small businessmen whose views otherwise would not be
adequately represented, in order to ensure a fair determination in rulemaking proceedings
under this section; and
(B) encourage the participation of small businesses in the compensation program adminis-
tered by the Commisssion under this subsection by disseminating to small businesses informa-
tion which explains the procedures and requirements applicable to the receipt of
compensation ....
Id § 10(c).
272. The phrase is borrowed from Marc Galanter's analysis of the practical and theoretical
advantages tat a "repeat player" litigant has over the "one-shot" plaintiff or defendant. See note 283
infra and accompanying text.
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applicants from fifteen different states and the District of Columbia.273 Of this
total, thirty-one groups were from the District of Columbia and twenty-one
from California.274 These figures double-count groups that were funded in
more than one proceeding. When those groups are counted only once, the
total drops to thirty different groups funded under the program, of which four-
teen were from California or the District of Columbia.275 Moreover, from the
start of the compensation program through January of 1979, approximately
sixty-five percent of all compensation funds obligated by the FTC went to only
273. See Appendix A. For purposes of these calculations, joint or coalition applicants were consid-
ered independently. Thus, the joint award to a coalition of four environmental groups in the R-Value
Proceeding was considered as four awards.
274. Id Other states that scored relatively high were New York (five awards), Massachusetts (four),
and Wisconsin (three). Id
275. Id
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eight groups.276 As already noted, the experienced applicant had a substantial
advantage over the neophyte.277 Overall, groups that applied for funding
three or more times had a success rate of better than eighty percent.278
The FTC also was charged with awarding disproportionately large compen-
sation to particular groups. Reimbursement of an applicant's participation in
a single proceeding ranged from less than one-hundred dollars to more than
one-hundred thousand, largely because the applications varied considerably in
the activities they proposed and the costs they projected. Applicants that re-
276. Applicants Whose Authorizations Total More Than $100,000
(cumulated from authorizations in each of the Magnuson-Moss rulemakings
through January 31, 1979)
Applicant
California Citizen Action Group
Americans for Democratic Action-
Consumer Affairs Committee
Council on Children, Media and
Merchandising
National Consumer Law Center, Inc.
National Council of Senior Citizens,
Inc.
Consumers Union of United States,









































*NCC merged into NCL on 6/27/77.
277. See note 283 infra and accompanying text (describing advantages to "repeat players").
278. See Appendix B.
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ceived large compensation awards generally undertook a wide variety of activ-
ities, including both the presentation of technical evidence and extensive legal
representation. Large awards consumed a substantial portion of the FTC's
compensation budget: the ten largest authorizations represented nearly forty
percent of the total compensation funds committed during the period stud-
ied.279 A significant overlap also existed between the groups that received
large awards, and those that applied in multiple proceedings. 280
A third aspect of the concentration issue was the frequent appearance of a
few law firms as representatives of compensated consumer groups. The Wash-
ington, D.C. firm of Swankin & Turner, for example, represented four com-
pensated clients in five proceedings.28' The Bruce Terris law firm, also
considered to be part of the Washington "private public-interest bar," was
279.
Ten Largest Authorizations For Reimbursement To An Applicant In A Single Magnuson-
Moss Rulemaking As Of January 31, 1979
Applicant Authorization Total Rulemaking
National Consumer Law
Center, Inc. $221,075.54 Credit Practices
National Hearing Aid
Society $ 83,510.80* Hearing Aids
Action for Children's
Television and Center for
Science in the Public Children's
Interest $ 77,016.20 Advertising
Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. and Committee Children's
on Children's Television $ 73,916.00 Advertising
California Citizen Action
Group $ 64,228.00 OTC Antacids
Council on Children Media Food




Council of Senior Citizens, Funeral
Inc. $ 57,474.35 Practices
National Consumers
Congress/National
Consumers League** $ 57,292.67 Care Labeling
The Housing Advocates $ 54,752.85 Mobile Homes
Total $721,273.89
* NHAS was unable to use $34,364 of this authorization because of a successful solicitation
that it sent to its members.
** NCC merged into NCL on June 27, 1977.
280. See note 276 supra (providing data on amounts received by certain groups).
281. Swankin & Turner represented the National Consumer Congress in the Care Labeling
Rulemaking, and its successor organization, the National Consumers League, in the R-Value rulemak-
ing. Other clients included the Automobile Owners' Action Council in the Used Cars Proceeding, the
1981]
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even more active: firm members represented compensated groups in nine pro-
ceedings, including six in which they represented the Consumer Affairs Com-
mittee of the Americans for Democratic Action.
282
The repeat appearances by these organizations and law firms was fostered, if
not ensured, by the FTC's insistence on technically competent representation.
If a major purpose of the program was to produce testimony based on sound
empirical research and to allow for expert legal representation, then groups
and lawyers who are familiar with the process and who have demonstrated
their competence in prior proceedings should be preferred. In theory, at least,
the "repeat player" has substantial advantages over the "one-shot" or new par-
ticipant.283 The behavior of participants representing industry in TRR contro-
versies seems to confirm this observation: a number of former FTC officials,
including two former commissioners, represented business clients; in several
instances the same individual lawyers and law firms appeared on behalf of
different clients in different proceedings.284 The large awards that concen-
trated funds in a few applicants were probably not large in comparison to the
amounts that the FTC and other participants paid to mount a full-scale de-
fense of their positions in the proceeding. Moreover, some economies of scale
undoubtedly resulted from combining functions such as testimony and advo-
cacy, or maintaining continuity of representation across different stages of the
proceeding.
In the absence of some radical reduction in the overall costs of participation,
the 1980 statutory limits on the amount that can be granted to any single par-
ticipant seem likely to raise the total cost of representation in a proceeding,
and may reduce the effectiveness of that representation. In this respect, the
trade-off between the democratic and technocratic aspects of the program
seems inevitable: gains in grassroots participation will only be purchased at
the cost of effective representation.
Continental Association of Funeral and Memorial Societies in the Funeral Practices rule, and Con-
sumer Action of Washington, D.C. in the Food Advertising hearing.
282. The Terris firm performed work for ADA-CAC in the Funeral Practices, Health Spas,
Ophthalmic Goods, OTC Drugs, Antacids, and Used Cars Proceedings. They also represented the
environmental groups in the R-Value Proceeding, and the joint participation of Action for Children's
Television and Center for Science in the Public Interest in the Children's Advertising TRR. Finally, the
firm evidently performed some limited services for the Council on Children, Media and Merchandising
in the Food Advertising Proceeding. See Letter from Robert Choate, Council on Children, Media and
Merchandising to Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Public Participation, FTC (Sept. 7, 1976)
(requesting reimbursement of fees paid to Bruce Terris).
283. See generally Galanter, Afterword Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 347 (1975); Ga-
lanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
284. The firm of Leighton & Conklin, for example, represented the Clorox Company in the Care
Labeling rule, the National Manufactured Housing Federation in Mobile Homes, and the Grocery
Manufacturers of America in Children's Advertising. ACUS PHASE I REPORT, supra note 31, at 200,
202, 209 app. Thomas Vakerics appeared on behalf of the Hearing Aid Industry Conference in the
Hearing Aids Proceeding, and the urea foam insulation manufacturers in the R-Value Proceeding. Id
at 207, 214 app. Edward Groobert represented the American Automotive Leasing Association in the
Used Cars Proceeding, and the American Optometric Association in the Ophthalmic Goods TRR. Id
at 211, 216 app. Some duplication of representation occurred when different rules covered related
subjects, so that a lawyer representing a single client might be active in multiple proceedings. This
duplication is illustrated in the Food Advertising, Protein Supplements, and Children's Advertising
Proceedings, all of which touched on the marketing of food products; in the Holder In Due Course andCredit Practices Proceedings, which dealt with consumer credit; and the OTC Drugs and OTC
Antacids Proceedings, which concerned proprietary nonprescription 
drugs.
FUNDING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Another question that the 1980 amendments raised was the extent to which
the predominance of repeat applicants was due to the FTC's failure to mount a
substantial "outreach" effort during the early stages of implementation. By
1978, the Commission had begun to experiment with techniques for attracting
more diverse participants.2 85 These notice-giving activities seem generally use-
ful in the administration of direct funding programs, especially when the pro-
gram is new and the agency has diverse constituencies. 2 86 Nevertheless, it is
questionable whether outreach alone could increase the diversity of applicants,
particularly from among consumer groups. No reliable current statistics seem
available on the total number of private-sector consumer advocacy organiza-
tions in the United States. Public estimates suggest, however, that the total is
small, perhaps less than a hundred in all, and that many of these groups are
ephemeral, shoestring operations.
28 7
285. The agency sponsored a conference in Chicago for potential applicant groups. Sohn & Rubin
Interview, supra note 40. It also held a series of seminars in major cities. These seminars were designed
to reach small businesses which might be affected by the Standards and Certification rulemaking. In-
terview with Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Public Participation, FTC (June 15, 1979).
286. An active outreach program, however, can subject the agency to criticism, and can generate
procedural wrangles over the credibility of compensated participants, particularly when the rulemaking
staff or Presiding Officer plays an active role in informing groups about the compensation fund or in
encouraging them to apply for compensation. This problem was most apparent in the Food Advertis-
ing Proceeding. A controversy developed when it appeared that agency staff had written statements for
friendly witnessess who were not reimbursed under the compensation program. As the following collo-
quy between an industry lawyer and the Presiding Officer indicates, rule opponents tried to develop a
line of impeachment to show that staff had misused the compensation fund to recruit other friendly
witnesses:
[INDUSTRY LAWYER]: ... I understood you to say that it would not be possible for the
Staff to ask somebody to participate and then have that group obtain funds [from the compen-
sation program]....
jPRESIDING OFFICER]: I don't rule out the possibility ....
The point I am trying to make is .... I don't think the staff here has a fund they can dip
into for the purpose of presenting the witnesses that they might be affirmatively going out and
soliciting to testify, though I think it is possible. . . the Staff notifies certain groups that are
interested in it, and the only way they can afford to participate is getting compensation of
some sort, and the only fund they can get compensation from would be Magnuson-Moss.
[INDUSTRY LAWYER]: So the impetus could come from the Staff?
[PRESIDING OFFICER]: It could even come from me because in talking to various
groups about [whether] they may be interested in testifying, I have suggested myself, perhaps
the avenue they will have to follow is see if they can qualify for compensation under the fund.
I frequently do that myself in an effort to obtain consumer representation ....
Food Advertising Hearings Transcript 4726-27. Even if the primary responsibility for outreach efforts
is placed in a separate office, the staff and Presiding Officer assigned to a particular proceeding neces-
sarily will have frequent informal contacts with a wide range of potential participants. Opposing par-
ticipants consequently may believe, or for tactical reasons may charge, that these officials try to subvert
or misuse the compensation fund.
287. One author surveyed lobbyists of national public interest groups with offices in Washington,
D.C. J. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE (paper ed. 1977). From a total of 83 organizations inter-
viewed, which was estimated to be "an extremely high percentage-surely above 80 percent-of the
true number of public interest groups that existed at the time of the interviewing" in 1972-73, there
were only 13 consumer groups. Id at 14. Relying on secondary sources, other authors found that "[b]y
1973, there were more than 80 national, state, and local non-profit consumer organizations supplying
information to consumers and attempting to influence the formation of governmental and privately
sponsored consumer protection programs." Snow & Weisbrod, Consumerism, Consumers and Public
Interest Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 395-96 (Weis-
brod, Handler & Komesar eds., paper ed. 1978). The Council for Public Interest Law focused more
narrowly on public interest law centers, which they defined as "nonprofit, tax-exempt groups that
devote a large share of their programs to providing legal representation to otherwise unrepresented
1981]
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Unless the subject matter were of very high priority to the group, organiza-
tions that live hand-to-mouth existences and rely on small staffs and volunteer
labor probably could not afford to divert their limited personnel to a major
project like a TRR proceeding--even with compensation. Two of the "repeat
player" consumer groups interviewed reported that they would not participate
in future FTC proceedings, in part because the work on TRR's disrupted their
normal operations and jeopardized their fund-raising activities.288 If the
number of potential public interest group applicants truly is limited, then an
agency that administers a compensation program may be forced to choose be-
tween funding a small cluster of repeat applicants and letting the applicants'
interests remain unrepresented. Given that the Magnuson-Moss Act directed
the FTC to fund spokespersons for unrepresented interests, the latter choice
may not have been available to the agency.
2. Supporting Rule-Supporters
The second major criticism of the FTC's funding pattern was that the
agency too frequently granted funds to groups that favored rules proposed by
the staff. Thus, opponents charged that the Commission "doled out. . . tax-
payer dollars. . . to proponents of Commission rules" 289 and that "the FTC
distribute[d] 95 percent of its funds to regulation supporters. ' 290 Agency offi-
cials responded that "the great majority of aid recipients [had] opposed staff
proposals in one way or another."
29'
Once again, how one judged the compensation program seems to have de-
pended upon whether one emphasized the objectives of technical representa-
tion or participatory democracy. If the decision in trade regulation rulemaking
depended primarily on the desires and value preferences of the principal con-
stituency groups, then whether particular participants favored or opposed the
rule would be determinative of the decision. If, on the other hand, the pro-
ceeding was viewed primarily as a process of reasoned decisionmaking depen-
dent upon the collection and analysis of data and argument, then the
participants' attitudes toward the proposed rules would be much less signifi-
cant than the technical support they had for those views.
Under either view of the process, the FTC's critics clearly were overgeneral-
izing. In several instances, the initial agreement between the staff and the com-
interests in court or administrative agency proceedings involving questions of important public policy."
FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 7, app. C-I. The Council located a total of 92 groups,
only seven of which specialized in consumer protection matters. Id This study also found that:
"[c]onsumer and women's law centers tend to be the smallest in the universe of public interest law.
Together, the 12 groups in these two areas have received only three percent of all contributions made to
public interest law. . . and virtually all have annual incomes ofless than $300,000." Id at 95-96.
Berry discovered that most of the organizations he studied had been created within the five years
preceeding his survey. J. BERRY, supra, at 33-34.
288. Interview with Michael Heifer, Co-Director, Consumer Action of San Francisco (Nov. 2, 1979)
(day-to-day operations disrupted by participation in rulemaking); Interview with Robert Choate,
Chairman, Council on Children, Media and Merchandising (March 23, 1979).
289. See Authorizationsfor the FTC. Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
the Senate Comm; on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1979) (prepared
statement of Richard J. Leighton, Special Counsel, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.).




pensated consumer representatives vanished once the original staff attorneys
left either the rule or the agency upon completion of the hearings, and a new
set of staff attorneys was assigned to analyze the record.292 These new
rulemaking staffs were less committed to the original rules than their predeces-
sors had been, and they were also more sensitive to the antiregulatory climate
prevailing at the time. They recommended substantial reductions in the rules,
which ended the original overlap in position between staff and compensated
participants. By that point, it would have been virtually impossible for a new
group to enter and to master the record sufficiently to mount a convincing case
for the original rule. Moreover, compensated consumer groups occasionally
differed not only with FTC staff, but also with each other.293 In the course of
292. Thus was the case with the Funeral Practices and Hearing Aids Proceedings.
293. In the Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding, for example, several consumer organizations were
funded to serve as group representatives and to develop empirical evidence regarding the need for the
rule. The rule proposed to remove bans on the price advertising of eyeglasses that had been imposed by
state action or private associations. One compensated participant, the California Citizens Action
Group (CalCAG), conducted a consumer survey that suggested consumers lacked the information they
needed to make informed purchase decisions on eyeglasses, but that they could make reasoned deci-
sions when exposed to truthful advertising. See Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding, Transcript 3648-730
(testimony of Paul Fine); Exhibits HX 279, HX 228. In the survey, consumers were shown a sample
advertisement for eyeglasses priced under twenty dollars, and were asked their attitude toward the
product. A majority of respondents said they doubted the quality of the advertised glasses, or thought
they would need to buy a much more expensive pair if they went to the advertiser. The researchers
then provided the respondents with information about the eyeglass industry, including fabrication and
distribution costs and quality control practices. Following these disclosures, the interviewers asked the
respondents again whether they would be interested in the cheap eyeglasses; a higher proportion an-
swered affirmatively.
A second consumer group, San Francisco Consumer Action (SFCA), had studied price advertising in
a state that already permitted it, and had found very little price competition. The group concluded that
the rule was "likely to have little effect" and "may be worse than doing nothing" unless the agency
revised it to account for various social and economic pressures that inhibit advertising. This group
principally found that despite the absence of legal restraints in Arizona, there was virtually no price
advertising of eyeglasses, and no lessening of the dispersion of eyeglass prices as predicted by economic
theory. Id at 6301-03 (testimony of Delia Schletter). The organization suggested several reasons for
this lack of price competition. Norms of professional culture held that price advertising by optometrists
and opticians was distasteful, if not unethical. Id at 6303. Moreover, market research by sellers had
found, and this study confirmed, that price was not an important motivating factor in eyeglass
purchases or in consumer choice of other health-related goods and services. Id at 6305, 6308. At the
same time, style and fashion recently had become increasingly important to eyeglass wearers and this
factor was particularly significant for the most profitable segment of the market, wealthy consumers.
Id at 6305. As a result, sellers found little competitive advantage in price advertising. SFCA also
questioned whether price advertising, if it occurred, would be an unmixed blessing for the consumer. It
could lead to market dominance by large multistate corporations that would be less responsive to con-
sumer complaints and less susceptible to effective supervision by state regulatory agencies. Id at 6307.
A third funded group, the Consumer Affairs Committee of the Americans for Democratic Action,
made a stinging credibility attack on the San Francisco group's witness on cross-examination. See
generally id at 6339-509. Among other things, the ADA spokesman implied that SFCA had misrepre-
sented the facts in its compensation application and had violated the terms of its compensation award
by substantially modifying its study design without notice to the FTC. Id at 6354-56. The dispute
among these consumer spokespersons continued throughout most of the proceeding. During testimony,
the SFCA witness had criticized the CaICAG study. Id at 4101-09. CaICAG responded by charging
her with naivete, misrepresentation, incompetence, and sloppiness in conducting her own research. See
Rebuttal Comments of California Citizens Action Group 18-25, Ophthalmic Goods Record 17,273,
17,431 (Nov. 15, 1976). Under this barrage of criticism, SFCA moderated its stand. In its own rebuttal
submission, SFCA sought to emphasize areas in which it agreed with CaICAG, concluding that "[t]he
conflict between our policy conclusions. . . is, we feel, largely based upon the different evidence avail-
able to us, regarding the realistic limitations on possible price advertising . . . and regarding the
probabilities of accompanying adverse consumer consequences." Rebuttal Comment of San Francisco
Consumer Action 3, Ophthalmic Goods Record 17,428, 17,431 (Nov. 15, 1976). Later, SFCA and Cal-
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such disagreement a variety of potentially useful information was added to the
rulemaking record.
II. CONCLUSION: THE RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM
The most important question regarding the FTC's compensation program is
also the most difficult and subjective to answer: what was its impact on the
agency's decisionmaking process? One way to answer the question would be
to determine whether the presence of the compensated groups affected the final
rules in any way.294 This determination unfortunately is impossible, both be-
cause the FTC reached a final decision on only a few rules during the period
studied, and because no objective or reliable means exist to measure any single
participant's influence on the outcome of a broad policy rulemaking proceed-
ing.295 It would be fair to conclude, however, that the compensated partici-
pants generally performed as competently as their uncompensated
counterparts.
The FTC Commissioners were generally enthusiastic about the participation
of the compensated consumer groups. Both Chairmen who held office during
the period studied publicly stated that the compensation program had made
substantial contributions to the quality of FTC deliberations.296 In interviews,
Commissioners noted some of the benefits they saw from the public participa-
tion program: the program brought different perspectives to the Commis-
CAG joined in a post-record comment submitted by all the compensated consumer groups, which
supported the proposed rule and urged that it be strengthened. See generally Presiding Officer's Re-
port, Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding, at 60-62, 116, 124, 136, 142, 158, 159, 170-71; Staff Report,
Ophthalmic Goods Proceeding, at 127-34, 145-49, 180, 268. CaICAG's mention of the ineffectiveness
of state regulation also was discussed and relied upon. See generally Presiding Officer's Report at 18
n.34, 27-28, 85-86; Staff Report at 100, 210, 213, 283, 291.
294. It could be argued that the effectiveness of the program should not be assessed by measuring the
extent to which compensated groups "won," or convinced the agency to accept their position. Just as
the criminal defendant may have had effective representation by counsel even when he does not go free
at trial's end, so also a rulemaking participant may have effectively presented his views and received
careful consideration by the agency, even though the views ultimately are rejected. Similarly, the pub-
lic participation program might be valued because it enabled consumer groups to meet industry as
equals, or because it helped struggling citizen organizations to survive.
295. In some instances, it was even difficult to determine exactly what outcome the participating
groups preferred. The procedures did not require applicants to file detailed statements describing the
rule provisions they preferred, and occasionally the positions of the group representatives seemed to
change as the proceeding progressed. Also, groups may have assumed positions for tactical reasons.
For example, a consumer group might assert an extreme position, in the belief that the Commission
ultimately would cut the rule back to a level acceptable to the group. Nevertheless, even assuming the
participants' positions were clearly stated and sincerely held, if the final rule adopted the position a
compensated participant favored, there would be no way to determine whether the group's participa-
tion had caused this result. Other participants frequently had similar preferences, and the proceedings
were characterized by broadly framed legal theories, vague standards of proof, and voluminous
records. Thus, it was rarely possible to single out one piece of evidence or one participant's argument
that clearly made a difference.
296. See Public Partlicpation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.. 3361 and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiclary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1977) (statement of FTC Chairman Calvin Collier) ("Based upon our experi-
ence operating this program for a year and a half, my opinion is that its benefits to Commission pro-
ceedings are substantial"). This view also was expressed by Chairman Pertschuk. Authorizations/or the
FTC- Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Senate Subcomm. for Consumers of the Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk)
(participation of compensated groups "emphatically" improved FTC's decision making process). See
also Pertschuk, Listening to the Little Guy, Wash. Post, June 26, 1979, § A, at 19, col. 6.
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sion,297 it helped to focus major issues, 298 and it provided the Commissioners
with more confidence that they were deciding on the basis of a complete rec-
ord.299 None of the Commissioners interviewed was critical of the program or
of the contributions of the funded participants.
3°°
At the operational levels of the agency, opinions were more mixed.30 1 Staff
attorneys predictably thought that the most important contribution by the.
funded participants was to present new evidence. They felt that the consumer
groups' role in conducting cross-examination was less crucial, because they
believed that the FTC staff adequately performed that function.302 Presiding
Officers, on the other hand, seemed to emphasize primarily the consumer
group representatives' role in balancing the hearings and providing additional
perspectives. As one officer stated, the consumer representatives were not nec-
essarily better than the staff, just different. This difference was useful to the
Presiding Officers.303 Two of the Presiding Officers interviewed in this study
explicitly noted that the consumer group lawyers were generally on a par with
industry lawyers in ability and expertise-although they appeared to operate
on much more limited budgets.3°4 Some interview subjects noted additionally,
however, that the "public interest bar" seemed spread thin during the period of
intensive FTC rulemaking; these subjects found that preparation was some-
times spotty and inexperienced junior asssociates frequently substituted for
more expert senior partners in particular proceedings.30 5 Evaluations of par-
ticular witnesses or written submissions ranged from "terrific," '30
6 "excel-
lent, ' 30 7 and "one of the better consumer witnesses I have had the privilege to
hear ' 308 to "repetitive," 30 9 "absolutely not supported by data," 310 and "fairly
worthless" 31' at the other. Several staff members noted the problems of time
pressure, limited expertise, and underfunding faced by the consumer groups
when trying to conduct surveys or other empirical studies.
312
These characterizations are consistent with the impressions of the research
297. Interview with Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Commissioner, FTC (Nov. 2, 1978) (groups provide
diversified views).
298. Interview with Michael Pertschuk, Commissioner, FTC (Dec. 6, 1978) (groups raised issues on
which agency had not fully focused).
299. Interview with Calvin Collier, Chairman, FTC (Dec. 29, 1977) (more comfortable making judg-
ments with input from consumer groups).
300. The most skeptical of the Commissioners interviewed was Paul Rand Dixon. He felt that the
compensated participants had done an adequate job, but wished it were possible to encourage public
participation without government funding. Interview with Paul Rand Dixon, Commissioner, FTC
(Aug. 2, 1978). Time pressures prevented Commissioner Clanton from commenting at length on the
compensation program during his interview. Interview with David Clanton, Commissioner, FTC (June
2, 1978).
301. To preserve the confidentiality of interview subjects and internal agency documents in this sen-
sitive area, supporting data will be cited as "Staff Evaluation -. "
302. See Staff Evaluations 4 & 13.
303. See Staff Evaluations 1, 7, 11 & 12.
304. Staff Evaluations 7 & 11.
305. See Staff Evaluations 4 & 7.
306. Staff Evaluation 8.
307. Staff Evaluation 3.
308. Staff Evaluation 9.
309. Staff Evaluation 11.
310. Staff Evaluation 4.
311. Staff Evaluation 6.
312. Staff Evaluations 4 & 6.
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staff involved in this study. The variances in perceived quality of testimony
and advocacy among the compensated groups did not differ markedly from the
variances observed among the unfunded participants. Within the constraints
of a relatively small resource base, a rather cumbersome set of rulemaking
procedures, and an array of vague legal theories that made it difficult for any-
one to "win on the facts," the compensated consumer groups made a respecta-
ble showing.
If the FTC's compensation program succeeded in these respects, why was it
not similarly perceived by Congress and other observers? Part of the reason
may lie in the political atmosphere of 1979. The agency's activism had pro-
voked powerful opposition and most of its activities were regarded with suspi-
cion, if not hostility. The agency's aggressive use of its rulemaking powers
during the period studied also tended to make the compensation program less
necessary and its accomplishments less visible than they otherwise might have
been. If direct funding is intended to counterbalance the persuasive powers of
the regulated industry, it was hardly desirable to test the concept in an agency
like the FTC, where the chairman admitted publicly that staff attorneys had
conducted anti-business "vendettas" in rulemaking proceedings. 3
1 3 The FTC
of the 1970's, in many respects, was a particularly unfortunate time and place
to experiment with direct funding for public participation. Beyond the un-
happy circumstances in which the agency compensation program developed,
however, was the underlying dilemma involved in striking an acceptable trade
off between participants' technical competence and grassroots participation.
The FTC's experience suggests that in the absence of a broader political con-
sensus or a clearer legislative mandate, this is an extremely difficult balancing
act to perform.
313. See note 41 supra (quoting Chairman Pertschuk).
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Appendix A: Tabular Summary of Compensation
Requests and Authorizations
Introductory Notes: The following tables are arranged by rulemaking
proceedings, in the order in which proceedings reached the hearing stage
under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The sequence is as follows:
1. Vocational Schools - December 1, 1975
2. Prescription Drugs - December 1, 1975
3. Holder-in-Due-Course - April 5, 1976
4. Hearing Aids - April 12, 1976
5. Funeral Practices - April 19, 1976
6. Protein Supplements - May 10, 1976
7. Ophthalmic Goods - June 7, 1976
8. Food Advertising - July 12, 1976
9. Care Labeling - November 8, 1976
10. Used Cars - December 6, 1976
11. OTC Drugs - February 28, 1977
12. Credit Practices - September 12, 1977
13. Health Spas - September 15, 1977
14. Mobile Homes - October 11, 1977
15. Thermal Insulation (R-Value) - February 13, 1978
16. OTC Antacids - December 4, 1978
17. Children's Advertising - January 15, 1979
Within each rulemaking proceeding, the applicants are arranged in alpha-
betical order.
The tables reflect information available at the FTC as of January 31,
1979. The study has relied upon the figures used by the applicants and the
FTC (even though these groups occasionally made errors in their calcula-
tions). Group totals that may be artificially inflated because of resubmis-
sions are marked with an asterisk. Applications that were withdrawn or
amended before the FTC acted upon them are not listed unless the with-
drawn application was the only application filed by the group in that
proceeding.
The following shorthand references are used in the column captioned
"Proposed Activities":
Pre-Hearing Comments: Prepare and submit written com-
ments during the first public comment period, which commences
with the publication of Initial Notice and ends 45 days before
hearing.
Testimony: All activities associated with presenting witness
testimony at the public hearings, including conducting surveys or
studies, locating and compensating witnesses, preparing wit-
nesses, and the like.
Group Representative: Having a lawyer or other representative
designated by the Presiding Officer as an interest-group represen-
tative who is entitled to conduct examination and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses at the hearings.
Rebuttal: All activities connected with preparing and submit-
19811
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ting rebuttal evidence after the conclusion of the public hearings
(includes review of transcripts, procurement of expert and attor-
ney services, other miscellaneous expenses).
Post-Record Comments: All activities associated with prepar-
ing and submitting comments on the Presiding Officer's and
Staff's reports during the second public comment period.
Oral Presentation to the Commission: All activities associated
with participation in oral presentations to the full Commission
following the second public comment period.
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Appendix B
Frequency of Application and Authorization as
of January 31, 1979
Applicants Who Requested
Reimbursement Funds in










California Citizen Action Group 7
Consumer Action-San Francisco 5
Council on Children, Media
and Merchandising




Center for Public 3
Representation
Consumers Union of the U.S.













Used Cars (with CFAS)
OTC Drugs
Health Spas (in part with
CU/CaICAG)





Health Spas (with CU and,

















OTC Antacids (with ADA)








Health Spas (with CaICAG







Holder in Due Course
Credit Practices
35
Action on Application
Amount Authorized
Denied
$ 57,474.35
$ 30,202.33
$ 9,304.59
S 24,470.90
$ 47,780.00
$21,592.00
$ 26,888.41
Withdrawn
$ 38,285.00
$ 43,683.13
$ 47,991.00
Denied
$ 29,263.00
Denied
$ 15,507.00
$ 43,544.60
$ 19,521.52
$ 62,434.78
$ 25,249.00
$ 41,064.63
$ 58,392.00
$ 2,070.00
$ 46,734.13
$ 57,474.35
$ 21,592.00
$ 46,353.68
Denied
Denied
$ 33,146.00
$ 4,573.09
$ 19,024.00
Denied
$ 47,991.00
$ 73,916.00
$ 9,295.00
$ 57,292.67
$ 42,484.00
$ 2,474.25
$ 3,093.25
$132,256.24
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